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INTRODUCTION
"It looks like we'll be doing a lot of business in Texas," my brother
predicted. The Supreme Court of Texas had just held that forum non conven-
iens' had been abolished by a 1913 statute providing that a large class of
foreign and out-of-state personal injury claims "may be brought in the courts
of this state."2 If a defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in Texas, the
Texas courts are now without authority to dismiss the claim, regardless of its
lack of connection with the state.
My brother, a litigator at a Washington, D.C. law firm, was somewhat
ambivalent. On the one hand, after Alfaro his corporate clients doing business
in Texas would be subjected to Texas litigation for virtually any personal injury
claims arising in or outside of the United States 3 and Texas juries are not
t Associate Professor, Rutgers Law School-Camden. I would like to thank Jack Balkin, Lea Brilmayer,
Stephen Burbank, Roger Clark, Roger Dennis, Jay Feinman, David Frankford, Steve Friedell, Nina Gussack,
Peter Hay, Aviva Orenstein, Martin Redish, Patrick Ryan, Linda Silberman, and Robert Williams for their
helpful comments and suggestions. Research assistance was provided by D. Matthew Jameson, Joseph
O'Malley, Gregory Puff, Mary Stevens, and Jean Warrick. An earlier version of this paper was presented
to the AALS Conflict of Laws Workshop, held in Washington, D.C. in July 1988.
1. Forum non conveniens is the discretionary power of a court to dismiss when the court determines
that there is a more suitable alternative forum in another judicial system. See generally Piper Aircraft Co.
v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981); Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court Access
Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 781 (1985).
2. Dow Chemical Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1990), cert. denied, IIl S. Ct. 671
(1991). The statute, codified in TEx. ClV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.031 (Vernon 1986), provides
in relevant part:
(a) An action for damages for the death or personal injury of a citizen of this state, of the United
States, or of a foreign country may be enforced in the courts of this state, although the wrongful
act, neglect, or default causing the death or injury takes place in a foreign state or country, if:
(1) a law of the foreign state or country or of this state gives a right to maintain an action for
damages for the death or injury;
(2) the action is begun in this state within the time provided by the laws of this state for
beginning the action; and
(3) in the case of a citizen of a foreign country, the country has equal treaty rights with the
United States on behalf of its citizens....
The Texas high court held that the language "may be enforced" constituted a legislative abrogation of the
forum non conveniens doctrine.
3. One potentially important limitation on the impact of Alfaro is the meaning of the requirement that
the plaintiff's home country have "equal treaty rights with the United States on behalf of its citizens." TEX.
Ctv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.031(3) (Vernon 1986). There is no legislative history on the meaning
of that phrase. The United States does have treaties with numerous countries guaranteeing free access to
American courts, although most were entered into well after enactment of the Texas statute. See, e.g., Treaty
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known for their pro-defendant sympathies.4 On the other hand, the fajitas are
terrific.
However, the actual burden of Alfaro on out-of-state defendants will turn
on a question not addressed by the Texas court, but one that must be foremost
in the minds of the federal bar there: To what extent are the federal courts
sitting in Texas bound by the state statute abrogating forum non conveniens? s
If the courts follow the lead of virtually every relevant precedent, they will hold
that control of the federal docket is a matter of federal law, and that federal
courts are therefore free to issue forum non conveniens dismissals.6 The battle
ground will then shift to attempts to defeat removal.7 If, instead, the federal
of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, July 14, 1956, United States-Federal Republic of Germany, 7
U.S.T. 1839, T.I.A.S. No. 3593; Treaty of Friendship, Establishment, and Navigation, Feb. 21, 1981, United
States-Belgium, 14 U.S.T. 1284, T.I.A.S. No. 5432; Convention of Friendship, Commerce, and Extradition,
Nov. 25, 1850, United States-Switzerland, 11 Stat. 587, T.S. No. 353. See generally Note, Forum Non
Conveniens and Foreign Plaintiffs: Addressing the Unanswered Questions of Reyno, 6 FORDHAM INT'L L.J
577, 590-91 (1973). As Costa Rica, the Alfaro plaintiffs' home country, had such a treaty, the Texas court
did not need to construe the phrase.
This issue was raised in connection with a 1988 Texas state court proceeding brought on behalf of
victims of the Bhopal chemical disaster. Soni v. Union Carbide Corp., No. B0121, slip op. at 140 (Jefferson
County, Tex. Dist. Ct. Oct. 17, 1988). Unlike Costa Rica, India has no treaty with the United States
expressly guaranteeing access to courts. In Soni, the plaintiff asserted that since the common law tradition
was to entertain transient causes of action brought by foreigners, the equal treaty rights provision should
only permit forum non conveniens dismissals against citizens of common law countries where a treaty
expressly barred court access. See Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint
on Grounds of Forum Non Conveniens at 13-14, Soni v. Union Carbide Corp.,No. B0121 (Jefferson County,
Tex. Dist. Ct. Oct. 17, 1988). The court granted the defendant's forum non conveniens motion without
stating whether or not its decision was based on the equal treaty right provision or on an interpretation of
the open-courts statute at odds with Alfaro.
4. See, e.g., Pennzoil v. Texaco, 481 U.S. 1 (1987) (precluding federal injunction against enforcement
of $11.1 billion state court verdict). Justice Gonzales of the Texas Supreme Court cited in his Alfaro dissent
a report in the Houston Post of a Texas attorney who solicited lawsuits with the promise that victims of
a Scottish oil rig accident "had a good chance of trying their cases in Texas where awards would be much
higher than elsewhere." Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d at 690 & n.2 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting).
5. But see Hotvedt v. Schlumberger Ltd., 914 F.2d 79, 82 (5th Cir. 1990) (applying federal law in
reversing Southern District of Texas' forum non conveniens dismissal without considering whether Texas
law controls); Jeha v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 751 F. Supp. 122, 125 (S.D. Tex. 1990) (rejecting application
of Alfaro to Texas federal practice).
6. See, e.g., Nolan v. Boeing Co., 919 F.2d 1058, 1068 n.1l (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, II S. Ct.
1587 (1991); In Re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La. on July 9, 1982, 821 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1054 (1988), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Pan Am. World Airways,
Inc. v. Lopez, 109 S. Ct. 1928 (1989); Sibaja v. Dow Chem. Co., 757 F2d 1215 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 948 (1985); Jeha, 751 F. Supp. at 125; see also 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & F. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3828, at 293-94 (2d ed. 1986) ("Although the Supreme Court has
repeatedly found that it did not need to decide whether state notions of forum non conveniens were binding
on a federal court in a diversity action, it seems quite clear that they ought not to be and that these are
matters of the administration of the federal courts, not rules of decision, so that state rules cannot be
controlling."). But see Weiss v. Routh, 149 F.2d 193 (2d Cir. 1945) (district court should have dismissed
action pursuant to New York internal corporate affairs doctrine). The Supreme Court has expressly reserved
the Erie question each time it has addressed the operation of forum non conveniens in the federal system.
See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235,248 & n.13 (1981); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501,
509 (1947).
7. The ferocity of the battle over removal of claims filed in states without forum non conveniens is
demonstrated by Nolan, 919 F.2d 1058. The plaintiffs there filed in Louisiana state court notwithstanding
the lack of significant forum connections with any of the parties or the controversy, an air crash in England.
Louisiana is one of several states to have substantially limited the use of forum non conveniens. Plaintiffs
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courts are persuaded by this Article, my brother may well get his fill of Tex-
Mex cuisine.
No problem has confounded both procedure scholars and courts more than
the issue of how access to the federal courts ought to be affected by state court-
access practice. Eight Supreme Court decisions have grappled with different
aspects of the problem,' and reference to the issue appears to be obligatory in
any Erie9 scholarship.
By "court access," I refer to the doctrines that affect only the venue of
litigation. The issue is whether to entertain the case in a particular court, and
the decision is, at least formally, without prejudice to litigation of the claim
elsewhere.10 Thus "court access" implicates aspects of personal jurisdiction,
capacity, statutory venue, forum non conveniens, transfer, and some types of
statute of limitations rulings." Problems in choosing between state and federal
appointed nondiverse administrators for the sole purpose of preventing removal, which would have
guaranteed trial in Louisiana. Defendants ingeniously countered by impleading a third-party corporation
owned by the French government. The French defendant was then permitted to remove the entire case
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1988), a special removal provision available only to sovereign defendants.
The federal court proceeded to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds, holding that state forum non
conveniens law was inapplicable to federal practice. 919 F.2d at 1061-68.
8. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988); Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198
(1956); Chicago R.I. & P.R. v. Stude, 346 U.S. 574 (1954); Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535
(1949); Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947); Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438
(1946); David Lupton's Sons Co. v. Automobile Club, 225 U.S. 489 (1912); Railway Co. v. Whitton's
Adm'r, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 270 (1872); see also Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958)
(allocation of authority between judge and jury); First Nat'l Bank v. United Air Lines, Inc., 342 U.S. 396,
399 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (federal courts should not be required to follow state law mandating
dismissal of certain wrongful death actions arising out of state).
9. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Unless otherwise stated, reference to "Erie" or the "Erie
doctrine" herein refers generically to the problem of choosing between federal or state law in the federal
courts. As discussed below, that law encompasses numerous post-Erie cases as well as several statutory
texts, notably the Rules of Decision Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988); see infra notes 27-60 and accompanying
text.
10. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b) (treating dismissals for lack of jurisdiction, improper service, and venue
as judgments not "on the merits"); see also Parsons v. Chesapeake & O.R.R., 375 U.S. 71 (1963) (state
court forum non conveniens dismissal does not require transfer from district court sitting in state); Mizokami
Bros. v. Mobay Chem. Corp., 660 F.2d 712 (8th Cir. 1981) (District of Arizona forum non conveniens
dismissal of identical case does not preclude assertion of jurisdiction by Western District of Missouri);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 110 (1969) (judgments not on the merits recognized only
as to issues actually decided).
11. The effect of a statute of limitations dismissal on maintenance of the claim elsewhere is not entirely
clear. The general rule seems to be that dismissal will bar relitigation "in the same judicial system" but not
in "a different system of courts," unless the second forum would apply the same statute of limitations
applied in the first proceeding. See 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 6, § 4441, at 366;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 19(f) (1982); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws
§ 110 comment b (1969).
The application of that rule in diversity is awkward, particularly when both proceedings are federal.
See C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 6, § 4472. In one sense the claims have been brought
"in the same judicial system," the predicate for preclusion. However, a federal dismissal on the merits of
claims cognizable in state court would appear inconsistent with the basic obligation to apply state substantive
law. Nonetheless, most courts seem to hold that the res judicata effect of a federal dismissal in federal court
is a matter of federal law, and do not allow relitigation of claims dismissed on statute of limitations grounds.
See, e.g., Steve D. Thompson Trucking, Inc. v. Dorsey Trailers, Inc., 870 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1989); PRC
Harris, Inc. v. Boeing Co., 545 F. Supp. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 700 F.2d 894 (2d
Cir. 1983). But see Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 435 F.2d 527 (4th Cir. 1970) (while holding that tolling
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court-access law arise when application of federal law is not expressly autho-
rized by statute.
I contend here that courts have misperceived the Erie implications of court-
access problems. Virtually no federal court has considered itself bound by state
doctrines providing greater court access than would be granted by federal law,
and federal respect for restrictive state court-access provisions is erratic. This
is, I suggest, a consequence of both judicial misunderstanding of the nature of
the obligation to apply state law and of the function of court-access doctrines.
Court-access issues are a class of problems distinct both from "substantive"
rulings "on the merits," such as res judicata or failure to state a claim, and from
technical, "procedural" rulings without prejudice to refiling in the same court,
such as pleading or service deficiencies. 12 Changes in venue may affect choice
of law, the identity and relative sympathy of the court, and the relative burden
and expense of the litigation. Court-access decisions thus can have enormous
impact on the litigants even though they may not necessarily affect the underly-
ing claim.
This hybrid nature of the rulings helps to explain why federal courts have
had such a hard time resolving court-access questions. Existing Erie doctrine
-the set of legal principles that has evolved to resolve the choice between
applying state or federal law in federal court-is dominated by considerations
of litigant equality. The rough focus of the inquiry is whether a federal court's
deviation from state law would bestow significant "substantive" advantages on
a litigant as compared to how that litigant would fare in the state courts. 3 If
so, federal nonconformity with state practice is said to create unacceptable
inequities. 4
Thus, the court-access problem is in part a problem of evaluating the
potential impact of the court-access ruling on the underlying claim. In the
Court's parlance, is venue-the location and identity of the judicial authori-
ty-sufficiently "outcome determinative" to fall within the prohibited category
issue was matter of federal law, court allowed plaintiff to maintain second diversity proceeding following
dismissal of earlier diversity proceeding filed in different district), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 932 (1971). See
generally Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and Federal Common Law: A
General Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 733 (1986). The issue is further complicated by FED. R. Clv. P.
41(b), which implicitly provides that statute of limitations dismissals are "on the merits."
12. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 19 (1982) (description of dispositions
"on the merits" warranting res judicata and exceptions thereto); see also FED. R. Ctv. P. 41(b).
13. As numerous scholars have noted, there are two distinct aspects to the equality problem: equality
between plaintiff and defendant, who may have disparate rights to choose the federal forum, and equality
between similarly situated litigants in the state and federal courts. See Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie,
87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 713 (1974); Redish & Phillips, Erie and the Rules of Decision Act: In Search of
the Appropriate Dilemma, 91 HARV. L. REV. 356, 374 (1977).
14. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965) (sole test of obligation to apply state law is whether federal
rule would make important difference to character or result of litigation so as to constitute discrimination
against citizens of forum or induce forum shopping).
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of "substantive" federal common law? 1 The common-sense answer would
seem to be, who knows?. Case law reflects this indeterminacy. Indeed, in a
single case, the Supreme Court suggested that the outcome-determinative impact
of the identity of trier of fact militates in favor of federal conformity while at
the same time questioning whether there was even "a strong possibility" that
outcome would be affected. 16
But there is an additional dimension to court-access problems that seems
to send the doctrine into a recursive loop. That dimension is that the underlying
federal jurisdiction is itself a court-access doctrine. If invocation of federal
jurisdiction means anything, it is that the litigants will not have access to state
courts, and will have access to the federal courts. Therefore, the requirement
that federal litigants have access "equal" to that afforded state litigants is
nonsensical. The federal courts can mimic state courts in many ways, but the
one thing they cannot do is provide or deny access to the same tribunal. The
presence of federal jurisdiction divests the state of control over access to its
courts. There is no way to provide absolute parity.' 7
This dilemma is replicated in the courts' inability to discern the outcome-
determinative impact of court-access decisions. If diverting the case to a dif-
ferent forum affects outcome, and affecting outcome is wrong, then there is no
way that the federal court can do the right thing since whether or not the court
diverts the case to another forum, it has already diverted it from the state
forum. The court must thus choose between concluding that choice of forum
is never outcome determinative, in which case the raison d'etre of federal
jurisdiction is called into question, 8 and finding that choice of forum is out-
15. Id. at 468. The restrictions on the development of federal common law in Erie, as well as its
progeny, all focus on the relatively narrow issue of whether federal common law may be developed as an
incidence of federal jurisdiction alone. In that context, the more that ajudicial decision affects substantive
rights and does not merely regulate judicial procedure, the more suspect it becomes. However, Erie did not
purport to limit the development of federal common law based on a federal substantive interest outside of
Article M. While the limits on that "substantive" common law are not without controversy, most scholars
concede far greater power for federal courts to develop true substantive common law than common law
justified solely by the existence of federal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of
Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881 (1986); Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 NW. U.L. REV.
805 (1989). But see Burbank, supra note 11, at 755-62; Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy,
and the Interpretive Process: An "Institutionalist" Perspective, 83 Nw. U.L. REV. 761 (1989) (both arguing
for application of Rules of Decision Act to substantive common law).
16. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958) ("were 'outcome' the only
consideration, a strong case might appear for saying that the federal court should follow state practice [of
trying certain issues before ajudge rather than jury]"); id. at 539 (no reason to suppose that nonconformity
with state practice affects outcome with certainty or "even a strong possibility").
17. There are, of course, two dimensions to the diversion of litigation: geographic and sovereign.
Federal adjudication, per se, diverts the litigation from the control of the state sovereign, but can maintain,
to a large extent, geographic conformity with state practice (the principal exception being where the federal
district court is not located in close proximity to the state trial court). Accordingly, any attempt by the
federal courts to provide parity with state court-access policy necessarily forecloses conformity with the
sovereign dimension of the state rule. True parity is attainable only if the state access rule is designed to
ensure a particular geographic venue without regard to the sovereign dimension.
18. Presumably, the primary purpose of federal jurisdiction is to "affect outcome" in some sense. If
state courts were thought to reach the same result as federal courts, there would be little reason to have
1991] 1939
The Yale Law Journal
come determinative, thereby rendering any parity between state and federal
court illusory.
This dilemma leads to two additional problems. The first is definitional.
Assuming the importance of treating state and federal litigants equally, how is
that objective best realized given the impossibility of absolute equality? If a
state court would not entertain jurisdiction and sends the case to a different
forum, are federal litigants, already in a different forum, treated "equally" by
being diverted to yet another forum? Is it "equal" to transfer the case to a
different district in the same federal judicial system when the parallel state
court-access practice subjects litigants to a different state's judicial authority?19
The second problem concerns the propriety of attempting to maintain access
equality altogether. Does conformity with state access requirements so under-
mine the essence of federal jurisdiction as to justify abandonment of the
equality ideal?2' A state practice that closes the federal door seems to frustrate
the underlying jurisdictional mandate. But here too is a paradox: nonconformity
with state court-access policy also undermines the federal jurisdictional purpose.
Federal nonconformity destroys concurrent state and federal jurisdiction. If
federal courts deviate from state court-access policy, there will be only one
forum in that state, either state or federal, where the action may be maintained.
In that case, the purpose of federal jurisdiction in diversity, maintenance of an
unbiased alternative forum,21 drops out.
It is my suggestion in this Article that the dilemmas generated by court-
access issues are not an inherent consequence of the problem, but of the solu-
tion. These dilemmas are, I suggest, largely attributable to two fundamental
mistakes that have traditionally been made in thinking about Erie problems. The
federal courts. See Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw. U.L REV. 427, 451-55 (1958)
(criticizing outcome-determination test as inconsistent with purpose of unbiased alternative forum).
19. Cf. In re Air Crash Disaster at Boston, Mass., 399 F. Supp. 1106 (D. Mass 1975). In applying New
York law to claims transferred to Massachusetts, notwithstanding the fact that New York state courts would
have dismissed the case on forum non conveniens grounds, the court noted: "Uniformity of result between
the state and Federal courts in the transferor jurisdiction is precluded whenever a federal court transfers an
action which the state court would have dismissed." Id. at 1121,
20. See, e.g., David Lupton's Sons Co. v. Automobile Club, 225 U.S. 489 (1912) (holding that state
rule of business qualification could not divest federal court of jurisdiction); cf. Meador, State Law and the
Federal Judicial Power, 49 VA. L. REV. 1082, 1103 (1963) (state door-closing statutes should not affect
federal jurisdiction); Note, The Interaction of the Common Law Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens and
28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a), 17 CREiGtTON L. R-V. 1407, 1429-30 (1983-84) ("When a federal court refuses
to exercise jurisdiction, thereby forcing a plaintiff to sue in a state or foreign court, the legislative purpose
for federal diversity jurisdiction is undermined.").
21. See Ziady v. Curley, 396 F.2d 873, 875 (4th Cir. 1968) ("One of the principal purposes of diversity
jurisdiction was to give a citizen of one state access to an unbiased court to protect him from parochialism
if he was forced into litigation in another state in which he was a stranger and of which his opponent was
a citizen."). In cases in which the state courts would deny access, there would appear to be little justification
for a federal diversity adjudication if the only purpose of diversity jurisdiction is to avoid subjecting the
litigants to a potentially biased state forum. Conversely, where the state courts provide access, a federal
denial of access can relegate the litigants to the state courts. In such cases, a plaintiff wanting to litigate
in that state will file in state court to avoid a dismissal or transfer in federal court. In that event, in-state
defendants will lack the power to remove. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1988) (civil actions not based on federal
question jurisdiction removable only if no defendant is citizen of the forum state).
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first is a mistaken belief that litigant equality is a meaningful value that should
be advanced by creating state and federal parity. Whatever deference is appro-
priately paid by the federal courts to the states pursuant to the Erie doctrine
arises from the demands of federalism.' Equality is a side effect, and not a
terribly meaningful one at that. Abandonment of equality as the driving force
behind Erie problems jettisons outcome determination, one of the major sources
of the doctrinal incoherence.
Second, the appropriate allocation of authority in a federal union cannot be
made by reference to the substance-procedure distinction.' To the extent that
respect for state autonomy is important to preserve through federal judicial
conformity with state law, that autonomy is just as easily undermined by inde-
pendent federal procedure as it is by independent federal substantive law. The
appropriate inquiry, I suggest, is not how state law is categorized, but whether
the policies driving the state law are undermined by federal nonconformity. To
the extent that we deem it appropriate for federal courts to respect regulatory
preferences in the context of "substantive" rules, it would seem incumbent on
a federal court to consider whether a given state access rule implicates a
comparable value that will be frustrated by federal departure from that rule. The
federalism principle underlying the Erie doctrine ought to engender as much
respect for state preferences about the private, social, and political costs of
litigation as it does for state preferences about the private, social, and political
costs of substantive liability.
This is not to say that all court-access rules equally implicate state preroga-
tives protected by Erie, or that there cannot be a paramount federal interest in
regulating court access in specific cases. However, a more sophisticated analysis
than has been employed to date is necessary to distinguish between the different
varieties of court-access problems, and to recognize the consequences of those
problems for the federal system.
If Erie problems are reconceptualized as problems of federalism rather than
as problems of equality, court-access issues are quickly demystified. While the
resolution of these issues remains a complex matter, they no longer appear
insoluble.
I. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The task of reconstructing Erie doctrine to resolve court-access problems
has been greatly aided by the insights of three articles, authored respectively
by Professor John Ely, who demonstrated that the Erie doctrine is in fact three
22. As discussed below, by "federalism" I mean federal respect for the sovereign prerogatives of the
state governments and the avoidance of undue federal usurpation of those prerogatives.
23. See infra notes 27-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of the role of substance-procedure
categorization in current Erie doctrine.
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separate doctrines;' Westen and Lehman, who, in contrast, demonstrated that
most Erie problems are fundamentally similar questions about congressional
intent;' and Redish and Phillips, who demonstrated the failure of prior ap-
proaches to recognize the centrality of federalism to the Rules of Decision
Act.' Despite the fact that all of these scholars disagree with one another in
some fundamental ways, a coherent integration of their insights is nevertheless
possible and provides an essential starting point for a proper resolution of any
Erie question.
A. Critique of the Substance-Procedure Dichotomy in Current Erie Doctrine
As Professor Ely persuasively demonstrated, the Erie doctrine is a product
of three separate doctrines, and some form of the substance-procedure dichoto-
my is central to each.27 First, there is some constitutional obligation to apply
24. Ely, supra note 13.
25. Westen & Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 311
(1980).
26. Redish & Phillips, supra note 13.
27. Ely, supra note 13; see also Carrington, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Rules Enabling Act,
1989 DUKE L. 601, 608 (describing variable meaning of "substance" and "procedure" in contexts of the
Constitution, Rules of Decision Act, and Rules Enabling Act).
The use of the substance-procedure dichotomy to distinguish between "foreign" substantive law that
should be followed and the forum's "procedural" law, which always controls, has its origin in conflicts of
laws methodology. Gelfand & Abrams, Putting Erie on the Right Track, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 937, 962
(1988); Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution (pt. 2), 53 Nw. U.L. REV. 541, 574-79 (1958). See
generally Risinger, "Substance" and "Procedure" Revisited, 30 UCLA L. REV. 189 (1982). It may be that
my critique of the dichotomy in the Erie context has some relevance to the interstate use of the doctrine.
However, even if the dichotomy has some validity as a conflicts device, its use in the Erie context is
distinguishable.
Ideally, when one state applies the law of another state, it would apply not only the "substantive law"
but the procedural law as well, since procedural laws may advance the foreign sovereign's policy interests
as directly as its substantive law. However, procedural conformity in the interstate context is impractical
since it calls upon the forum to reconstitute itself as whatever foreign tribunal provides the substantive law.
The forum may not only lack the expertise and resources to mimic the particular practice in question, but
such conformity would be highly disruptive of the court's adopted practice. In Professor Hill's terms, the
substance-procedure dichotomy in interstate conflicts represents an imperfect balance between respect for
the other sovereign and disruption of the forum's own practice. See generally Hill, supra.
That balance may come out differently in the Erie context. Obviously, federal conformity to the forum-
state practice presents far fewer practical difficulties since federal trial courts develop an intimate expertise
with the forum's law in general. See Gelfand & Abrams, supra, at 963. Moreover, interstate procedural
conformity would arguably undermine the forum's jurisdictional claim over the case in a way not relevant
to the Erie context. When a state has accepted jurisdiction over a foreign claim, it asserts its sovereign
interest in resolving the controversy, notwithstanding its application of foreign law. See Stein, Styles of
Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REV. 689, 745-47
(1987). The territorial contacts with the forum that predicate the assertion of jurisdiction give the forum
the authority to resolve the controversy in its courts, with its judicial authority and practice. id. Its assertion
of jurisdiction, to some extent, purposefully excludes the foreign sovereign's control over the litigation. To
the extent that foreign prerogatives are respected it is only because of "comity." Even when foreign law
is applied, the forum state is still vindicating a regulatory interest in the underlying claim. Indeed, when
that regulatory interest is completely absent, the forum's constitutional authority to adjudicate may be in
question. See infra note 182.
The federal sovereign's claim to the adjudication of the lawsuit versus the state's is different. It is in
no sense a territorial hegemony. Its purpose in accepting jurisdiction is to exclude state control in a much
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state law in the absence of federal power under the Constitution.8s When
applied in this context, the substance-procedure dichotomy defines the kinds
of residual authority under Article I and the necessary and proper clause to
make procedural law incident to the establishment of the federal courts.29
There are, in addition, two statutory restrictions on the power of the federal
courts to make federal law. The Rules of Decision Act directs the federal
courts, unless otherwise authorized, to defer to state law "in cases where it
applies. '30 In this context the substance-procedure dichotomy has been used
as a shorthand for respecting the regulatory prerogatives of the states and for
avoiding inequitable treatment of litigants.31 Finally, the Rules Enabling Act
restricts the authority of the Supreme Court to promulgate Rules of Civil
Procedure that "abridge, enlarge, or modify" substantive rights. 32 The sub-
stance-procedure dichotomy in this context defines the scope of the Court's
rulemaking authority.33
The level of deference to state law demanded by Erie will vary according
to the source of the conflicting federal law. While there is some disagree-
ment'34 it appears that where a federal law is authorized either by statute or
constitutional authority other than Article III, little or no deference to state law
more limited sense, and its duty to apply state law is not optional. The federal "sovereign" interest, at least
in diversity, is satisfied by eliminating potential local bias. It has no other regulatory interest as federal
sovereign in the underlying claim. Consistent with that limited interest, the federal courts are under a
legislative mandate in the Rules of Decision Act to minimize their disruption of state regulatory prerogatives.
28. Most commentators agree that this limitation is a fairly weak one in an era of expansive federal
authority. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 13, at 696; Field, supra note 15, at 952. Others have asserted that there
is a core or enclave of state authority protected by the Constitution. See, e.g., Gelfand & Abrams, supra
note 27.
29. There are, of course, many other sources of federal lawmaking authority in the Constitution. It is
in the absence of those other sources of authority that a federal court must rely on its residual power to make
law defining the form of the judicial authority contemplated by Article Il. It is only when federal law, either
statutory or common, is based solely on Article II that choice of federal or state law problems arise. Cf.
Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of Arbitration Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1305,
1320-22 (1985) (questioning authority of Congress to promulgate Federal Arbitration Act solely as exercise
of Article III power). When federal law is based on some other constitutional authority, the supremacy clause
obviates any differences between state and federal law by preempting inconsistent state law, even in state
courts. Field, supra note 15, at 956; Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law,
39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 404 (1964).
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988).
31. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 39 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467-68 (1965). See generally infra notes 52-68 and accompanying text.
32. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1988). The Rules Enabling Act also implicitly uses the substance and
procedure categories in two other contexts: only rules of "practice and procedure" are authorized by the
first sentence of the Act, and the "supercession" provision of the Act makes "such rules" preemptive of
any conflicting law. Id.
33. The policies advanced by the dichotomy here are less clear. While the limitation has been tradition-
ally assumed to advance the same kind of federalism concerns driving the Rules of Decision Act, recent
scholarship suggests that the limitation in the Rules Enabling Act represents a separation of powers concern.
Congress did not want the court assuming "legislative" authority under the guise of its rulemaking power,
and expressed this concern by limiting the Court's "substantive" rulemaking authority. See Burbank, The
Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982); Carrington, supra note 27, at 607 (Rules of
Civil Procedure that create "rights bearing on behavior external to the court" would undermine separation
of powers principle that courts should make law only in context of deciding cases and controversies).
34. See, e.g., Gelfand & Abrams, supra note 27.
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is required. After some vacillation, the Supreme Court now seems persuaded
that there are few or no "enclaves" of state regulatory prerogative immune from
federal regulation.35 Congress can create or authorize judicial creation of
substantive or procedural law displacing contrary state law provided that the
law is within the scope of the legislative powers enumerated in the federal
Constitution, and it does not conflict with any other constitutional restriction.
Most court-access provisions would seem to fall easily within congressional
power to create federal courts and regulate their jurisdiction pursuant to Article
III and the necessary and proper clause 6.3  Accordingly, where there has been
congressional authorization, implicit or explicit, for the federal court-access
practice, it is probably constitutional.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that displace other substantive laws, state
or federal, are more problematic given the restriction of the Rules Enabling
Act. 37 While recent scholarship, particularly Professor Stephen Burbank's, 38
has urged greater scrutiny of the Rules, the courts appear satisfied with any
Rule of Civil Procedure that is "arguably procedural" even if it affects a sub-
stantive right.39 Any possible frustration of congressional intent behind the
Enabling Act restriction is mitigated by implicit congressional ratification of
all new Rules, which do not take effect until at least seven months after being
sent to Congress.n°
35. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), overruling National League
of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
36. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 32 (1988). ("The constitutional authority of
Congress to enact section 1404(a) is not subject to serious question.").
37. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1988) provides in relevant part: "Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or
modify any substantive right."
38. Burbank, supra note 33.
39. See, e.g., Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447 (1990) (upholding validity of FED.
R. CIV. P. I1 award of attorney fees); Burlington N.R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5 (1987) (upholding FED.
R. APP. P. 38, authorizing award of costs in frivolous appeals); Schlagenhaufv. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1960)
(upholding FED. R. CIV. P. 35(a), authorizing physical and mental examinations); Ringrose v. Engelberg
Huller Co., 692 F.2d 403, 406-08 (6th Cir. 1982) (sustaining relation-back provision of FED. R. Civ. P.
15(c)); cf. Carrington, supra 27, at 628 (asserting extensive authority under the Rules Enabling Act to affect
arguably substantive rights as long as consistent with law-reform objectives of the Act).
40. See Burlington N.R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. at 6:
The study and approval given each proposed Rule by the Advisory Committee, the Judicial
Conference, and this Court, and the statutory requirement that the Rule be reported to Congress
for a period of review before taking effect.., give the Rules presumptive validity under both
the constitutional and statutory constraints.
See also 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (1988), which provides in relevant part:
(a) The Supreme Court shall transmit to the Congress not later than May I of the year in which
a rule prescribed under section 2072 is to become effective a copy of the proposed rule. Such
rule shall take effect no earlier than December 1 of the year in which such rule is so transmitted
unless otherwise provided by law.
A 1985 amendment to the statute, H.R. 3550, replaced the prior 90-day "layover" period with a new
seven-month provision specifically to ensure that Congress would have adequate opportunity to intervene
and to bring the "layover" period for Rules of Civil Procedure into conformity with other rules. H.R. REP.
No. 99-422, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 26-27 (1985).
1944
1991] Court Access 1945
Court access is not, by and large, affected by the Rules. To the extent that
the Rules affect access to federal courts, they principally control issues of
how4 or when42 a litigant may assert a claim, or who the proper person is
to bring the claim. 3 The Rules do not have much impact on where a claim
may be brought. 4 The principal exception is Rule 4(f), which limits the reach
of a federal court's process to the territorial limits of the state, or beyond the
state only as provided by state or other federal law.45 The validity of that limit
has been upheld on the rather specious ground that the Rule only affects the
manner of service, not the jurisdiction of the court. In fact, the Rule seems
to be the principal obstacle to expansion of federal personal jurisdiction beyond
state assertions of jurisdiction.47
The most problematic conflicts between federal and state court-access
provisions arise in the context of federal common law access doctrines, which
are subject to the mandate in the Rules of Decision Act to apply state law
unless otherwise authorized. By "common law," I refer not only to doctrines
such as forum non conveniens that are made out of whole judicial cloth 48 but
any judicial decision resulting in a conflict with state law where the disregard
of the state provision is not clearly authorized by federal statute.49 In this
sense, application of numerous statutory court-access rules, such as those
governing transfer or venue are, at least in part, subject to the Rules of Decision
41. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(a).
42. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)
43. FED. R. CIV. P. 17(b).
44. There are no express jurisdictional provisions in the Rules. Rule 4(e), which governs service of
process, provides that the court should follow state procedures for out-of-state process. Both the venue and
transfer provisions are statutory, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391, 1404, 1406 (1988), and are not addressed by the Rules,
except in reference to how any such objections should be raised. Accordingly, the primary conflict between
the Federal Rules and state practice is in regard to how one invokes the judicial process, not whether that
process is available.
45. But see proposed amendments to FED. R. CIv. P. 4(k)(2), which would create nationwide personal
jurisdiction for federal question cases in which the defendant is not subject to general jurisdiction in any
state; PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 4(k)(2), transmitted by the
Judicial Conference of the United States to the Supreme Court of the United States on Nov. 19, 1990,
reprinted in WEST'S FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (1991-92 Educational ed.), at 23 [hereinafter
PROPOSED AMENDMENT]. See generally Note, Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction in All Federal Question
Cases: ANewRule4, 64 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1117 (1989) (discussing implications of earlier draft of amendment
providing nationwide service of process in all federal question cases). The only provisions of the current
Rule 4 that provide a potentially greater jurisdictional reach than that available in state court are for service
on an impleaded or necessary party, on whom service may be made within 100 miles of the federal court
regardless of the party's amenability to state jurisdiction. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f).
46. Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1946).
47. See Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolph Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97 (1987) (foreclosing service of process
on defendant in Commodity Exchange Act action where Act did not so provide and defendant was beyond
reach of state process).
48. See generally Stein, supra note 1, at 795-822 (tracing modem development of forum non conven-
iens doctrine).
49. See, e.g., Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980) (Rule 3 provision that action
commences upon filing of complaint does not control issue of whether action filed within statute of
limitations period). But see Westen & Lehman, supra note 25 (arguing that all common law adjudication
is in some sense implicitly authorized by legislature since legislature always has option of legislatively
overruling adjudication).
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Act's directive.5" Indeed, I will attempt to show that questions about congres-
sional intent to incorporate or displace state law in federal statutes are of the
same genre of question faced in testing the validity of a wholly common law
doctrine and are susceptible to the same analytical resolution.5' In both cases,
I suggest that the appropriate inquiry is discerning congressional intent. In the
absence of more specific guidance, that intent should be presumed to favor
results that minimize friction between the state and federal governments, unless
the vindication of some important federal interest requires otherwise.
B. Current Doctrine's Resolution of Common Law Rules
The standards governing conflicts between federal common law and state
law were set out in dicta in Hanna v. Plumer.52 While Hanna has been ap-
plauded for bringing some coherence to the Erie doctrine, 53 it has in fact
obscured as many issues as it has clarified. Its effect on court-access issues has
been particularly debilitating.
Hanna assumed that litigant equality was Erie's central objective.' The
50. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1392 (1988) (referring to but providing no definition of civil actions of "a
local nature"). Both courts and commentators have tended to view the problem of whether state law should
be used to fill a "gap" in a federal statutory scheme as a fundamentally different question from whether
federal "common law" may be created. See DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 160-61
n.13 (1983) (Rules of Decision Act does not require application of state statute of limitations to federal
statutory cause of action); Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in the
Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797, 802-04 (1957). Application of
state law to fill in the "interstices" of federal statutes is said to be a form of "incorporation" whereby
Congress implicitly chose to define federal law by reference to state law, but could have just as easily
created different federal law on the issue. Id. at 799-800. On the other hand, state law is said to "apply of
its own force" in the absence of a federal statutory scheme. Id.
As persuasively demonstrated by Westen & Lehman, however, this is a false dichotomy. See Westen
& Lehman, supra note 25. To the extent that Congress could constitutionally displace much of state law,
its failure to do so represents a choice comparable to incorporation of state law in federal statutory schemes.
Id. at 316, 357. Accord Burbank, supra note 11, at 762; Field, supra note 15. The Rules of Decision Act,
in this sense, represents a congressional directive to the federal courts not to displace state law unless
otherwise directed, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress. That directive has as much application to filling
in gaps in statutes or rules as it does to creating freestanding common law. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 172-74
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Burbank, supra note 11, at759-60; Burbank, OfRules and Discretion: The Supreme
Court, FederalRules and Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693,703-04 (1988). The only difference
is that in a statutory context, the courts may have more data from which to discern a specific congressional
preference. See DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 174-75 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
51. See Westen & Lehman, supra note 25, at 333-36; Burbank, supra note 11, at 755-62; Field, supra
note 15, at 893-94. But see Redish, supra note 15, at 792-99 (arguing that there is fundamental distinction
between process of interpretation in statutory construction and creation in common law adjudication).
52. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). The state rule on service of prccess was, in fact, found to be in direct conflict
with FED. R. Civ. P. 4, which the Court found to be controlling. The Court, however, stated that the case
would have come out the same way even if a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure had not authorized the mode
of service. 380 U.S. at 467-69; see M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF
JUDICIAL POWER 220 n.71 (2d ed. 1990) (describing Hanna discussion of Rules of Decision Act as dictum).
53. See Ely, supra note 13, at 699.
54. M. REDISH, supra note 52, at 225:
Hanna represented a significant shift in approach for deciding Rules of Decision Act cases-one
away from the system-oriented analysis employed in Byrd toward a return to a litigant-oriented
view of Erie and the statute. The goal of Erie, implied the Hanna Court, was not to maintain a
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mere fact of diversity of citizenship should not result in a different allocation
of rights between the parties than would exist in the absence of federal jurisdic-
tion. This objective was reflected in the "twin aims" of Erie: avoidance of
forum shopping and the "inequitable administration of the law."55 As several
commentators have noted, when so viewed, the "twin aims" collapse into a
single concern for equality: forum shopping results from and contributes to
different treatment of litigants on the basis of their citizenship."
Hanna attempted to address this concern for litigant equality by modifying
the "outcome-determinative" test first articulated in Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York.57 According to that test, while some differences between state and feder-
al practice are acceptable, it is inequitable for the outcome of the lawsuit to be
affected by federal jurisdiction. The Hanna Court's problem with the York test
was that it was overinclusive. Hanna noted that all differences between state
and federal practice can affect outcome if the litigants fail to conform to the
prescribed federal practice58 If federal law requires the use of blue paper in
motions, and state law permits white, application of federal law to the user of
white paper will be "outcome determinative." However, outcome differences
resulting from the conscious disregard of federal practice are not inequitable
since the disobedient party had the opportunity to comply with the federal rule
and avoid dismissal5 9 Thus, concluded Hanna, the only differences between
state and federal practice outlawed by Erie60 were those differences that would
affect outcome independent of how the parties conducted the litigation.
While such an approach has an appealing simplicity to it, it is a poor vehi-
cle for implementing the Rules of Decision Act, and is especially problematic
when applied to court-access problems. There are three deficiencies in Hanna
that render a principled application of the doctrine difficult.
First, as the court-access cases demonstrate, it is hard to know how a given
rule will affect outcome. Equally cogent arguments have been made that the
balance within the federal system but rather to protect citizens from the dangers of forum shopping
and the inequitable administration of the law.
55. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468.
56. E.g., M. REDISH, supra note 52, at 225 ("While the Court identified these two Erie policies as
distinct, it seems clear that its focus reduces to a single concern: fairness to the litigants."). But see Walker
v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. at 753 (deviation from state rule that defendant must be served within statute
of limitations period would not necessarily induce forum shopping, but would represent "inequitable
administration of the law").
57. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
58. 380 U.S. at 469.
59. Id.
60. Hanna itself does not explicitly refer to the Rules of Decision Act in its discussion of outcome-
determinative laws and the "twin aims" of Erie. This discussion has, however, been read by subsequent
courts as a construction of the Act. See, e.g., Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29-31 (1988)
(Scalia, J., dissenting); In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois, on May 25, 1979, 803 F.2d 304,
314 (7th Cir. 1986); Olympic Sports Prod., Inc. v. Universal Athletic Sales Co., 760 F.2d 910, 913 (9th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1060 (1986); Feinstein v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 643 F.2d 880, 889
(1st Cir. 1981); Stoner v. Presbyterian Univ. Hosp., 609 F.2d 109, 111 (3d Cir. 1979).
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identity of the trier of fact is and is not outcome determinative.1 Some courts
have reasoned that court-access issues simply decide where a case will be
heard.62 In this sense, court-access rules are not any more outcome determina-
tive than moving a case from state to federal court. It seems just as obvious
to other courts that the identity of the trier of fact will inevitably affect the
ultimate disposition of the case. 63 Still other decisions have taken the relatively
formalistic view that since a federal court-access provision can result in a
dismissal of an action that would not be dismissed in state court, the question
is absolutely outcome determinative as defined by Hanna.'
Second, even if it were possible to identify outcome-determinative rules,
outcome determination, even as modified by Hanna, is a poor test of whether
federal and state litigants are accorded equal rights. Non-outcome-determinative
differences between state and federal practice could be considered just as ineq-
uitable as outcome-determinative differences. Any difference between rights
afforded in a federal court and a state court could be considered the "inequita-
ble administration of the laws." For example, it could be considered just as
inequitable to subject a federal litigant in an inconvenient forum to greater
litigation expenses as it is to subject her to greater liability.65 The real question
is not whether all litigants are treated equally, but rather what kind of differenc-
es are justified. Outcome determination offers a tautological answer.
61. See supra note 16.
62. See, e.g., Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60, 66 n.13 (1965) ("The federal jurisdictional
and venue statutes do not affect the rules of decision by which the parties' rights will be adjudicated; they
only determine the forum.").
63. See, e.g., Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958) ("It may well be that
in the instant personal injury case the outcome would be substantially affected by whether the issue...
is decided by ajudge or a jury."); Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1955) ("If the federal
court allows arbitration where the state court would disallow it, the outcome of litigation might depend on
the courthouse where suit is brought.... The nature of the tribunal where suits are tried is an important
part of the parcel of rights behind a cause of action.").
64. In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La. on July 9, 1982, 821 F.2d 1147, 1157 (1987):
If Louisiana courts refuse to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds, and if that doctrine does
not apply to a Louisiana cause of action in a federal diversity court, there will be a tremendous
disparity of result between trials in the two court systems. One case will proceed to judgment and
the other will be dismissed to a foreign land.
The court, however, went on to find a paramount federal interest in deviating from state forum non
conveniens practice. See infra note 172 and accompanying text.
I characterize the approach as "formalistie" insofar as it ignores that the "dismissal" is in substance,
if not form, simply a device to move the case to a different forum, albeit a foreign one. While a given forum
non conveniens dismissal might be seen as "outcome determinative" because of the relative disadvantages
imposed by the foreign forum or its choice of law, it is unduly formalistic to treat forum non conveniens
dismissals per se as any more outcome determinative than transfers pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). But
see Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens in America and England: "A Rather Fantastic Fiction," 103 LAW
Q. REV. 398, 418-20 (1987) (showing that vast majority of claims dismissed from U.S. courts are never
pursued in foreign alternative forums).
65. Similarly, viewed from a "forum shopping" perspective, rules permitting greater discovery, more
convenient venue, or less formal pleading have as much potential to draw litigants into a federal court as
rules about standards of care. The very fact that the rule in question is being contested suggests that it
matters to the parties. All things being equal, a litigant will be drawn to the forum with the favorable rule.
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Finally, Hanna understates the values underlying the Erie doctrine. As
Justice Harlan noted at the time,66 the Court's focus on forum shopping and
equality exclusively ignores a central concern of Erie: the appropriate allocation
of sovereign authority between the state and federal governments. 67 It was
Congress's apparent desire in the Rules of Decision Act that the operation of
the federal courts not unduly interfere with the regulatory prerogatives of the
states.6 The Court's focus on litigant equality ignores this federalism concern.
66. 380 U.S. at 474 (Harlan, J., concurring).
67. The most forceful critique of Hanna's narrow concern for litigant rights rather than for the proper
allocation of authority in the federal system is Professor Redish's. See M. REDISH, supra note 52, at 225-46;
Redish & Phillips, supra note 13.
In the recent decision in Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988), the Court, in dictum, made
explicit its view that Erie was based solely on equality and not federalism concerns. Wortman held that a
state may apply its own longer statute of limitations to a claim even when the state would be constitutionally
prohibited from applying its own substantive law. The Court distinguished the fact that statutes of limitation
are considered substantive in the Erie context by reasoning that the full faith and credit limitations on
interstate conflicts were designed to allocate sovereign authority among the states, while Erie simply
guaranteed equal outcomes in federal and state courts:
Guaranty Trust itself rejects the notion that there is an equivalence between what is substantive
under the Erie doctrine and what is substantive for purposes of conflict of laws. Except at the
extremes, the terms "substance" and "procedure" precisely describe very little except a dichotomy,
and what they mean in a particular context is largely determined by the purposes for which the
dichotomy is drawn. In the context of our Erie jurisprudence, that purpose is to establish (within
the limits of applicable federal law, including the prescribed Rules of Federal Procedure) substan-
tial uniformity of predictable outcome between cases tried in a federal court and cases tried in
the courts of the State in which the federal court sits... . The purpose of the substance-procedure
dichotomy in the context of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, by contrast, is not to establish
uniformity but to delimit spheres of state legislative competence. How different the two purposes
(and hence the appropriate meanings) are is suggested by this: It is never the case under Erie that
either federal or state law-if the two differ-can properly be applied to a particular issue ....
but since the legislative jurisdictions of the States overlap, it is frequently the case under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause that a court can lawfully apply either the law of one State or the contrary
law of another ....
Wortman, 486 U.S. at 726-27 (citation omitted).
68. See Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part Two, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 1231, 1241-50, 1263-67
(1985) (describing generally Anti-Federalists' apprehension that federal common law would obliterate states'
rights, and concluding specifically that Rules of Decision Act mirrored constitutional allocation of general
lawmaking authority to states); Redish, supra note 15, at 792. Legislative history of the Rules of Decision
Act is notoriously thin. Most scholarly attention has been directed to the Swift v. Tyson issue of whether
the reference to "state law" in the act included state common law. See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.)
1 (1842); Redish, supra note 15, at 79 1. The primary authority on the Act generally is Warren, New Light
on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49 (1923), which Justice Brandeis
relied on heavily in the Erie decision. Unfortunately, Warren's analysis of the Rules of Decision Act
(included as section 34 of the Judiciary Act) is largely surmise. The only historical datum he discovered
was an apparent first draft of the section that explicitly included both state statutory and common law as
controlling authority in federal judicial proceedings. Warren concluded that the final version's use of the
general term "state law" must therefore include both statutory and common law, a direct challenge to the
holding of Swift v. Tyson. Id. at 86.
Warren was apparently the first proponent of the theory that the Rules of Decision Act was designed
to prevent unequal treatment of litigants based on their citizenship. Id. at 84-85. Indeed, Justice Brandeis'
elliptical observation in Erie that the Act was designed to prevent "grave discrimination by non-citizens
against citizens," 304 U.S. at 74, is taken almost verbatim from Warren's article. Warren, supra, at 125-26
("Diverse citizenship... instead of preventing a discrimination against a non-citizen, results [after Swift]
in discrimination in their favor and against the citizen.") (emphasis in original). Warren's only support for
this interpretation of the Act was that the purpose of diversity jurisdiction was to prevent local bias; the
Rules of Decision Act must therefore be read consistently with this objective. Swift's disregard of state
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Whether or not outcome might be affected, the state may have a stake in the
manner in which the litigation is conducted. For example, a state may want to
vest certain parties with a convenient venue; to maintain the confidentiality of
certain information; to limit the expense of litigation; to give its juries authority
to assess the liability of certain parties; or even to reap the economic benefits
of opening its courts to a large volume of litigation. Outcome determination
offers no way to test the federal court's obligation to vindicate these interests.
The modified outcome-determination test of Hanna thus tends to obscure rather
than clarify the real issues at stake in a choice between federal common law
and state law.
However, reliance on the substance-procedure dichotomy is not limited to
scholars who take an equality-oriented approach to Erie. Even commentators
concerned about Erie's federalism component, and who are thus critical of
Hanna's preoccupation with forum shopping and litigant equality, have tended
to distinguish between substantive and procedural rules as a way of identifying
state regulatory prerogatives.69 The state is said to have an interest in substan-
tive rules that govern "primary conduct" outside of litigation, but less of an
common law frustrated this objective by bending over backwards for the noncitizen.
Warren offered no explanation of why Swift gave any advantage to the noncitizen over the citizen, both
of whom could select the federal forum if it were to their advantage. While some scholars have asserted
that Justice Brandeis' use of the phrase "discrimination against citizens" refers to the advantage that
noncitizens have over citizens in removal, see, e.g., Ely, supra note 13, at 712, it appears that Warren's
use of the phrase was simply an attempt to pen a catchy symmetry.
Warren's conclusion that the Rules of Decision Act was drafted to insure litigant equality should not
be read to mean that the drafters were more concerned about litigant equality than federalism. The broader
theme of Warren's study is that federalism was the pervasive issue throughout the drafting of the entire
Judicial Act. Warren cites at length an Anti-Federalist newspaper to illustrate:
By far the most weighty and conclusive objection against the new Constitution in its present form
is that it will necessarily and speedily produce a consolidated or national government; by
superseding and annihilating in its operation, the several State governments, which from the nature
of things would in so extended a territory be an iron handed despotism .... subversive of all
liberty .... The legislative power vested in Congress is so unlimited in its nature .... The
judicial powers vested in Congress are also so various and extensive that by legal ingenuity they
may be extended to every case, and thus absorb the State Judiciaries....
Warren, supra, at 125-26 (quoting from Cendnel Revived, Independent Gazetteer (Phil.), Aug. 29, 1789);
cf. Redish, supra note 15, at 792 ("When viewed in this historical light, the underlying legislative purpose
intended to be served by the Rules of Decision Act, originally enacted by the very first Congress, becomes
relatively clear. In enacting that legislation, Congress was attempting to preserve the political values of
federalism by curbing the one branch of the federal government most feared as a threat to state power.").
69. Even Professor Redish, who otherwise rejects Hanna's analysis, cites as state laws most worthy
of federal deference those "rules... designed to provide behavioral guides for state citizens or to attain
substantive state policy goals." M. REDISH, supra note 52, at 240. He fails, however, to provide any
definition of "substantive." See also Burbank, supra note 33, at 1128, 1183 (suggesting effect on "out-of-
court conduct" as test of "substantive righe' for purposes of the Rules Enabling Act).
While recently repudiating his earlier suggestion that the Rules of Decision Act provided relatively
little guidance in choosing between state and federal law, Professor Redish adheres to his earlier conclusion
that nonconformity with state substantive law generates greater friction with state autonomy than nonconfor-
mity with state procedural law. Indeed, he now concludes that "federal courts are not constrained by the
Act in [procedural] matters," and construes the phrase "rule of decision" to refer only to substantive matters
"extending completely beyond the four walls of the federal courthouse." Redish, supra note 15, at 787 &




interest in procedural, litigation-oriented rules that simply prescribe how a
remedy will be provided.70
There are several possible rationales for such a distinction. None is very
persuasive. First is the claim that maintaining uniform rules governing primary
conduct is critical to reducing uncertainty in the law, and that since procedural
rules do not implicate that concern, federal courts are free to develop indepen-
dent procedural law.71 Professor Ely, however, has persuasively refuted this
rationale, demonstrating that most differences between "primary conduct" rules
do not in fact produce debilitating uncertainty.7 Most competing rules of con-
duct are not mutually exclusive. If, for example, a state liability rule requires
merely the exercise of reasonable care and the federal courts assessed liability
for failure to exercise extraordinary care, a defendant could ex ante avoid liabil-
ity in both forums by exercising extraordinary care. Uncertainty can be elimi-
nated in most cases simply by complying with the more stringent standard of
conduct.73 Accordingly, the different treatment accorded substantive and proce-
dural laws cannot be justified by a substantially differential impact on predict-
ability.
Moreover, to the extent that reducing uncertainty is the objective of the
substance-procedure distinction, the utility of that distinction is substantially
impaired by the potential, and largely unknowable, impact of judicial procedure
on primary conduct. People may structure their nonlitigation conduct in reliance
on a given set of state judicial procedures, and federal procedural nonconformi-
ty can disrupt that planning. In particular, a potential defendant may avoid
having jurisdictional contacts with a state that imposes onerous procedural
burdens in favor of more hospitable locales.74 For instance, if a state insulates
nonresident corporations from litigation over out-of-state claims in its courts
by forsaking "general jurisdiction," a corporation may for that reason decide
to build a plant there. However, if federal courts do not follow the state juris-
diction rule, the corporation cannot accurately assess the risk of coming into
the state. Accordingly, both premises of the certainty argument are flawed:
uniformity between state and federal substantive law is often not necessary to
avoid uncertainty, and variations between state and federal procedural law may
in some cases produce uncertainty.
70. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (citing H. HART & H.
WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 678 (1st ed. 1953)); cf. Carrington, supra
note 27, at 610 (statutes of limitations should be considered "substantive" to the extentthat they have effects
"outside the courthouse and have no bearing on the quality or accuracy of judicial proceedings").
71. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 474 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("Erie recognized that there should not be two
conflicting systems of law controlling the primary activity of citizens, for such alternative governing
authority must necessarily give rise to a debilitating uncertainty in the planning of everyday affairs.").
72. Ely, supra note 13, at 710-11.
73. Id. at 711.
74. See Note, Forum Selection Clauses: Substantive or Procedural for Erie Purposes, 89 COLtUM. L.
REV. 1068, 1081-82 (1989).
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Second, it might be argued that the state has no legitimate interest in how
remedies are distributed outside of its courts as long as substantive rights are
respected. As the above examples demonstrate, however, a federal departure
from a state "procedural" rule may well frustrate the policy underlying the state
rule. If a state decides to cut back on discovery because it inflicts unjustifiable
costs on witnesses and parties, federal expansion of discovery frustrates that
policy whether or not it affects party behavior outside the courthouse.
Thus the explanation for why state procedural rules that do not affect
primary conduct may be disregarded cannot simply be that the state does not
care. The argument must be instead that Congress recognized a superior federal
interest in providing independent, uniform procedural rules even where state
policies may be frustrated, and therefore exempted these procedural rules from
the command of the Rules of Decision Act. 5 The problem with this argument
is that it proves too much. If congressional interest in independent rules of
procedure justifies disregard of state procedural policies, why does it not also
justify disregard of state substantive policies?76 Few would assert that a federal
interest in fair and uniform procedure would justify disregard of the state statute
of limitations, or the state definition of the elements of a cause of action. The
uniformity argument is no more persuasive as a justification for independent
common law procedural rules.
This uniformity argument also ignores the historical context of the Rules
of Decision Act. The Process Act of 1789, enacted concurrently with the Rules
of Decision Act (RDA), required federal conformity with state practice.77 Con-
formity was maintained in one form or another until passage of the Rules
Enabling Act in 1934.78 Thus the argument that uniformity in federal practice
is somehow essential to the fair and efficient maintenance of the federal
courts79 is contradicted by historical practice. 0
75. Cf. Hazard, Reflections on the Substance of Finality, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 642, 644-47 (1985)
(suggesting that federal courts, as independent system for administering remedies, have wide discretion to
adopt independent procedural rules).
76. See Redish & Phillips, supra note 13, at 390.
77. The Process Act of 1789 provided:
That until further provision shall be made, and except where by this act or other statutes of the
United States is otherwise provided, the forms of writs and executions, except their style, and
modes of process and rates of fees, except fees to judges, in the circuit and district courts, in suits
at common law, shall be the same in each state respectively as are now used or allowed in the
supreme courts of the same.
Process Act of 1789, ch. 36, 1 Stat. 275 (1792).
78. See generally P. BATOR, P. MELTZER, P. MIsHKIN, & D. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 755-64 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter HART AND WECHSLER];
Burbank, supra note 33, at 1037-42.
79. Commentators have also noted the absence of uniformity in contemporary federal practice. See
Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
1925, 1929 (1989); Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules. and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and
Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2011-2026 (1989).
80. See Burbank, Afterwards: A Response to Professor Hazard and a Comment on Marrese, 70
CORNELL L. REV. 659, 661 & n.18 (1985) (rejecting proposition that Rules of Decision Act incorporates
substance-procedure distinction in light of historical federal conformity to state practice); accord, Hill, State
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As with Hanna's focus on litigant equality, the "primary conduct" approach
asks the wrong question. The question is not simply whether state preferences
are implicated in state law, but rather which state preferences are to be respect-
ed by the federal courts. Again, the substance-procedure distinction offers a
tautological answer."1
C. A Sounder Analytic Approach
As Redish and Phillips ably demonstrated, the closest the Supreme Court
has come to getting it right was in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Electric Cooperative,2
Procedural Law in Federal Nondiversity Litigation, 66 HARV. L. REV. 66, 86-87 (1955) (concluding that
Rules of Decision Act was historically construed to make state procedural law applicable in federal court).
81. It may be that if the class of laws deemed "procedural" is very narrowly defined, the substance-
procedure dichotomy can begin to track an appropriate allocation of regulatory authority between the federal
courts and state governments, or at least identify a narrow class of cases in which state regulatory preroga-
tives are not usurped. Professor Risinger has suggested as a distinction between substantive and procedural
rules a test of whether the rule in question has any purpose other than the achievement of an accurate and
efficient adjudication. Risinger, supra note 27, at 204-09.
It would not be unreasonable to argue that the grant of federal diversity jurisdiction implies, at a
minimum, the right to design an independent system to enforce accurately rights created under state
substantive law. As long as the rule in question reflected no value other than this remedial purpose, it would
be hard to argue that the federal courts were powerless to adopt their own "procedures." Any such argument
would tend to nullify any purpose in having independent federal courts.
The problem with using Professor Risinger's model in the Erie context is that virtually no rule could,
in fact, be considered purely procedural. Under this test, even a discovery rule could not be deemed purely"
procedural, since it would necessarily balance the probative value of the discovery against the cost and
burden of discovery to the litigant, thus compromising the pure accuracy-based "procedural" interest. At
the margins, virtually all procedural rules have comparable substantive, non-accuracy-based, components.
82. 356 U.S. 525 (1958); see Redish & Phillips, supra note 13, at 363-67. Redish & Phillips propose
a balancing test similar to but distinct from the approach taken here. Ad hoc balancing is rejected in favor
of a "refined balancing approach" pursuant to which the balance is guided by how the state and federal
interests are classified. Id. at 387-96. They suggest that there are four classes of state interests, listed in
decreasing order of importance: rules designed to achieve a "substantive" objective; rules for conducting
trials that purposely bestow an advantage on one of the parties; rules for conducting trials that are designed
to "do justice" by achieving an optimal adjudication; and "mere housekeeping" rules.
These interests are to be weighed against the federal interest in a contrary rule, but there is only one
category of federal interest capable of trumping a significant state interest: avoiding cost or inconvenience
to the federal courts. Other federal objectives, such as uniformity, can be accommodated through other
means, such as a new Rule of Civil Procedure.
Redish & Phillips thus retain the fundamental distinction between "substantive" and "procedural"
interests, while at the same time recognizing that "procedural" rules may advance "substantive" objectives.
While I am generally in accord with their approach, especially in its focus on the federalism dimension of
Erie problems, I have several criticisms of their classifications. First, although the substance-procedure
categories are employed, no guidance is provided for how to distinguish between them-the same difficulty
which has plagued all prior attempts to resolve Erie problems. The approach advocated in this Article
attempts to circumvent that problem by simply identifying whether the state interest, whatever its category,
is implicated by a contrary federal practice. The more the state interest is undermined, the greater is the
federal deference that is called for.
Second, even assuming a coherent distinction between substantive and procedural objectives is possible,
no justification is offered by Redish & Phillips for why procedural objectives are less important than
substantive ones. Why should it be categorically assumed that a policy designed to affect "primary conduct"
is more important to the state than its decision to bestow a significant advantage on a litigant? For instance,
if a state decided to eliminate discovery because its expense and potential for abuse was not considered
justified by its value to litigation, why should that interest be considered any less weighty than a rule
designed to encourage corporate registration? It may be that Redish & Phillips' categories are shorthand
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a case all but ignored in subsequent developments. 3 The Byrd Court's consid-
eration of competing state and federal policies reflected an insight ignored by
the Hanna majority that the decision to apply a federal rule different from the
state practice may represent a usurpation of a regulatory prerogative belonging
to the state. That potential usurpation, the Byrd Court implicitly assumed, is
what was at stake in Erie.'
The issue in Byrd was whether the plaintiff had a right to a jury determina-
tion of whether he was a "statutory employee" of the defendant. If he was, he
would be precluded from maintaining an independent action against the defen-
dant under the Workmens Compensation Law. Under state practice, the determi-
nation would have been made by a judge. The Court concluded that the district
court was free to submit the question to a federal jury.
The Byrd Court employed a technique which would be recognized today
as "interest analysis." 5 It determined that the only. policy driving the state
preference for a judicial determination of the statutory employee question was
administrative convenience-the state's decision to vest the determination of
plaintiff's status in a judge rather than a jury was a consequence of the "practi-
cal consideration that the question had theretofore come before the South
Carolina courts from the Industrial Commission and the courts had become
accustomed to deciding the factual issue of immunity without the aid of ju-
ries."86 Accordingly, no state policy would be implicated by a federal depar-
for measuring the degree to which state interests are in fact implicated by a contrary federal practice. Thus,
rules affecting primary conduct are always implicated, and rules designed to save the state judiciary money
are rarely implicated. If so, their categories obscure rather than advance the inquiry. The better approach
is to evaluate directly the pertinence of the state interest to federal practice.
83. Some have asserted that Byrd was implicitly overruled by Hanna. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 13,
at 717 n. 130; Little, Out of Woods and Into The Rules: The Relationship Between State Foreign Corporation
Door-Closing Statutes and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b), 72 VA. L. REV. 767, 788-89 (1986). But
see Redish & Phillips, supra note 13, at 370-72 (citing post-Hanna application of Byrd approach by lower
federal courts).
84. See Redish & Phillips, supra note 13, at 364. The federalism assumptions of the Byrd Court, while
never stated explicitly, are implicit in the structure and language of the opinion. Under a section headed
"First," the Court considers whether the state rule is "bound up with [state-created] rights and obligations.
." 356 U.S. at 535. This inquiry, the Court states, is necessitated by Erie's command that "federal courts
in diversity cases must respect... state-created rights and obligations." Id. The focus of that section is on
whether the purposes behind the state rule would be impaired by federal deviation from that rule. "Equality"
is not mentioned or alluded to in that discussion. It is only in the subsequent section headed "Second" that
the court considers "uniform enforcement of the right" and outcome determination as "a broader policy"
evinced by "cases following Erie." Id. at 536-37. It is thus clear that the first section's focus comes not
out of an equality concern, but from a respect for state regulatory prerogatives.
While Byrd does ask some of the right questions, it is flawed. As Professor Ely cogently demonstrated,
Byrd does fall victim to the "myth" that Erie was a single doctrine rather than the consequence of both
constitutional and Rules of Decision Act limitations imposed on federal courts. Ely, supra note 13, at 717.
85. See Leathers, Erie and Its Progeny as Choice of Law Cases, 11 HouS. L. REV. 791,811-18 (1974)
(applying conflicts methodology to Supreme Court Erie decisions through Hanna v. Plumer). See generally
B. CURRIE, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 177 (1963) [hereinafter SELECTED ESSAYS].
86. 356 U.S. at 536.
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ture from state practice. In conflicts terminology, there was a "false con-
flict.' '8 7
That should have settled the matter. Instead, the Court proceeded to balance
state and federal policies in light of the possibly outcome-determinative impact
of a decision to disregard state law."8 The Court determined that whatever
inequities flowed from the different treatment of litigants in state and federal
court were justified by a strong federal policy in favor of jury trials, "under the
influence-if not the command-of the Seventh Amendment." 9 The last
phrase has subjected the decision to the apt criticism that if the question was
controlled by the Seventh Amendment, it was not even subject to the command
of the Rules of Decision Act to apply state law unless otherwise authorized by
federal law.9" Conversely, if the Seventh Amendment did not require a jury
determination of plaintiff's status, it cannot be said that there was a strong
federal policy favoring a jury determination of the question.91
The Byrd Court found it necessary to analyze the relative strength of the
federal interest, notwithstanding the absence of a state interest, because it
misperceived the nature of the equality guaranteed by Erie, or more specifically,
by the Rules of Decision Act.92 The Court was inappropriately troubled by
the disparate treatment of litigants in a situation where the state did not care
about the federal practice.93
Once it is recognized that neither Congress nor the Constitution contemplat-
ed absolute symmetry between state and federal courts, the focus should shift
from whether there is a difference or inequality to whether any perceived differ-
ence or inequality is justified. The theory of justification cannot be divorced
from federalism, the central policy underlying the Rules of Decision Act. 4
The primary inquiry under the Rules of Decision Act ought to be whether there
has been a usurpation of a state regulatory prerogative,95 not whether all
litigants were treated "equally." If a state has not attempted to "vest" a litigant
with a right to a particular procedure, it is nonsense to view the federal depar-
ture from that procedure as unfair to the party.96 As Brainard Currie discov-
87. Leathers, supra note 85, at 812.
88. 356 U.S. at 537-39.
89. Id. at 537.
90. Westen & Lehman, supra note 25, at 345-47.
91. Id.
92. As Redish & Phillips point out, the Court does not explicitly rely on the Rules of Decision Act.
Redish & Phillips, supra note 13, at 362 n.36. However, it is the only possible source of authority in the
decision: no Federal Rule of Civil Procedure was implicated, so the Rules Enabling Act was irrelevant; and
there is no suggestion that the result was constitutionally compelled. Id.
93. For example, contrast the Fourth Circuit's approach in Atldns v. Schmutz Mfg., 435 F.2d 527 (4th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 932 (1971). The court there held that the state statute of limitations need
not be applied where the purpose behind the statute, timely notification of defendant, was satisfied by the
prior filing of a parallel proceeding in another federal district court.
94. See supra note 68.
95. Cf. Hill, supra note 18, at 574.
96. Id. at 554.
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ered in the context of interstate conflicts, a party should not be heard to com-
plain about the loss of a "right" if the state never intended to confer the right
in the circumstances of the particular case.97 In this sense, Byrd, as well as
all other "outcome-determination" approaches, appears to embrace a "vested
rights" view of the world otherwise questioned by modern jurisprudence.98
Consideration of the strength of the federal interest may be appropriate, but
only after identifying a "true conflict": a situation in which the state would
want its law applied in federal court. Only then must a federal court justify its
frustration of the state preference. However, the federal interest at that point
must be more substantial than a generalized interest in the way in which federal
courts are run.99 Recognition of such an interest would turn the command of
the Rules of Decision Act into a nullity: "Apply state law unless you are
accustomed to applying federal law in your courts."
1". APPLICATION OF THE FRAMEWORK TO COURT-ACCESS PROBLEMS
The above critique suggests that a three-step analysis would help clarify the
real issues presented by court-access problems. First, as Hanna suggested, the
source of the federal court-access rule must be ascertained. Where there is clear
and legitimate statutory authority for the rule, such as the venue or transfer
provisions, the federal provision will apply. Congress clearly has the right to
regulate access to the federal courts.
However, as discussed below, the courts must avoid abuse of this justifica-
tion. Where a specific legislative intent to develop an independent rule cannot
be identified, the mandate of the Rules of Decision Act should control: federal
courts must avoid unnecessary interference with state governance. The courts
must therefore ascertain whether or not state preferences would be affected by
federal disregard of the relevant state rule. If state policy would not be affected,
the federal court should be free to follow a different practice. If state policy
would be affected, the state practice ought to be respected absent a specific
federal interest in a contrary practice.
Such a federal interest must be based on a federal interest outside of Article
III, or at least tied to the purpose behind the existence of federal jurisdiction.
In diversity, federal courts may disregard parochial state bias toward their own
97. See B. CURRIE, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Law Method, in SELECTED
ESSAYS, supra note 85, at 116-17 (a state's law should only apply when legislature intended to bestow right
on the litigant). But see Gelfand & Abrams, supra note 27 (arguing that inequality should preclude
application of federal law even when there is no federalism concern).
98. Thisinsightwasin fact the basis for the ByrdCourt's conclusion in the firstpart of its Erie analysis
that the state practice was not "boundup" in the rights and obligations that the state intended to confer upon
the litigants. See supra notes 16, 18. The Court's later consideration of equality problems is thus particularly
formalistic; the implication is that even though the state has not conferred any rights on the litigants, they
are still somehow entitled to the same strategic opportunities that are made available to litigants in the state
courts.
99. See Redish & Phillips, supra note 13, at 387.
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citizens. In federal question cases, federal courts may disregard state procedures
that interfere with federal substantive rights.
The balance of this Article will articulate this three-step analysis more fully
and attempt to apply it specifically to court-access problems.
A. Is There Statutory Authorization for the Federal Practice?
Since the seminal work of John Hart Ely in 19 74 ,100 both courts and com-
mentators have divided Erie problems into at least two categories, or tracks,
corresponding to the restraints imposed by statute and the Constitution: federal
statutes, restrained only by constitutional limits on federal power; and federal
common law, additionally restrained by the Rules of Decision Act.101 Numer-
ous scholars, including Professor Ely, have suggested an additional "spur":
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, restrained by the Rules Enabling Act restric-
tion on the abridgement, enlargement, or modification of substantive rights."°
The multitrack approach, while technically sound, has tended to obscure the
difficult federalism questions implicated by court-access problems in all three
contexts.
Access to federal court is indeed controlled by all three types of law. Statu-
tory regulations include transfer of an action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a),
the federal venue provisions, 10 3 some specialized personal jurisdiction provi-
sions,1 ' and subject-matter jurisdiction. 05 Common law restraints include
forum non conveniens °3 and standing, in particular the "prudential limita-
tions."107 Pertinent Federal Rules of Civil Procedure include Rule 17 (capaci-
ty) and Rule 4 (service of process). There is obviously some analytic impor-
tance to the category of federal law at issue. No one doubts that federal statutes
trump conflicting state law in all but the extraordinary case where the federal
statute is unconstitutional. 08 Not quite as conclusively, applicable Rules of
100. Ely, supra note 13.
101. See generally Freer, Erie's Mid-Life Crisis, 63 TUL L. REV. 1087 (1989).
102. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988); see Ely, supra note 13, at 722. I refer to the Rules Enabling Act restraint
as a"spur" to the extent that it represents a branch on the statutory track: the Rules Enabling Act is a federal
statute that "otherwise provides" for the application of federal law within the meaning of the Rules of
Decision Act.
103. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1988).
104. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §5 (1988) (Sherman Act); 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1988) (Securities Act of 1933).
105. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
106. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
107. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 464 (1975).
108. See, e.g., Brown v. Pyle, 310 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1962) (federal venue statute prevails over state
statute giving plaintiff right to maintain action in state).
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Civil Procedure generally seem to displace conflicting state provisions."° To
that extent, the source of federal law is dispositive of the Erie question.
However, the far more common and problematic issue is not whether federal
statutes or rules take precedence over conflicting state law, but rather whether
there is in fact a conflict between codified federal law and state law. While
there may be an appropriate three-track analysis of Erie problems, there is
enormous ambiguity in track assignment. Unless Congress has explicitly stated
that a federal rule or statute displaces state law, a court must make an initial
choice of law prior to applying the three-track analysis: does the federal
provision accommodate or displace state law? 110
The judicial task in deciding whether a federal statute displaces state law
is, I suggest, virtually identical to the choice of whether to develop a purely
common law federal provision. In both cases, the court must understand the
relevant state and federal interests, as well as the policy behind the Rules of
Decision Act. In both cases, the court must determine whether creation of an
independent federal standard needlessly undermines state regulatory autonomy.
If it does, sound statutory construction guided by the Rules of Decision Act
suggests that Congress would not have approved of the unnecessary friction
generated by federal nonconformity."'
109. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460,472 (1965) (Rules of Civil Procedure will be enforced over
conflicting state laws if they are "rationally capable of classification" as procedural). But see Burbank, supra
note 33 (arguing for increased scrutiny of Rules pursuant to Enabling Act limitation); McCollum Aviation,
Inc. v. CIM Assoc., 438 F. Supp. 245, 248 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (state door-closing statute takes precedence
over FED. R. CIV. P. 17(b) since it affects "primary conduct" and is thus substantive within meaning of
Enabling Act restriction).
110. This is a familiar problem in regard to federal common law outside of the procedural context,
where federal statutes are deemed to authorize expansive federal judicial gloss only when independent
federal standards are necessary to implement the statutory purpose. In such cases, the federal courts have
more latitude to develop doctrine independent of state law. See, e.g., Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655
(1950) (federal statute creating military insurance policy implicitly exempted proceeds from state community
property law). Otherwise, federal law is said to "incorporate" state law; the law applied is federal, but the
content of the law is provided by reference to state law. See Kamen v. Kemper Financial Servs., No. 90-516,
1991 WL 79138 (U.S.) (in derivative action brought pursuant to federal Investment Company Act of 1940,
state law governs requirement of pre-complaint demand); DelCostelo v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S.
151, 173 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Rules of Decision Act requires borrowing of state statute of
limitations in federal cause of action in absence of express federal statutory provision); United States v.
Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979) (incorporating state law on issue of priority of liens arising from
federal loan program); see also Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. Cmn. L. REv.
1, 33 (1985). See generally Mishkin, supra note 50.
111. Cf. Merrill, supra note 110, at 33 (Rules of Decision Act provides presumption in favor of state
law in filing gaps in federal legislation). This inquiry should not be seen, as Westen and Lehman argue,
as balancing away federal supremacy. See Westen & Lehman, supra note 25, at 351. The evaluation of
competing policies is appropriate to divine whether or not Congress would approve of the displacement of
state law. If there is some significant displacement not required by the implementation of a federal interest,
it is reasonable to infer that Congress would not want to step on state toes.
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1. Choosing the Right Track
That initial choice of law, or track assignment, has received relatively little
judicial attention."2 In the Rules of Decision Act, Congress provided a rebut-
table presumption that state law applies in federal court. In the absence of more
express direction, it should be assumed that state law applies. The problem is
in ascertaining how much express direction is required, and where it can be
found. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has attempted to divorce that inquiry
from any coherent understanding of the Rules of Decision Act.
In Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., the Court recognized that the mere pres-
ence of an applicable statute or rule does not automatically displace all related
state law."3 The issue there was whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3
displaced a provision of state law requiring service of process to toll the statute
of limitations. While Rule 3 provides that "a civil action is commenced by fil-
ing a complaint with the court," it does not explicitly address the effect of filing
on the statute of limitations. Thus, state law and the federal Rule were not
mutually exclusive. The Court therefore declined to find that the Rule displaced
state law. Such displacement would only be found, the Court stated, where there
was "a direct collision" that was "unavoidable."" 4
Unfortunately, Walker provided little guidance for the lower courts strug-
gling to determine whether the federal Rule is "sufficiently broad" to displace
state law.15 Notwithstanding the Court's disclaimer that it advocated a narrow
construction of the Federal Rules," 6 there is almost no analysis in the opinion
that explains why the "commencement" of an action pursuant to the Rules does
not toll the statute of limitations. While the Court noted that the Advisory
Committee "thought the Rule might have [a tolling] effect,"" 7 the Court
summarily concluded that the only function of Rule 3 was to "gover[n] the date
from which various timing requirements of the Federal Rules begin to run."'
Taken literally, the "unavoidable, direct collision" standard articulated in
and applied by Walker is unworkable. There are obviously situations where the
legislature intends to displace conflicting state law, yet the express statutory
language falls short of a "direct collision.""' 9 For instance, no one doubts that
federal law defines when a claim "arises out of the same transaction" for
112. See generally Freer, supra note 101.
113. 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
114. Id. at 749 (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470 (1965)).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 750 n.9.
117. Id. at 750 n.10.
118. Id. at 751. But see West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35, 39 (1987) (holding that Rule 3 provides tolling
rule applicable to federal question case). For a critique of West and its inconsistency with Walker, see
Burbank, supra note 50, at 702-04.
119. Cf. Burbank, supra note 11, at 773 ("In authorizing the Court to promulgate Federal Rules,
Congress must have contemplated that the federal courts would interpret them, fill their interstices, and,
when necessary, ensure that their provisions were not frustrated by other legal rules.").
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purposes of Rule 13(a) compulsory counterclaims.12 Yet there is no direct
clash; state law could be consulted.
The rigidity of the Walker approach has led courts to apply unarticulated
standards in making the track assignment. Two recent Supreme Court decisions
suggest that the Court has abandoned the "direct collision" test, although it
continues to pay lip service to it. In Burlington Northern Railroad v.
Woods,12 1 a unanimous Court held that an Alabama statute imposing an auto-
matic penalty on unsuccessful appellants"~ had no application in federal court
because Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 authorizes the court of appeals
to award damages for frivolous appeals.It s
If, as suggested by Walker, the standard is whether the federal and state
provisions are capable of coexisting, the answer in Burlington is clearly yes,
as the Court all but concedes. Both provisions could be applied without render-
ing either a nullity.124 State damages could be awarded in every unsuccessful
appeal, and additional damages could be assessed for frivolous appeals at the
discretion of the court of appeals. Rule 38 does not prohibit damages in
nonfrivolous cases.
The Court's contrary conclusion that the discretion contemplated by the
Rule would be unduly restricted by the Alabama statute is, again, conclusory.
It is based solely on the theory that since the two provisions share the same
purpose of deterring appeals, the federal provision must be preemptive of the
state's.ls But the "same purpose" approach begs the question as much as the
"direct collision" standard does. In only the most general sense did the two
provisions have the same purpose: both deterred appeals. However, the Ala-
bama rule deterred a wider class of appeals than the federal rule, which ad-
dressed only frivolous appeals. If there was a collision, it was with a more
generalized federal policy of encouraging good faith appeals, not with the
federal interest in deterring frivolous ones embodied in Rule 38.121 Yet, the
Court made no effort to identify a basis for such a policy.
120. See 6 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1409-49 (2d
ed. 1990) (federal law governs when claim arises out of same transaction or occurrence).
121. 480 U.S. 1 (1987).
122. ALA. CODE § 12-22-72 (1986) provides in relevant part:
When a judgment or decree is entered or rendered for money, whether debt or damages, and the
same has been stayed on appeal by the execution of bond, with surety, if the appellate court
affirms the judgment of the court below, it must also enter judgment against all or any of the
obligors on the bond for the amount of the affirmed judgment, 10 percent damages thereon and
the costs of the appellate court
123. Rule 38 provides: "If the court of appeals shall determine that an appeal is frivolous, it may award
just damages and single or double costs to the appellee." FED. R. APP. P. 38.
124. "[A] federal court sitting in diversity could impose the mandatory penalty and likewise remain
free to exercise its discretionary authority under Federal Rule 38." 480 U.S. at 7.
125. Id. ("[T]he purposes underlying the Rules are sufficiently co-extensive with the asserted purposes
of the Alabama statute to indicate that the Rule occupies the statute's field of operation so as to preclude
its application in federal diversity actions.").
126. Whitten, Erie and the Federal Rules: A Review and Reappraisal After Burlington Northern
Railroad v. Woods, 21 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1, 22 (1987).
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One leaves Burlington with the distinct impression that something else was
going on. Perhaps the Court felt that Alabama had no business affecting the
behavior of federal litigants, or that Alabama never contemplated application
of its statute in the federal courts. These difficult issues dealing with the proper
allocation of authority in the federal system are never explicitly addressed in
the decision.
2. Stewart Organization v. Ricoh and the Impact of Track Assignment on
Court Access
The Court's recent resolution of Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh
Corp.t2 7 demonstrates how unreflective track assignment can be and under-
scores the need for a more sensitive understanding of relevant state and federal
policies implicated by court-access rules in both statutory and common law
contexts. In Stewart, the Court held that a case could be transferred under 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a) in furtherance of a forum selection clause in the parties'
contract notwithstanding the unenforceability of forum selection clauses under
Alabama law. A contract between the parties to a commercial distribution
agreement stipulated that any dispute "arising out of or connected to" the
agreement would be litigated in Manhattan and governed by New York law.
The plaintiff distributor sued the manufacturer for antitrust and contract viola-
tions in Alabama federal court.1t
The district court declined to transfer the case to New York under section
1404(a) on the ground that choice of forum clauses were unenforceable as
against public policy in Alabama.'29 The court of appeals reversed en
banc, t30 and the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals decision in an
eight-to-one decision written by Justice Marshall. 131
The majority reasoned that since transfer was controlled by federal statute,
the circumstances in which transfer was appropriate were wholly a matter of
federal law.132 In contrast, Justice Scalia's dissent concluded that the federal
127. 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
128. Id. at 24.
129. Id.
130. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 810 F.2d 1066 (1lth Cir. 1987).
131. Justice Scalia dissented. Justice Kennedy wrote a concurrence joined by Justice O'Connor. The
case was remanded so that the district court could evaluate the propriety of transfer in light of the forum
selection clause, a factor the lower court had refused to consider because of the Alabama rule. See 487 U.S.
at 32. On remand, transfer was again denied. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 696 F. Supp 583 (N.D. Ala.
1988); see note 139 infra.
132. The Court left unresolved an issue that has divided the lower courts: whether federal common
law governs the enforceability of forum selection clauses absent the statutory authority of section 1404(a).
A minority of lower courts addressing the issue appear to follow state law on the enforceability of choice
of forum provisions when raised by way of a motion to dismiss rather than a motion to transfer. Compare
General Eng'g Corp. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc., 783 F.2d 352 (3d Cir. 1986) (following state law)
with Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci Am., Inc., 858 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1988) and Kline v. Kawai Am. Corp.,
498 F. Supp. 868 (D. Minn. 1980) (both applying federal law). The viability of that distinction in the wake
of Stewart is unclear. See Instrumentation Assoc. v. Madsen Elec., 859 F.2d 4, 7 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing
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transfer right was circumscribed by state law since the enforceability of forum
selection clauses was not expressly addressed by statute, and a contrary result
would induce forum shopping.'33 Neither opinion, however, asked the right
question: Did Congress intend section 1404(a) to operate within the environ-
ment of state law, or, in other words, does section 1404(a) incorporate or
displace state law? 134
Justice Marshall concluded that there was a displacement, but his explana-
tion is unconvincing. His principal rationale was that section 1404(a) decisions
require an "individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and fair-
ness." 135 The judicial discretion contemplated by the statute, he reasoned,
would be unduly restricted by compliance with the "single factor" approach
of the state rule:
Congress has directed that multiple considerations govern transfer within
the federal court system, and a state policy focusing on a single concern
or a subset of the factors identified in § 1404(a) would defeat that
command. Its application would impoverish the flexible and multifacet-
ed analysis that Congress intended to govern motions to transfer within
the federal system. The forum-selection clause, which represents the
parties' agreement as to the most proper forum, should receive neither
dispositive consideration (as respondent might have it) nor no consider-
ation (as Alabama law might have it), but rather the consideration for
which Congress provided in § 1404(a). 136
But this begs the question; on its face, section 1404(a) no more displaces state
law than Rule 12(b)(6) defines a cause of action. 37 Congress did not say how
Martin Marietta with approval).
133. 487 U.S. at 39-40 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
134. Cf. Freer, supra note 101, at 1105 (appropriate inquiry is discerning existence of congressional
mandate to displace state law). Justice Marshall came closest to the appropriate inquiry, framing the issue
as whether "state and federal rules 'can exist side by side.., each controlling its own intended sphere of
coverage without conflict."' Stewart, 487 U.S. at 31 (quoting Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740,
752 (1980)). His opinion appears to pull back from the "direct collision" standard discussed in Hanna and
Walker:
Our cases at times have referred to the question at this stage of the analysis as an inquiry into
whether there is a "direct collision" between state and federal law... Logic indicates, however,
and a careful reading of the relevant passages confirms, that this language is not meant to mandate
that federal law and state law be perfectly coextensive and equally applicable to the issue at hand;
rather, the "direct collision" language, at least where the applicability of a federal statute is at
issue, expresses the requirement that the federal statute be sufficiently broad to cover the point
in dispute.
Stewart, 487 U.S. at 26 n.4 (citations omitted).
135. Id. at 30 (quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622 (1964)).
136. Id. at 32.
137. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) provides that the court may dismiss a claim for plaintiff's "failure to
state a claim." It is well understood that, at most, the Rule enforces a federal standard of pleading, not a
federal definition of the underlying claim. 5A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURJE § 1356, at 294 (2d ed. 1990). The mere fact that the word "claim" is used in the Rule does not mean
that the Rule's framers thereby contemplated the development of a federal definition. The rule, in context,
obviously contemplates incorporation of existing substantive law. Justice Marshall's statement that forum
selection clauses should receive "the consideration for which Congress provided in § 1404" thus begs the
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much consideration should be given to forum selection clauses. The Court could
either develop an independent approach or incorporate state law on that is-
sue. 38 Nor does incorporation reduce the inquiry to "a single concern." The
petitioner's argument was not that all transfers from Alabama federal court are
foreclosed by the state statute, but only that a transfer otherwise justified
principally by the forum selection clauset39 should be limited by the unenforc-
eability of such clauses under state law.' ° In that respect, the state non-
enforcement of such clauses operates no more as a "single factor" rule than the
federal enforcement of such clauses pursuant to the statute. In short, it is
possible for the federal statute and state policy to coexist.' 4'
In this, as in most cases, the incorporation problem cannot be resolved
simply by looking at the face of the statute. What is required is an understand-
ing of why conformity with state practice is important, and how conformity in
any given case would affect the purpose behind the statute in question. Mar-
shall's consideration of those issues in Stewart is perfunctory. Absent from his
opinion is any discussion of the legislative history or purpose behind section
1404(a) (other than the above-quoted language). Having placed the case on the
statutory track, Marshall expressly found the impact of the state court-access
policy irrelevant. 42 He thereby failed to recognize the relevance of those
policies to the issue of whether the case belonged on the statutory track to
begin with. 4 3
Such recognition would have led the Court to two related inquiries, both
ultimately supportive of the result in Stewart: (1) whether the legislative history
question; it assumes that because forum selection clauses may be pertinent to section 1404(a) practice,
Congress necessarily contemplated a federal standard for their enforcement. It ignores the significant
possibility that Congress preferred to incorporate state standards.
138. Justice Marshall seemed to confuse the argument for incorporation as an argument for supremacy
of state law over federal:
Not the least of the problems with the dissent's analysis is that it makes the applicability of a
federal statute depend on the content of state law.... If a state cannot preempt a district court's
consideration of a forum-selection clause by holding that the clause is automatically enforceable,
it makes no sense for it to be able to do so by holding the clause automatically void.
Id. at 31 n.10. Of course, application of federal statutes frequently depends on the content of state law. The
state is not preempting the exercise of federal power, rather, the federal government in those cases chooses
to adopt state law as federal. Cf. id. at 35 n.1. (Scalia, J., dissenting). See generally Mishkin, supra note
50.
139. On the facts of the case, the argument for transfer in the absence of a forum selection clause was
exceedingly weak. Indeed, the district court in Stewart, on remand following the Supreme Court's decision,
held that it would not enforce the forum selection clause in light of the absence of significant connections
with New York: the case concerned the conduct of petitioner in Alabama; witnesses were located in both
Alabama and New Jersey; no relevant conduct occurred; no documents were available; and important
witnesses were unavailable in New York. 696 F. Supp. 583, 588-91 (N.D. Ala. 1988).
140. See Stewart, 487 U.S. at 35 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 30 n.9 ("Our determination that § 1404(a) governs the parties' dispute notwithstanding any
contrary Alabama policy makes it unnecessary to address the contours of state law.").
143. See id. at 26 ("A District Court's decision whether to apply a federal statute such as § 1404(a)
in a diversity action, however, involves a considerably less intricate analysis than that which governs the
'relatively unguided Erie choice."') (footnote omitted).
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of section 1404(a) sheds any light on whether that provision was intended to
displace state law on choice of forum clauses; and (2) if not, whether noncon-
formity with state law on that issue generates unnecessary friction with the
state. Both inquiries employ modes of statutory construction. The second treats
the Rules of Decision Act as a canon of construction consistent with its federal-
ism objective: Assume federal law does not displace state law where it would
matter to the state, unless justified by a federal purpose.
a. The Legislative History of Section 1404(a)
Section 1404(a) was passed in 1948, only one year after the federal adoption
of forum non conveniens and well before the adoption of that doctrine by many
states.' It is therefore unlikely that Congress thought transfer was in any
way dependent upon the permissibility of transfer or dismissal under state law.
Such state practice, even where available, was only analogous to the federal
intrasystem adjustment of venue since transfer does not constitute a dismissal,
the forum non conveniens remedy. The distinction between a forum non con-
veniens dismissal from state court and transfer from federal court widened after
Van Dusen v. Barrack,45 which dictated that the transferor law applies in the
transferee forum, a result that is unachievable in state forum non conveniens
practice.'46 Accordingly, even if Congress wanted to maintain symmetry
between state and federal practice, a good argument could be made that transfer
pursuant to section 1404(a), in a circumstance where forum non conveniens
dismissal from state court would not be available, does not represent an asym-
metry.
Moreover, it is unlikely that Congress gave any consideration at all to
conformity with state law. Section 1404(a) was passed along with numerous
revisions to the U.S. Judicial Code, including (ironically) the expansion of
corporate venue in section 1391. The statute's principal objective appeared to
be the reversal of Baltimore & Ohio Railroad v. Kepner,'47 which held that
statutory venue represented an indefeasible statutory privilege for plaintiffs.'48
In the wake of that decision, there was a felt need to curtail ambulance-chasing
by urban attorneys who exploited liberal federal venue provisions to concentrate
certain classes of cases, particularly FELA claims, in the venues where they
practiced.'49 Thus, the statute was seen as a federal solution to a federal prob-
144. See Stein, supra note 1, at 807. See generally Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 68-71 (1949).
145. 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
146. As the more convenient forum is not within the same judicial system as the dismissing court, it
is in no way bound by that court's choice of law.
147. 314 U.S. 44 (1941).
148. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) historical and revision notes (1988).
149. See Stein, supra note 1, at 806-07.
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lem.'t 0 To the extent that forum selection clauses advance the same objective
of limiting unilateral forum shopping and channel cases into a forum agreeable
to both parties, it is unlikely that Congress would disapprove of their enforce-
ment simply because of a different state policy.
However, it would be fair to conclude that Congress did not specifically
contemplate the impact of the section 1404(a) on forum selection clauses, a
fairly recent innovation. There is little reported use of forum selection clauses
prior to 1965, when Pennsylvania broke from the traditional view that such
clauses constituted an impermissible "private ouster" of the court's jurisdic-
tion.'5' As the Court pointed out in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,'52
such clauses were historically disfavored, and it was not until that 1972 decision
that their enforcement was endorsed by the federal courts. 53
In sum, a historical inquiry into the background and purpose of section
1404(a) would suggest, although not conclusively, that Congress did not
contemplate federal conformity with state practice.
b. Effect of Federal Nonconformity on Alabama's Regulatory Purpose
Given the inconclusiveness of the specific legislative history behind section
1404(a), the federal nonconformity with the Alabama rule could have been
further supported by analysis of the impact of federal practice on the policies
driving the state rule. Because these policies apparently would not be affected
by federal nonconformity, the Rules of Decision Act would not mandate
application of state law.
150. See Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 636 (1964) ("[Bloth the history and purposes of §
1404(a) indicate that it should be regarded as a federal judicial housekeeping measure, dealing with the
placement of litigation in the federal courts."). To counter this implication, Justice Scalia contrasted the
explicit displacement of state law in the Federal Arbitration Act with the silence of section 1404(a) on the
issue:
A written provision in ... a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to
perform the whole or any part hereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an
existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevoca-
ble, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or equity for the revocation of any
contract.
Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. at 36 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988)). He
thus argued that Congress knows how to displace state law when it so intends.
There is, however, good reason for the explicit displacement of the Federal Arbitration Act not pertinent
to section 1404(a): the Federal Arbitration Act displaces state law in state court as well as federal court.
See generally Hirshman, supra note 29. There is no way Congress could have done that without making
it explicit. In contrast, Congress may well have assumed that its regulation of federal venue in section
1404(a) would have been understood to create an independent federal standard.
151. See Central Contracting Co. v. Youngdahl & Co., 418 Pa. 122,209 A.2d 810 (1965); Freer, supra
note 101, at 1095-96 & n.31.
152. 407 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1972).
153. Cf. Boyd v. Grand Trunk W.R.R. Co., 338 U.S. 263, 266 (1949) (refusing to enforce contract
limiting venue in FELA action to place of employee's residence on ground that enforcement would frustrate
"substantial" right to sue in all places provided for in venue statute).
1991] 1965
The Yale Law Journal
The principal Alabama judicial decision setting out the policy against forum
selection clauses emphasizes that private parties should not be able to constrict
the jurisdiction of the state's courts." Enforcement of the forum selection
clause here would not be in derogation of Alabama's judicial authority. (It is
not even in derogation of federal judicial authority, since the federal court is
retaining jurisdiction, and simply adjusting venue). Thus, as in Byrd, the state
rule would seem to be bound up in concerns about the administration of its own
courts, rather than in conferring privileges upon the litigants or achieving some
other regulatory objective relevant to federal practice. 155 In choice of law
parlance, there is a "false conflict." No value of federalism would be sacrificed
here by federal nonconformity with state practice.
The significance of grounding the Rules of Decision Act mandate in the
principle of federalism rather than litigant equality is vividly demonstrated by
Justice Scalia's dissent in Stewart. Scalia's argument that the question is con-
trolled by the Rules of Decision Act's general directive to respect state law in
the absence of contrary instructions misapprehends both the nature of that
imperative and the policies implicated by this particular court-access rule.
Justice Scalia argued that the majority was sanctioning precisely the kind
of general federal common law condemned by Justice Brandeis in Erie. Because
section 1404(a) does not expressly address the validity of forum selection claus-
es,'56 Justice Scalia reasoned, the command of the Rules of Decision Act
applies. He thus brought the case within the purview of the "twin aims" test
of Hanna: the state rule against forum selection clauses must be followed since
federal recognition of the clause would encourage forum shopping and result
in the inequitable administration of laws.'57
Scalia defined inequity solely in terms of litigant equality: federal noncon-
formity with state practice is condemned because it results in a different distri-
bution of important rights than would be enjoyed in a state court. 58 Impor-
154. Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Foster, 382 So.2d 554, 556 (Ala. 1980) ("We consider contract
provisions which attempt to limit the jurisdiction of the courts of this state to be invalid and unenforceable
as being contrary to public policy. Parties may not confer jurisdiction by consent, nor may they limit the
jurisdiction of a court by consent.").
155. The state policy is not without ambiguity. One aspect of the state rule does suggest that federal
transfer undermines its objective: choice of forum clauses are unenforceable only insofar as they stipulate
a forum outside of the state. Id. at 555 (acknowledging enforceability of venue selection agreements). While
that qualification is consistent with the objective of preventing private diminishment of the state's judicial
authority and thus irrelevant to federal practice, it may also suggest an interest in local resolution of the
controversy affected by federal transfer. See infra notes 175-90 and accompanying text for discussion of
such a territorial interest.
156. Scalia emphasized that all conditions warranting transfer explicitly mentioned by the statute refer
to prospective facts: how the chosen venue will affect the convenience of the parties and witnesses. Forum
selection clauses are retrospective, requiring evaluation of the parties' intent and bargaining position. Forum
selection clauses thus implicate matters extrinsic to the litigation, and are presumably more intrusive into
matters traditionally regulated by the states. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 34 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 38.
158. Id. at 39:
The best explanation of what constitutes inequitable administration of the laws is that found in
Erie itself; allowing an unfair discrimination between noncitizen and citizens of the forum state
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tance is measured solely in reference to impact on the parties. Absent from
Scalia's opinion is any consideration of the significance of the practice to the
state.
As discussed above,159 however, such an attempt to define equality with-
out reference to some external standard by which to evaluate the permissibility
of differences between state and federal practice is an impossible task,1" and
one that reduces the federalism policies driving the Erie doctrine to a pointless
mechanical exercise. There are many asymmetries between state and federal
practice, and there is no indication that Congress would condemn a given
asymmetry to which the state is indifferent simply because it affects the
parties."' Such an approach gives a windfall to the pro-conformity litigant in
the sense that she is given rights that neither the state nor federal legislatures
intended to confer.
The above analysis of Stewart provides three insights critical to a proper
analysis of the Erie implications of court-access rules. First, Stewart demon-
strates that federalism is relevant even when the federal practice is arguably
authorized by federal statute. Federalism guides the determination of whether
the statute in fact should be construed to displace state law. Second, Stewart
illustrates the folly of categorization. Depending on the nature of both the
federal and state interests, federal nonconformity with state court-access practice
may or may not generate unjustified friction. Categorizing the practice as
substantive or procedural does not advance the inquiry into whether friction is
generated. Third, Stewart illustrates the significance of treating the Rules of
Decision Act mandate as a function of federalism rather than of litigant equali-
ty. The state may be wholly indifferent to federal nonconformity with certain
.... Whether discrimination is unfair in this context largely turns on how important is the matter
in question. The decision of an important legal issue should not turn on the accident of diversity
or the presence of a federal question unrelated to that issue.
159. See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
160. Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982) (asserting that "equality" as
abstract proposition is legally useless as it requires prior understanding of which persons and treatments
are alike).
161. Even taken on its own terms, Justice Scalia's argument is flawed on the facts of Stewart. Assuming
for the sake of argument that the Rules of Decision Act requires an identity of rights distributed in state
and federal court, there was no deviation from that standard here since petitioner's case could not have been
brought in state court as pleaded. Plaintiff chose the federal forum, presumably because federal courts have
exclusive jurisdiction over antitrust claims. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988); see also Freeman v. Bee Machine Co.,
319 U.S. 448, 451 (1943). Plaintiff's antitrust claims would not have been cognizable in state court. There
was no "inequitable administration" of the laws since there was no other Alabama forum with jurisdiction
over the case as pleaded. Similarly, there was no danger of forum shopping since there was only one forum
in which to shop. Accordingly, the rights affected were not in any way determined by the citizenship of
the parties.
Assuming for the sake of argument that federal courts are constrained by Erie in federal question as
well as diversity cases, such a constraint would seem to be without purpose where the federal courts have
exclusive jurisdiction over a case, and no "forum shopping" is possible. Cf. Westen & Lehman, supra note
25, at 381 ("[T]his antidiscrimination value (and the outcome-determinative rule itsupports) is notrelevant
to patent cases, because the exclusiveness of federal jurisdiction precludes any possibility of discrimina-
tion.').
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state practices. If the state is indifferent, there is no reason to believe that
Congress would have outlawed federal nonconformity simply because the
litigants are treated differently.
These three insights suggest that resolution of court-access problems can
be aided significantly by analysis of the various state interests driving court-
access rules and of the federal interests in an independent practice.
B. Are the Policies Driving State Court-Access Rules Affected by Federal
Practice?
For any state practice there are three possible kinds of legislative purpose
relevant to the Erie problem, two of which are threatened by federal disregard
of the practice.
First, the state rule may represent a decision not to spend state resources
on a given problem. The state courts may have shorter hours, or, as in Byrd,
may bypass jury determination of certain questions because judicial resolution
is more economical or practical. This is the only kind of state policy not
undermined by federal practice. If the federal courts want to expend their
resources, the state ought to be indifferent.162
Second, the state may be attempting to achieve a regulatory objective
external to the lawsuit. For example, it may want to encourage trust relation-
ships by bestowing evidentiary privileges, to achieve repose by imposing a
statute of limitations, or to deter wrongful conduct by conditioning court access
on a foreign corporation's registration with the secretary of state. It is generally
conceded that federal courts should not unduly frustrate these external regulato-
ry objectives. 163
Third, the state may be attempting to achieve a regulatory objective intrinsic
to the lawsuit. It may want to make pleading more conclusory, provide more
or less discovery, assert local control over the resolution of the litigation, or
vest venue in a location convenient to a litigant. It may be balancing the
interests of the parties, or simply deciding how to achieve an optimal adjudica-
tion. While these litigation-related interests have generally been ignored in the
Erie context, there is no principled reason that they are less worthy of federal
deference than external regulatory objectives.
As modern conflict of laws doctrine has painfully demonstrated, discerning
the nature of the actual policies driving a given rule can be hazardous. 161 The
state legislature will rarely specifically evaluate whether it wanted federal
162. Where state policy attempts to limit use of state resources to the taxpayers who have paid for those
resources, federal nonconformity with that practice is irrelevant to the underlying policy to the extent that
federal courts are not funded exclusively by the forum state, and the out-of-state litigant may well be part
of the federal taxpayer base. The validity of pro-citizen court-access policies to avoid free-rider problems
is further considered below. See infra notes 207-08 and accompanying text.
163. See Ely, supra note 13, at 725-26; Redish & Phillips, supra note 13, at 394.
164. See generally R. CRAMTON,'D. CURRIE & H. KAY, CoNFLICT OF LAWS 230-34 (4th ed. 1987).
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practice to conform. Attempts to divine legislative intent can appear to be
purely fictitious. 165 However, there are two distinctions between state-federal
conflicts and state-state conflicts that render the task more manageable in the
former.
First, in state-federal conflicts there is less need to speculate about whether
the state intended its policy to protect federal litigants. In an interstate context,
interest analysis has been criticized as requiring an almost metaphysical deter-
mination of whether the state intended to extend its law to extraterritorial
transactions.1 66 In the Erie context, on the other hand, the policy objectives
protected by federal deference are all matters of legitimate domestic concern
to the state. Whether or not federal practice was specifically contemplated by
the state lawmaker, undesirable friction is generated when state policies are
undermined by federal nonconformity. In fact, the federal court is not called
upon to divine that specific state intent at all; it is not the state's choice of law
that is being vindicated, but its internal regulatory objective. The federal court's
determination of state legislative intent is the common judicial task of figuring
out which legitimate regulatory objective was intended by the lawmaker, not
whether the lawmaker intended its law to apply to this specific transaction. It
is the difference between asking whether a law is designed to save money or
promote safety, as opposed to asking whether a state wanted to promote safety
for persons or transactions outside its territory.
Second, the Rules of Decision Act provides a presumption in favor of state
law that is absent in the interstate context. It may well be difficult or impossible
to ascertain whether a state practice of, for instance, limiting discovery is
designed to make litigation less expensive for the court or for the litigants. The
latter would be frustrated by a contrary federal practice; the former would not.
Given the Rules of Decision Act's directive to avoid infringement of state regu-
latory prerogatives, however, it is incumbent on anyone urging a common law
departure from state practice to demonstrate the absence of a state interest.
Two fairly straightforward questions provide an appropriate focus for
examining the policies driving court-access rules: (1) In a situation where a
lawsuit could be brought in several places, why would a state want to hear a
case the federal court would not otherwise retain; and (2) why would the state
not want to hear a case that the federal court would otherwise retain? Despite
the relative simplicity of the questions, the answers are fairly complex.
1. Open-Door Policies
It is remarkable that virtually no federal court has considered itself bound
by state rules that provide greater access to state courts than the federal courts
165. Cf. Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth ofLegislative Intent, 78 Mid. L. REv. 392,399-402
(1980).
166. See id. at 400-01.
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have provided.'67 In contrast, state door-closing rules have received some
respect from the federal courts, 168 including a number of Supreme Court
decisions mandating conformity.169 It is hard to account for this disparity.
Intuitively, it would seem that the state decision to retain and expend resources
on a case has as much or more pertinence to federal practice than a state
decision to dismiss and save resources; in the latter case, the state might truly
be indifferent if the federal government wants to "waste" its resources. It
nevertheless appears that the federal courts can more easily recognize "sub-
stantive" state interests compromised by federal nonconformity with door-
closing rules than with door-opening rules.
Conflict with open-door policies arises principally in two contexts: transfers
pursuant to section 1404(a), as in Stewart, and forum non conveniens dismissals
in states that have limited or abrogated the forum non conveniens doctrine.170
In virtually all of the cases where the Erie implications are addressed explicitly,
consideration of relevant state policies is avoided by the courts' conclusion that
limiting access to federal courts is one of the "inherent powers" of the court.
For instance, in In Re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, Louisiana on
July 9, 1982,'171 the court chose to ignore Louisiana's'restriction on forum non
conveniens dismissals because of a paramount federal interest in "self-manage-
ment":172
Federal courts must be able to control the fact-finding processes by
which the rights of litigants are determined in order to preserve the
"essential character" of the federal judicial system. Of course, we do
not contend that this control will not affect state-created substantive
rights in some cases. Ultimately, however, the integrity of our fact-
finding processes must outweigh considerations of uniformity. ...
Hanna gives us good reason to hold that federal courts have inherent
powers under Article III to displace state laws on matters involving their
basic competence as courts.... We hold that the interests of the federal
forum in self-regulation, in administrative independence, and in self-
management are more important than the disruption of uniformity
167. The closest the Supreme Court has ever come to enforcing such an open-door rule was in
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956). In that pre-Hanna decision, the Court held that a
Vermont federal district court sitting in diversity must enforce the state rule against enforcing arbitration
clauses. The district court was thus forced to adjudicate an action it would have otherwise dismissed.
Bernhardt, however, falls short of representing a true "open-door" paradigm. The state policy against
arbitration was found to be substantive, and thus binding on the federal courts, not due to any state interest
in providing a Vermont forum but because of a state policy favoring judicial resolution over proceedings
before arbitration panels. Id. at 203-04. The state interest recognized by the court thus had more to do with
the mode of proceeding rather than its location.
168. See cases cited infra note 237.
169. E.g., Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949); Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183
(1947).
170. See infra note 191.
171. 821 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1987).
172. Id. at 1158.
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created by applying federal forum non conveniens in diversity cas-
es.
173
No explanation is offered for why the federal interest in court access is
more pressing than is the federal interest in any other "procedural" rule, but
a sufficient number of courts have fudged the issue with the "innate power"
rationale to generate a respectable body of precedent. 74
Had the courts considered the federalism implications of nonconformity with
open-door policies, they would have discovered a wide range of state interests
driving the open-door rules. Most of those interests are undermined by federal
nonconformity. This suggests that something has gone wrong in the cases, or
at the very least that greater scrutiny of the "inherent power" rationale is
warranted.
a. Territorial Policies: Regulatory Interest in the Underlying Dispute
The most obvious reason a state might want to retain a case subject to
dismissal in the federal courts is that it perceives some regulatory stake in the
underlying dispute. Either some events giving rise to the suit threaten the well-
being of persons within the state's borders, or the state wants to hold one of
its citizens accountable for her actions outside the state.175
Federal insensitivity to such interests may be attributable to two related
premises, both of which are flawed. First, it is often said that any state regula-
tory interest is adequately vindicated by application of the state's law by
another court.1 76 This is a particularly dispositive premise in the transfer con-
text, where application of the choice of law of the transferor state is guaranteed
by Van Dusen v. Barrack.177 The state is perceived as indifferent to transfer
as long as its law (or choice thereof) is applied. Second, it might appear that
whatever state interest exists in resolving a dispute in state court is irrelevant
173. Id. at 1158-59 (quoting Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 369-70 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc));
accord 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 6, § 3828, at 293-94; see also Exxon Corp.
v. Chick Kam Choo, 817 F.2d 307, 320 (5th Cir. 1987) (implying in dictum that federal court in Texas may
issue forum non conveniens dismissal and is not bound by Texas open-courts statute), rev'd on other
grounds, 486 U.S. 140 (1988).
174. See, e.g., Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 435 F.2d 527, 536 (4th Cir. 1970) ('[Aldoption of state
court procedures by federal courts ... may be feasible, but it may also be in conflict with the fundamental
interests of the federal courts in the conduct of their own business and the maintenance of the integrity of
their own procedures, the legitimate interest of a federal forum, qua forum."), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 932
(1971). It should be noted that the inherent powers rationale preceded Erie: even under the Conformity Acts,
exceptions were carved out for judicial administration. McDonald v. Ness, 238 U.S. 264, 266 (1915) (courts
have innate power to adopt and enforce their own self-preserving rules).
175. The state's interest in providing a forum for its own citizens, or in altruistically providing justice
to the world, will be considered separately below. See infra notes 199-203, 206-14 and accompanying text.
Neither of those interests is based in the state's interest in the dispute itself.
176. See, e.g., Kogan, A Neo-Federalist Tale of Personal Jurisdiction, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 257, 364
(1990); Lewis, The Three Deaths of "State Sovereignty" and the Curse of Abstraction in the Jurisprudence
of Personal Jurisdiction, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 699, 736 (1983).
177. 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
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to whether the dispute should be resolved in federal court; the state has been
divested of its adjudicatory prerogative by the creation of federal jurisdiction.
Whether the federal court transfers the case or not, the state will not be able
to exercise its sovereign prerogative. Court-access issues thereby appear distinct
from choice of law questions since the federal court may still vindicate the
state's legislative jurisdiction even though it has divested the state of its judicial
jurisdiction.
These arguments are undercut in situations where choice of law would be
affected by the court-access decision. Such a case would seem likely to arise
in states that have declined to follow the Supreme Court's holding in Piper
Aircraft Co. v. Reyno' 7T---that forum non conveniens is not precluded where
dismissal would result in less favorable choice of law for plaintiff.179 Some
California courts, for instance, have expressly declined to follow Piper Aircraft,
and do foreclose dismissals that would affect choice of law, at least where
plaintiff is a citizen of California.180 A federal court sitting in California that
was tempted to apply Piper Aircraft could not rationalize its decision by
viewing California as indifferent to the decision. California's stake in the
federal court's retention of jurisdiction is virtually identical to its interest in
having its choice of law applied, a state preference with which the Supreme
Court has clearly mandated federal conformity. 81 In both the choice of law
and choice of forum contexts, California has the identical interest in the en-
forcement of rights recognized under California law.
However, even where choice of law is unaffected by a federal dismissal,
the suggestion that application of the state's choice of law exhausts the state's
interest misapprehends the nature of the federal courts and the state's territorial
interest in asserting judicial jurisdiction. The governmental authority exercised
by a court in asserting its jurisdiction is not simply an abstract act of sovereign
authority. The court brings to the community the authority and responsibility
for resolving the controversy and establishing legal norms. That interest is
vindicated even where some other state's law would be selected. Indeed, in
cases where a state has no legitimate regulatory interest in the defendant or
underlying dispute, asserting jurisdiction may be constitutionally problemat-
178. 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
179. See generally Stein, supra note 1.
180. Holmes v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 156 Cal. App. 3d 372, 202 Cal. Rptr. 773 (1984); Internation-
al Harvester Co. v. Superior Court, 95 Cal. App. 3d 652, 157 Cal. Rptr. 324 (1979). California also seems
to deviate from the holding of Piper Aircraft that a foreign plaintiff's choice of forum is not entitled to the
substantial deference accorded American plaintiffs. See. e.g., Corrigan v. Bjork Shiley Corp., 182 Cal. App.
3d 166, 227 Cal. Rptr. 247 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1049 (1987) (while Australian plaintiff not entitled
to absolute deference given to California plaintiff, "substantial deference" is not eliminated when plaintiff
is foreign). But see Shiley Inc. v. Superior Court, 203 Cal. App. 3d 1376, 250 Cal. Rptr. 793 (1988)
(adopting Piper Aircraft and criticizing Holmes and Corrigan).
181. Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
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ic. t82 As the Supreme Court stated in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, "[t]here is
a local interest in resolving localized controversies decided at home."183 That
local interest is not simply curiosity; it is an interest in local governance. Both
the judge and jury act as representatives of the community in vindicating the
community's interest in the dispute.1"
This is a familiar theme because it is also the backbone of federalism. Fed-
eralism seeks a balance between the economic, military, and social advantages
of a national government and the political advantage of local governance.185
That balance is reflected in the structure of the federal courts. While federal
courts are ultimately answerable to the federal government, they are also, in
important respects, part of the state community. Virtually no federal district
covers more than a single state.186 Federal judges are inevitably selected from
the local bar,"7 and federal juries are drawn from the state population.88
The personal jurisdiction of the federal courts is, by and large, restricted to the
personal jurisdiction of the state courts.189
Of course Congress could change all that by creating a single national dis-
trict court, or some variation thereon, but it has not done so. It is clear that the
182. See Stein, supra note 27, at 699 (arguing that sufficiency of minimum contacts should be measured
by degree of state regulatory interest implicated by defendant's conduct). But see Burnham v. Superior Court,
110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990) (rejecting constitutional attack on transient jurisdiction where jurisdiction was
justified solely on basis of defendant's temporary presence in state). Ironically, in a case upholding jurisdic-
tion in which there was no forum regulatory interest in the defendant or his conduct, the Burnham Court
went out of its way to question the legitimacy of assertions of general jurisdiction over individual, as
opposed to corporate, defendants. Id. at 2110 & n.l. For a thorough consideration of the implications of
the Burnham decision on the law of personal jurisdiction, see Symposium on Burnham v. Superior Court,
21 RUTGERS L.J. (forthcoming 1991).
183. 330 U.S. 501, 509 (1947).
184. See Weisburd, Territorial Authority and Personal Jurisdiction, 63 WASH. U.L.Q. 377, 428-29
(1985).
185. Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985
SUP. CT. REv. 341. As demonstrated by Professor Rapaczynski, the benefits of local governance are both
instrumental and intrinsic. Instrumentally, local government may be more responsive and accessible to
individuals or groups who could not make their voices heard in a national arena dominated by well-
organized and well-financed forces. Id. at 380-91. Local governance offers an additional, intrinsic advantage
over a purely national polity: it provides greater space for citizen participation in government decision-
making. Id. at 395-405.
While adjudication of lawsuits is not typically thought of as a vehicle for participatory democracy, the
benefits of local governance are realized by appropriate jurisdiction decisions. While the community may
not directly dictate the disposition of a lawsuit, its values and preferences are reflected in the make-up of
the jury and the selection of the judge, who is also typically drawn from the community.
186. See generally 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 6, § 3505. Conformity of the
federal judicial districts to state borders has been maintained since the creation of the inferior federal courts
in the Judiciary Act of 1789. Id. The sole exception is the District of Wyoming, which includes portions
of Yellowstone National Park located within Montana and Idaho. See 28 U.S.C. § 131 (1988).
187. See Surrency, Federal District Court Judges and the History of Their Courts, 40 F.R.D. 139
(1966).
188. 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(1) (1988) requires that all jurors be residents of the district for at least one
year.
189. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e) limits long-arm service to the circumstances in which it would be available
in state court, unless otherwise authorized by federal rule or statute. There are some specialized federal
jurisdictional provisions, but the norm is compliance with state territorial limits. See infra notes 265-68 and
accompanying text.
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state-bound structure of the district courts is not accidental; it is itself an ac-
commodation to the principle of federalism.
Accordingly, when a federal court makes a decision to assert its judicial
authority it advances the territorial authority of the state community, if not
formally the state government. Conversely, a federal dismissal or transfer of
jurisdiction may frustrate that interest. Indeed, from this perspective, the state
interest in retaining jurisdiction is equally frustrated by a federal transfer to
another federal court, or a federal forum non conveniens dismissal in favor of
a foreign forum. The only difference is that a transfer marginally maintains the
principle of self-governance since the state community is, in some highly
diluted sense, part of the national community. Dismissal in favor of a foreign
forum entirely divests the community of control over the litigation.
By the same token, however, state decisions to assert jurisdiction that are
not rooted in legitimate territorial regulatory interests should command less
federal obedience. Suppose, for example, that state X were to hold that no case
involving a dispute in state Y would be dismissed from its courts. It could
hardly be maintained that federal conformity with such a rule, even if constitu-
tionally applied in state X courts, would advance the interests of federalism.
Federal deference to the state's regulatory autonomy implies an important
territorial limitation: the state's regulatory prerogative will only be respected
when the state is acting within its legitimate sphere of territorial authority.190
That limitation, in turn, suggests that two common state interests advanced by
open-door rules may be distinguished from core territorial interests: altruistic
policies and revenue-generating policies.
b. Extraterritorial Policies: The Texas Problem
Several states have completely eliminated discretionary dismissal of certain
actions on the ground of forum non conveniens.' 9' As discussed above, the
Supreme Court of Texas recently held that forum non conveniens there is
precluded by a Texas statute guaranteeing that personal injury actions arising
190. See Hill, supra note 18, at 553-54 (obligation to apply forum law should be limited to cases where
forum has contacts with the controversy).
191. See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 671 (1991); Haug v. Burlington N.R.R., 236 Mont. 368, 770 P.2d 517 (1989) (precluding forum non
conveniens dismissals in FELA actions); Shewbrooks v. A.C. & S., Inc., 529 So.2d 557,562-63 (Miss. 1988)
(precluding forum non conveniens where action barred elsewhere by statute of limitations); Kassapas v.
Arkon Shipping Agency, Inc., 485 So. 2d 565 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 488 So.2d 203 (La.), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 940 (1986). By recent statute, forum non conveniens dismissals of claims founded upon federal
law are permitted in Louisiana. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 123 (West Supp. 1989). Forum non conveniens
dismissals in Vermont are available only when a plaintiff's choice of forum constitutes an attempt to "vex,
harass or oppress the defendant," a standard much higher than that applied in federal court. Burrington v.
Ashland Oil Co., 134 Vt. 211, 216, 356 A.2d 506, 510 (1976). See generally Robertson & Speck, Access
to State Courts in Transnational Personal Injury Cases: Forum Non Conveniens and Antisuit Injunctions,
68 TEX. L. REV. 937, 950-51 (1990) for a comprehensive survey of state forum non conveniens provisions.
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outside of Texas "may be enforced in the courts of this state."' 92 As long as
Texas has personal jurisdiction over the defendant, its courts will adjudicate
the controversy, regardless of its connection (or lack thereof) with the state.
Not surprisingly, "[t]ransnational tort litigation is increasing in the states
that have not chosen to follow the federal forum non conveniens doctrine."' 93
Does federal nonconformity with those policies undermine legitimate state
preferences?
The answer, I think, depends on why those states have taken that position.
Legislative history on the Texas statute is incredibly thin.194 There are, how-
ever, several possible accounts.195
(1) Regulatory Interests in Defendants
To say that Texas has no connection to the offshore suits overstates the
matter. The statute is not implicated unless there is jurisdiction over the defen-
dants. The fact that the claims arose outside the state means that, in most cases,
there must be "general jurisdiction" over the defendants, i.e., the defendants
must have maintained "pervasive and systematic contacts" with Texas such that
Texas can legitimately claim an interest in regulating their conduct, even
outside the state. t96
If that is the interest advanced by the open-courts provision, it is hard to
conclude that federal nonconformity does not undermine that policy. If Texas
wants to hold its citizens, or functional equivalent thereof,197 accountable to
the Texas community, a federal forum non conveniens dismissal frustrates that
192. Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674. The statute, TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.031 (Vernon
1986), is set out supra note 2.
193. Robertson & Speck, supra note 191, at 952.
194. The Alfaro court cites no direct legislative history on the 1913 Act. Its holding is based solely
on a linguistic analysis of the provision. Indeed, Justice Hightower in concurrence, acknowledges the benefits
of forum non conveniens but claims to be constrained by the statutory wording. 786 S.W.2d at 679
(Hightower, J., concurring).
Justice Gonzalez, in dissent, asserts that the history of the provision demonstrates that it has nothing
to do with forum non conveniens, a doctrine which came into common usage well after the passage of the
Act. Id. at 692 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting). Rather, he asserts, the Act was passed to guarantee Texas citizens
injured in Mexico a right to proceed in Texas court without risk of being dismissed under the "dissimilarity
doctrine," a conflict of laws rule that mandated dismissal when the controlling law was so different from
forum law that it could not be easily or accurately applied. Id. See generally Note, The Texas Dissimilarity
Doctrine as Applied to the Tort Law of Mexico-A Modern Evaluation, 55 TEX. L. REv. 1281 (1977).
195. Justice Doggett, in a lengthy concurrence, focused on a series of policy-based justifications for
the rule, most of which are considered infra (see notes 196-236 and accompanying text). 786 S.W.2d at
680-89 (Doggett, J., concurring). He does not appear to be making the claim that these policies were in fact
the legislative objective behind the statute.
196. See Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d at 685 (Doggett, J., concurring) ("[Tihe personal jurisdiction-due process
analysis will ensure that Texas has a sufficient interest in each case entertained in our state's courts.").
197. See Stein, supra note 27, at 758 (justifying assertions of general jurisdiction as functionally
equivalent to holding citizens of state accountable); cf. Brilmayer, Haverkamp, Logan, Lynch, Neuwirth,
& O'Brien, A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 721,726 (1988) (assertions of general
jurisdiction justified where defendant has accrued benefits of state, and has access to state political process
comparable to that of state citizen).
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policy.198 Indeed, there will probably be diversity jurisdiction in many cases
that fall within the statute. This regulatory interest is directly undermined when
the action is removed to federal court and subsequently dismissed.
There are, however, alternative explanations of the statute that are less
worthy of federal deference.
(2) Altruistic Interests
Perhaps the most common-sense explanation of the broad open-door policy
is that Texas wants to spread its judicial wisdom to the world.199 Jurisdiction
over the defendant is simply a way of achieving that goal.
It is unclear whether federal retention of these cases would in fact advance
that policy; to the extent that the rule reflects a confidence in the state judicial
machinery, federal adjudication would not spread Texas judicial wisdom.
However, even if federal practice is pertinent to the state policy, there is
reason to discount that policy. Such "altruistic interests" have traditionally been
considered of questionable legitimacy in the conflicts context,'to and should
not command federal deference in the Erie context. As discussed above,20 1
the federal obligation to respect state regulatory prerogatives is necessarily
limited by some territorial restriction on the definition of the state's regulatory
interests. The state's desire to spread its judicial wisdom to the world is tanta-
mount to an interest in expanding its boundaries. The sensitivity to state
regulatory prerogatives required by the Rules of Decision Act does not mandate
federal deference to such extraterritorial interests.' °a Moreover, as discussed
below, 2 3 paramount federal interests may justify federal disregard of state
practices that interfere with interstate federalism or foreign relations.
198. Justice Doggett's concurrence attempted to find a more direct territorial interest under the "what
goes around comes around" principle: because of the global nature of the economy, any offshore misconduct
by a Texas domiciliary had the potential to harm Texas residents. On the facts of Alfaro, he suggests a Texas
interest in preventing the use of dangerous pesticides that could return to the state in the form of tainted
Costa Rican fruit. 786 S.W.2d at 689 (Doggett, J., concurring).
199. See id. at 688 (Doggett, J., concurring) ("The abolition of forum non conveniens will further
important public policy considerations by providing a check on the conduct of multinational corporations.");
Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 145 (1987) ("Texas has constituted itself [as] the world's
forum of fimal resort, where suit for personal injury or death may always be filed if nowhere else.").
200. See Gergen, Equality and the Conflict of Laws, 73 IOWA L. REV. 893,895 (1988) (Supreme Court
choice of law rulings "endow states with nearly boundless power to use their law to their citizens' advantage
and they bar states from using their law to aid out-of-staters"); cf. Ely, Choice of Law and the State's
Interest in Protecting Its Own, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 173 (1981) (criticizing conflicts theorists',
particularly Brainard Currie's, rejection of the legitimacy of altruistic interests).
201. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
202. Whether or not the state is permitted to promote nonterritorial interests instate courts is a different
question. State practice in state court will be restrained only by the limits of the due process, full faith and
credit, and equal protection clauses. The issue of whether a state should be restrained from its own
unconstitutional treatment of a litigant is distinct from whether Congress wants the federal courts to respect
a state regulatory prerogative.
203. See infra notes 315-24 and accompanying text.
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(3) Revenue-Generating Interests
Another possible explanation of broad open-door policies is that they serve
as revenue-generating measures for the state. Texas lawyers, among others,
stand to benefit from a rule that draws out-of-state judicial business into the
state. Such interests, while not extraterritorial in the same sense as altruistic
interests, demand little federal deference for similar reasons.
In the case of a revenue-generating measure, the "regulatory choice" that
the state has made is not in fact an internal preference for one domestic policy
over another. The state is simply trying to attract business from another state
to its own. The only regulatory "choice" that the state has made is whether or
not to subsidize that business by underwriting the cost of the judiciary, and it
has no business directing the federal government similarly to subsidize the
state's economy. The state is without competence to "choose" to enrich its own
bar at the expense of out-of-state lawyers. Like the altruistic interest, this is not
a domestic policy matter.204 The state objective of enriching the bar may be
frustrated if federal court access is denied, but the federal government has not
interfered with state prerogatives as to how to regulate activity within its territo-
ry. 5 The federal government could hardly be charged with stepping on state
toes when it has simply declined to use federal resources to channel clients into
the state.
(4) Resident-Benefiting Policies
Unlike the Texas approach of opening the courts to the world (for certain
types of cases), several states have limited their open-access approach to
204. See Brilmayer, Legitimate Interests in Multistate Problems: As Between State and Federal Law,
79 MICH. L. REV. 1315, 1330 (1981) ("Each state has a prima facie right to regulated domestic con-
tacts-persons, property, or events affiliated with the state-but a state generally has no business regulating
circumstances connected only with other states.").
205. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Ferens v. John Deere Co., 110 S. Ct. 1274 (1990),
questioned the importance of such revenue-generating interests in holding that the law of the transferor state
should be applied to plaintiff-initiated transfers pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). According to the Court,
a contrary choice of law rule would induce states to develop pro-plaintiff rules, such as extended statutes
of limitations, to lure judicial business to the state- The Ferens rule forces a state to provide "take-out" law:
Applying the transferee law, by contrast, might create opportunities for forum shopping in
an indirect way. The advantage to Mississippi's personal injury lawyers that resulted from the
state's then applicable 6-year statute of limitations has not escaped us; Mississippi's long
limitation period no doubt drew plaintiffs to the state. Although Sun Oil held that the federal
courts have little interest in a state's decision to create a long statute of limitations or to apply
its statute of limitations to claims governed by foreign law, we should recognize the consequences
of our interpretation of § 1404(a). Applying the transferee law, to the extent that it discourages
plaintiff-initiated transfers, might give states incentives to enact similar laws to bring in out-of-
state business that would not be moved at the instance of the plaintiff.
Ferens, 110 S. Ct. at 1282.
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residents or citizens.' These rules foreclose jurisdictional dismissals against
resident plaintiffs while permitting them against nonresident plaintiffs.
Consider the following hypothetical: Plaintiff, a resident of Colorado travels
to Montreal for vacation, where she ingests soup containing botulin manufac-
tured by the Acme Soup Company. Plaintiff is hospitalized in Montreal, where
she eventually recuperates. When plaintiff returns to Colorado she files suit
against Acme in Colorado state court. All relevant proof is located in Montreal.
Acme is a multinational corporation with systematic and pervasive contacts in
every state. Since plaintiff is a citizen of Colorado, the court will accept juris-
diction; if she were not, the case would be dismissed on the ground of forum
non conveniens. To what extent must the federal courts in Colorado respect the
open-door rule when the defendant seeks to remove the case to federal court?
Unlike the citizenship-neutral open-access rule, which could be interpreted
as vindicating the state's regulatory interest in the conduct of defendants, the
state has made clear here that its interest is only in protecting its resident
plaintiff. While such discrimination may appear problematic under either the
equal protection or privileges and immunities clauses of the Constitution, the
Supreme Court sanctioned such state practices in Douglas v. New York, New
Haven & Harford Railroad. 7 The Douglas Court found the discrimination
permissible largely because of a free-rider problem: out-of-state plaintiffs who
did not contribute to the tax base should not have the same right to that re-
source as in-staters who paid for the courts. 08
Because forum residents are not the primary source of the federal court's
funding, they have no greater privilege of federal court access than out-of-state
litigants. The state ought to be indifferent about the extent to which the federal
courts provide equal access to all litigants.
Of course, the state is not indifferent to the extent that the pro-resident rule
represents an attempt to confer a relative advantage on resident plaintiffs. If the
206. Santa Fe Eng'rs, Inc., v. Carolina Door Prods., Inc., 275 S.C. 215, 268 S.E.2d 581 (1980);
McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Lohn, 192 Colo. 200,557 P.2d 373 (1976) (construing "open-courts"provision
of Colorado constitution to preclude forum non conveniens dismissals against resident plaintiffs). California
historically took this position, but a 1986 amendment to the California Civil Procedure Code expressly
provided that the California residency of a plaintiff will not preclude a forum non conveniens dismissal.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.20 (West Supp. 1990). As discussed above, California continues to favor
resident plaintiffs in cases where dismissal would result in an adverse change of law for plaintiff. See
Holmes v. Syntex Laboratories, 156 Cal. App. 3d 372,202 Cal. Rptr. 773 (1984); see also cases cited supra
note 180.
207. 279 U.S. 377 (1929).
208. Id. at 387 ("There are manifest reasons for preferring residents in access to often overcrowded
Courts, both in convenience and in the fact that broadly speaking it is they who pay for maintaining the
Courts concerned."). But see Gergen, supra note 200, at 929:
[Notwithstanding free-rider justifications] states may not deny out-of-staters access to services
that are essential to the functioning of markets (roads, public markets, and police protection, for
example). In the case of these services, our interest in facilitating the operation of states as
goods-creating entities is outweighed by our interest in promoting interstate commerce. Courts
should come within this exception. To bar out-of-staters from the courts of states when they seek
relief on claims arising from business transacted with citizens or within the state would discourage
interstate commerce.
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state wants its plaintiff to be able to sue at home, the federal court frustrates
that preference by making her sue elsewhere. Stripped of the free-rider justifi-
cation by removal to federal court, does that pro-resident preference deserve
federal respect?
If the privileges and immunities clause means anything, it is that states
cannot simply prefer their own citizens to citizens of other states.' But,
argues the state, its rule does not represent such a naked preference, even
without the free-rider justification. Rather, a "citizenship-neutral" principle of
venue is advanced: all plaintiffs should be able to sue at home.210 Indeed, the
federal venue statute embodied that principle prior to its 1990 amendment.1
Thus, the resident plaintiff is favored not because she is a citizen of the state,
but because she is suing at home.21
To what extent is that state preference different from the state's "selfish"
desire to enrich the local bar? Is there a legitimate internal regulatory interest
advanced by the "sue-at-home" rule? The answer, I think, is a cautious yes. 213
At heart, the rule is pro-plaintiff, not pro-resident. While it may operate to the
disadvantage of nonresident plaintiffs, the major impact of the rule is on
defendants. The state has chosen to vest the plaintiff with more control over
the venue of the suit than the defendant. The plaintiff can always have her
rights adjudicated at home; the defendant cannot. That pro-plaintiff bias is
209. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385,396 (1948) (clause bars "discrimination against citizens of other
states where there is no substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that they are citizens
of other states"). See generally Simson, Discrimination Against Nonresidents and the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 229 (1979).
210. See Gergen, supra note 200, at 920 n.180 (state access policy based in belief that "all people
should be able to look to their states for protection" does not constitute unconstitutional "naked preference").
Such a distinction illuminates a particularly confusing discussion in Justice Holmes' opinion in Douglas.
The New York statute in question was construed to authorize discretionary dismissals of actions brought
by nonresidents, but not those brought by residents. 279 U.S. at 386. Concluding that the statute only
discriminated on the basis of residency, and not citizenship, the Court condoned the discrimination: "A
distinction of privileges according to residence may be based upon rational considerations and has been
upheld by this Court, emphasizing the difference between citizenship and residence." Id. at 387; see also
Simson, supra note 209 (criticizing distinction as formalistic).
While the Court's distinction may appear artificial, it is directly relevant to the issue of whether the
state rule is based on considerations other than a naked preference for its citizens, i.e., the principle that
all plaintiffs should be able to sue at home. The only time the statute would be applied differently to New
York citizens versus New York residents is in the case of a nonresident citizen. In such a case, the
nonresident citizen would be put on the same footing as any other nonresident, and would be denied access.
279 U.S. at 386-87. Accordingly, the state would not provide a forum if plaintiff was not suing, and thus
maintains the neutral justification.
211. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1988), amended by Pub. L. No. 101-650 (1990) (eliminating plaintiff's
residence as a permissible venue in diversity actions).
212. The same principle is the basis for the holding of Piper Aircraft v. Reyno that a foreign plaintiff's
choice of an American forum is entitled to less deference than an American plaintiff's choice: "When the
home forum has been chosen, it is reasonable to assume that this choice is convenient." 454 U.S. 235, 255-
56 (1981).
213. My caution is a consequence of the significant possibility that the state rule is not really driven
by citizenship-neutral considerations at all. Rather, the state crafted the rule to benefit its own citizens. Cf.
Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84
MICH. L. REv. 1091 (1986) (discriminatory impact of legislation on out-of-staters creates presumption of
discriminatory intent).
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precisely the kind of preference respected in the context of "substantive rights."
It is not significantly different, for instance, from a rule establishing a pre-
sumption of substantive liability. While pro-plaintiff biases may or may not be
misguided as a matter of policy, they are the kind of regulatory preferences
allocated to the states by longstanding principles of American federalism.
It may be that a federal interest in international relations justifies federal
nonconformity with the pro-resident plaintiff rule when there is a foreign
alternative forum. Such a justification will be examined in Part II.C.2. The
federal interest in maintaining an unbiased forum underlying diversity jurisdic-
tion probably does not, however, apply here. While the state rule on its face
discriminates against the defendant, who, in the case of removal, will always
be a noncitizen, the state preference does not represent a bias against nonresi-
dent defendants. The state rule would apply with equal force if the defendant
were a citizen of the state; the resident defendant could not affect a change of
venue even if all relevant evidence and events occurred elsewhere. The defen-
dant is thus disadvantaged not because he is a noncitizen, but because he is a
defendant." 4 Accordingly, the federal diversity interest in avoiding local bias
against either litigant is irrelevant.
(5) Policies Against Private Control over Venue
As seen in Stewart, a state may compel its courts to accept jurisdiction
notwithstanding a prior agreement between the litigants to resolve the dispute
in some other forum.21 A number of states thus refuse or make it difficult
to enforce contractual choice of forum provisions.216 Such rules are in direct
conflict with the federal common law rule, first developed in the admiralty
context, that forum selection clauses are to be treated as presumptively val-
214. That, of course, leaves open the question of whether the different treatment of similarly situated
nonresident plaintiffs is unduly discriminatory. Unless it can be established that the rule is unconstitutionally
discriminatory such that it could not be constitutionally applied in state court, there is little justification for
federal nonconformity based in the diversity policy of avoiding parochial bias. The federal diversity policy
protects equality between the plaintiff and defendant. It does not purport to address the broader issue of
equality between different classes of litigants,
215. The converse issue of whether a forum selection clause is enforceable to create jurisdiction where
it would not otherwise exist also raises Erie problems, and is considered below in connection with state
door-closing provisions. See infra notes 237-307 and accompanying text.
216. Alabama, Georgia, Missouri, and Texas do not enforce forum selection clauses. See Note, Forum
Selection Clauses: Substantive or Procedural for Erie Purposes, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1068, 1071 (1989);
Annotation, Validity of Contractual Provision Limiting Place or Court in Which Action May Be Brought,
31 A.L.R. 4th 404, 409-14 (1984).
Other states refuse to recognize contractual submissions to jurisdiction in the state. See, e.g., Alexander
Proudfoot Co. v. Thayer, 877 F.2d 912 (1lth Cir. 1989) (federal court is bound by Florida's refusal to
recognize consent to jurisdiction clauses). But see Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 810 F.2d 1066, 1068
(lth Cir. 1987) (en banc), affd on other grounds, 487 U.S. 22 (1988) (enforceability of forum selection
clause is matter of federal law in case in which issue is whether court may dismiss or transfer case filed
in violation of choice of forum clause).
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id.21 7 Some federal courts have started to extend that rule to diversity cases
generally.218
While Stewart authorized the federal courts to ignore state law that refused
to enforce forum selection clauses in the context of a section 1404(a) transfer,
the case does not resolve whether state law must be followed in the absence
of section 1404(a). Thus, an open Erie question remains in cases where the
contractually stipulated forum is outside of the federal system,21 9 or where
a defendant moves to dismiss for improper venue rather than to transfer to the
contractually stipulated forum.
To the extent that such state rules merely represent the application of
broader open-door policies, the above analysis provides appropriate guidance
for federal conformity; if a state always asserts jurisdiction and will not dismiss
even when the parties have agreed to litigate elsewhere, the argument for
federal dismissal is no stronger than in a case without a choice of forum clause.
If significant state territorial interests are implicated by the case, a federal court
has no business frustrating those interests simply because it wants to honor the
contractual expectations of the parties. The state has already struck the balance
in favor of its territorial policies by rejecting the contractual exception to its
217. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991); The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore
Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972). See generally Nadelmann, Choice-of-Court Clauses in the United States; The Road
to Zapata, 21 Am J. COMP. L. 124 (1973).
218. Jones v. Weibrecht, 901 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1990); Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci Am., Inc., 858
F.2d 509,514-15 (9th Cir. 1988); Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 810 F.2d. 1066, 1069 (1lth Cir. 1987)
(en banc), aff'd on other grounds, 487 U.S. 22 (1988). The Third Circuit is apparently alone in concluding
explicitly that the enforceability of forum selection clauses is a matter of state law. General Eng'g Corp.
v. Martin Marietta Alumina, 783 F.2d 352 (3d Cir. 1986) (applying Virgin Island law to forum selection
clause signed by two Virgin Island residents); see also Instrumentation Assoc. v. Madsen, 859 F.2d 4, 7
(3d Cir. 1988) (citing Martin Marietta with approval, but characterizing issue as an open question in diversi-
ty); Farmland Indus. v. Frazier-Parrott Commodities, Inc., 806 F.2d 848, 852 (8th Cir. 1986) (stating in
dictum that "consideration should be given to the public policy of Missouri forbidding forum selection
clauses").
219. See, e.g., Instrumentation Assoc., 859 F.2d at 7 (stating in dictum that state law governs enforce-
ability of clause stipulating Canadian forum); Manetti-Farrow, 858 F.2d at 509 (enforcing contractual
selection of Italian forum, holding that federal venue statutes justify application of a uniform federal rule
on enforceability of forum selection clauses in diversity).
220. Martin Marietta, 783 F.2d at 352; Farmland, 806 F.2d at 849. Such motions to dismiss have been
entertained pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3) as well as 12(b)(6). The propriety of a 12(b)(3) motion
to enforce a choice of forum clause is questionable; the statutory venue requirements have in fact been
satisfied. The motion is therefore more analogous to a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens, normally
considered independent of 12(b)(3). This in turn raises the broader question of whether forum non conveni-
ens can be raised in cases covered by section 1404(a). The majority of courts have held that section 1404(a)
preempts a forum non conveniens motion where the alternative forum is.within the federal system, but the
Supreme Court has not addressed the question. See Cowan v. Ford Motor Co., 713 F.2d 100, 103 (5th Cir.
1983); Collins v. Am. Auto. Ins. Co., 230 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 802 (1956). See
generally Note, supra note 20; Annotation, Application of Common-Law Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens
in Federal Courts After Enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) Authorizing Transfer to Another District, 10
A.L.R. FED. 352 (1972).
The Supreme Court recently upheld dismissal (as opposed to transfer) of a personal injury claim filed
in Washington rather than the contractually stipulated Florida forum. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute,
111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991). However, since the claim was in admiralty, there was no question that federal law
governed the enforceability of the forum selection clause pursuant to Zapata. See id. at 1525 ("[T]his is
a case in admiralty, and federal law governs the enforceability of the forum-selection clause we scrutinize.").
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open-door policy. It is difficult to identify any legitimate basis for federal
rejection of that balance, at least in the absence of congressional authoriza-
tion.21
Similarly, if the state nonenforcement policy is driven by the state's interest
in protecting its choice of law, it is hard to see how a federal court could justify
its disregard of that policy. As discussed above in the forum non conveniens
context,222 one reason a state may wish to retain control over the litigation
is to ensure that its law will be applied. Just as a state's decision whether to
enforce a contractual choice of law provision clearly commands federal confor-
mity,tm its nonenforcement of forum selection clauses to achieve the same
objective warrants no less respect.
Where the conflict between state and federal law is specifically over the
value of choice of forum clauses, the question is more complicated. As with
the other open-door rules, a careful evaluation of the policies animating that
rule is critical to the issue of federal conformity. The two common explanations
for nonenforcement of choice of forum clauses have radically different Erie
implications.
Where, as was apparently the case in Stewart, the state rule is based on a
policy of not allowing private litigants to "oust" the court of its authority,
federal nonconformity with the state rule would not affect that policy. As
discussed above, federal jurisdiction has already divested the state court of its
authority.
On the other hand, to the extent that a state rule against choice of forum
clauses reflects a judgment about the relative rights of the litigants, federal
practice can undermine that policy. Specifically, if the state has made a judg-
ment that choice of forum clauses typically are not freely bargained for and
thus do not represent the true consent of the parties, federal enforcement of the
clause would directly frustrate that policy.'
221. As discussed above, supra notes 144-53 and accompanying text, a credible case can be made that
section 1404(a) does represent such authorization. Accordingly, federal transfers in the face of state non-en-
forcement policies raise fewer problems than forum non conveniens dismissals in the face of those same
policies.
222. See supra note 181 and accompanying text; see also Freer, supra note 101, at 1136 (choice of
forum clauses are primarily choice of law tools).
223. The obligation of federal courts to follow state law on the enforceability of choice of law clauses
appears to be universally recognized. See, e.g., Yeldell v. Tutt, 913 F.2d 533, 543 (8th Cir. 1990); Equifax
Servs., Inc. v. Hitz, 905 F.2d 1355, 1360 (10th Cir. 1990); Interfirst Bank Clifton v. Fernandez, 853 F.2d
292, 294 (5th Cir. 1988); Tele-Save Merchandising Co. v. Consumers Distrib. Co., 814 F.2d 1120, 1122
(6th Cir. 1987); T & S Brass Works, Inc. v. Pic-Air, Inc., 790 F2d 1098, 1102 (4th Cir. 1986).
224. It might be argued that federal enforcement of forum selection clauses would only frustrate state
policy where the litigants did not in fact freely bargain for the clause. A state rule based in concerns about
contractual volition can, in some sense, be seen as a question of administrative convenience not necessarily
affected by federal nonconformity. To the extent that the state rule is driven by concerns about whether
choice of forum clauses are freely bargained for, the rule represents a categorical judgment that a sufficient
percentage of such clauses are not freely bargained for as to cast doubt on their use generally. By making
that categorical judgment rather than adjudicating the volition issue in each case, the state has freed the court
and litigants from the time and expense of proving volition. If the federal courts choose to spend their own
resources ascertaining volition in every case, the state policy has been substantially accommodated as long
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The resolution by the lower courts of the Erie implications of forum
selection clauses outside of the section 1404(a) context reflects the same
question-begging evidenced in Stewart. The most egregious example is the
Ninth Circuit's 1988 decision in Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci America,
Inc.- s In that post-Stewart case, the parties had entered into a provision se-
lecting Florence, Italy as the exclusive forum for disputes regarding "interpreta-
tion or fulfillment" of their exclusive dealership agreement.' 2 When defen-
dants attempted to terminate the dealership and assign distribution to their
wholly owned subsidiary, plaintiff filed suit against the parent, subsidiary, and
managing officers in the Northern District of California, alleging a variety of
breach of contract and tortious interference claims. The district court granted
defendant's motion to dismiss on the basis of the forum selection clause and
the court of appeals affirmed. The court held that forum selection clauses were
presumptively valid under the Zapata standards, and should generally be
enforced in diversity proceedings.
While recognizing that Stewart was limited to the section 1404(a) con-
text,' 7 and that Zapata had been developed as an admiralty rule,' the
court nonetheless held that the enforceability of forum selection clauses in
diversity had been federalized by a generalized federal interest in venue. Those
federal interests "significantly outweigh the state interests."' 9 Quoting the
court of appeals decision in Stewart, the court concluded that the federal venue
statute "makes clear that Congress considered this a question appropriately
governed by federal legal standards."'uo
as non-bargained-for clauses are not enforced. Cf. Atkins v. Schnutz Mfg. Co., 435 F.2d 527 (4th Cir. 1970)
(federal tolling rule may be developed where state interest in enforcing statute of limitations was accommo-
dated by initiation of parallel proceeding in different jurisdiction within statutory period), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 932 (1971).
However, it would be wrong to conclude that the federal courts could fully accommodate state policy
by making a case-by-case determination of volition. The state policy is still compromised to the extent that
the state intended to relieve the party resisting enforcement of the clause of the litigation expense, delay,
or effort of disproving volition. Moreover, the absence of certainty about the enforceability of forum
selection clauses generates a potential for coercion. A party who has entered into even a purely boilerplate
forum selection agreement could not be certain that the clause would not be enforced absent federal
conformity to the state rule. She accordingly might be coerced into an adverse settlement rather than risk
litigating in the contractually selected forum. Alleviation of that kind of coercion would seem a legitimate
state regulatory prerogative warranting respect by the federal courts.
225. 858 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1988).
226. Id. at 511.
227. Id. at 512 & n.2.
228. Id. at 512.
229. Id. at 513. Other than the quoted language, there is no discussion of what those state interests
are.
230. Id. There is no consideration of any legislative history on the question. The venue statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1391 (1988), on its face does no more than stipulate where federal civil actions may be brought.
There is, of course, no reference to forum selection clauses.
The court also cites the Eleventh Circuit's reliance in Stewart on the provision of FED. R. CIV. P.
12(b)(3) as further evidence that venue questions should be governed by a federal standard. Manetti-Farrow,
858 F.2d at 513. Such an argument obliterates any obligation to apply state law. The same logic would
presumably lead a court to conclude that the provision of FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss for failure
to state a claim authorizes the development of a federal common law standard for the legal sufficiency of
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Of course, the only relevant congressional act was a venue statute that gave
plaintiff a right to bring suit in the Northern District of California. The court
relied on that statute as an unequivocal congressional directive to develop a
federal common law rule giving presumptive validity to private agreements that
displace statutory venue. The court did not even consider whether or not the
state rule on forum selection clauses was in direct collision with federal poli-
cy,"'l the predicate established by Walker v. Armco Steel Corp. for finding
a statutory displacement of state law.
Not only does the opinion thus undermine the "direct collision" standard,
but its purported balance between state and federal interests places a lead thumb
on the federal side of the scales. There is no consideration in the opinion of
what the relevant state interests are, and the only federal interest identified is
the claim that "if venue were to be governed by the law of the state in which
the forum court sat, the federal venue statute would be nugatory." 2 But on
the contrary, if anything makes the federal venue statute "nugatory" it is the
enforcement of private venue agreements that displace statutory venue, not state
doctrines that might ignore such private agreements.
The Erie issue in Manetti-Farrow is raised in an exceedingly odd context.
The court engaged in an extended discussion of whether state or federal law
controls the enforceability of the forum selection clause without even stating
whether state law was different from federal law or identifying which law-
Californian or Italian-would control the issue if state law applied.3 3 In fact,
California seems to have adopted the federal standards for enforcing forum
selection clauses.134 The court nevertheless found it important to establish that
federal law applied.
It appears that the real purpose of establishing that federal law applied was
to preclude plaintiff's parol evidence that the forum selection clause did not
cover the claims raised in its complaint: "Manetti-Farrow sought to introduce
parol evidence to show that it did not intend the forum selection clause to apply
to tort claims. Traditional contract law provides that extrinsic evidence is
inadmissible to interpret an unambiguous contract." 3s
What the court fails to mention, however, is that California law would have
allowed the introduction of extrinsic evidence on this issue, in conflict with the
a cause of action.
231. California law in fact seems to be in accordance with the Zapata standards. See infra note 234
and accompanying text.
232. 858 F.2d at 513 (quoting Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 810 F.2d 1066, 1068 (1lth Cir. 1987)
(en bane), aff'd on other grounds, 487 U.S. 22 (1988)).
233. While it would seem that California law should govern the issue, the contract included a choice
of law clause which stipulated that the contract was to be interpreted in accordance with Italian law.
Accordingly, it is possible that California would have looked to Italian law to determine the enforceability
of the forum selection clause.
234. See Smith, Valentino & Smith v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 491, 551 P.2d 1206, 131 Cal. Rptr.
374 (1976).
235. 858 F.2d at 514 (emphasis added).
1984 [Vol. 100: 1935
Court Access
"traditional contract law" applied by the court.3 6 In shades of Swift v. Tyson,
the court thus federalized not only the enforceability of forum selection clauses,
but the ancillary question of whether the forum selection clause constitutes the
actual agreement of the parties. On this choice of law question, the court
attempts neither to balance the relevant state and federal interests nor to identify
pertinent statutory authority. Presumably the existence of the federal venue
statute would have again been relied on as conclusive statutory authority.
As fundamentally flawed as the post-Stewart opinions are, the lower courts
are doing little more than carrying Stewart to its logical conclusion. If section
1404(a) can be summarily held to federalize the enforceability of forum selec-
tion clauses, finding comparable authorization in section 1391 is not a radical
extension. The lower courts' failure to consider the nature of competing state
interests mirrors the Supreme Court's adjudication in Stewart.
2. Closed-Door Policies: The Mirror Images of Open-Door Policies
As discussed earlier, state limitations on court access have received far more
respect from the federal courts than have state guarantees of court access.237
The Supreme Court has closed the federal door to litigants who are not "quali-
fied" to sue in a state's courts," and federal conformity to the jurisdictional
reach of the state courts under state long-arm statutes is mandated in the
absence of contrary statutory authority,239 even in cases involving federal
questionsm
A number of factors seem to have contributed to this greater conformity.
First, the courts have had an easier time discerning "substantive" objectives to
door-closing statutes in the sense of advancing a purpose external to the lawsuit.
For example, the state may be encouraging registration of foreign corporations
by barring unregistered corporations from the courts,24 or it may be encour-
aging foreign corporations to do business in the state by limiting the jurisdiction
of the state courts over them to matters arising within the state."s2
236. The California parol evidence rule, which allows even unambiguous contracts to be defeated by
conflicting extrinsic evidence, had been roundly criticized, although followed, by the Ninth Circuit earlier
in the year. Trident Center v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564, 568-69 (9th Cir. 1988). The
Manetti-Farrow court's failure to acknowledge its departure from California law could not have been an
oversight. It cited Trident Center in its opinion, and was careful to characterize its statement of the parol
evidence rule as "traditional contract law" rather than California law.
237. See, e.g., British Fish Dev. v. Wheelers's Restaurants PLC, No. 89 CIV. 4616 CSH, 1990 WL
71467 (S.D.N.Y.); Winter Constr. Co. v. Lamas Constructors, No. C87-1937A, 1987 WL 60203 (N.D. Ga.);
Lawson Prod. v. Tifco Indus., 660 F. Supp. 892 (M.D. Fla. 1987); McCollum Aviation, Inc. v. CIM Assocs.,
438 F. Supp. 245 (S.D. Fla. 1977); Weinstock v. Sinatra, 379 F. Supp. 274 (C.D. Cal. 1974). For a compre-
hensive review and critique of federal conformity with door-closing rules, see Little, supra note 83.
238. Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949).
239. FED. R. CIrV. P. 4(e); see also Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963).
240. Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97 (1987).
241. Woods, 337 U.S. at 535.
242. Rosenthal v. Unarco Indus., Inc., 278 S.C. 420, 297 S.E.2d 638 (1982).
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Even when such a "substantive" policy is not apparent from the face of
state statutes, federal courts have conformed to state jurisdictional limits to
avoid the mere possibility that a substantive objective may be frustrated. As
Judge Friendly stated in his classic defense of jurisdictional conformity in
Arrowsmith v. United Press International:
State statutes determining what foreign corporations may be sued, for
what, and by whom, are not mere whimsy; like most legislation, they
represent a balancing of various considerations-for example, affording
a forum for wrongs connected with the state and conveniencing resident
plaintiffs, while avoiding the discouragement of activity within the state
by foreign corporations. We see nothing in the concept of diversity
jurisdiction that should lead us to read into the governing statutes a
Congressional mandate, unexpressed by Congress itself, to disregard the
balance thus struck by the states.243
Conversely, the federal courts have found less federal interest in expanding
the jurisdictional limits of the federal courts than in limiting the volume of
cases on the federal docket.' The courts have concluded that it is beyond
their power to issue process without statutory authorization, unless service of
process is authorized under state law. 5 Such conformity is apparently con-
templated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which the courts have taken
both as authorization to assert jurisdiction 6 and as a restraint on federal com-
mon law supplements to state service provisions.247
It is my suggestion that the courts have got it backwards. While there are
situations in which expansive federal jurisdiction would undermine state policies
driving jurisdictional restrictions, there is far less likelihood of that in the
closed-door context than in the open-door context. It is more likely that a state
will be indifferent to federal adjudication of cases not otherwise heard in the
state courts than to federal dismissal of cases that would have been adjudicated
in the state courts.
243. 320 F.2d 219, 226 (2d Cir. 1963).
244. The federal interest in creating and maintaining federal courts apparently implies no independent
jurisdictional reach, even though it is thought to authorize on forum non conveniens grounds disregard of
not only state open-door policy but also federal venue provisions. Compare Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf
Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97 (1987) (courts may not issue process outside of statutory authority or Rules of
Civil Procedure) with In re Air Crash Near New Orleans, La. on July 9, 1982, 821 F.2d 1147, 1158 (5th
Cir. 1987) (federal interest in controlling docket justifies disregard of state open-door policy).
245. Omni Capital, 484 U.S. at 98; see also cases cited infra note 247.
246. Sprow v. Hartford Ins. Co., 594 F.2d 412, 416 (5th Cir. 1979) (authorizing jurisdiction pursuant
to 100-mile "bulge" provision of Rule 4(f) regardless of whether state could assert jurisdiction over
defendant).
247. See, e.g., Max Daetweiler Corp. v. R. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290,295 (3d Cir. 1985) (rejecting "national
contacts" approach to foreign defendant on grounds that federal courts are constrained by limits of state
jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 4(e)), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985); accord Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells
Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 418 (9th Cir. 1977).
1986 [Vol. 100: 1935
Court Access
Similarly, if the mere creation of an independent federal judicial authority
implies the discretionary power to decline jurisdiction, it must certainly imply
the independent power to assert personal jurisdiction.' It ought to be easier,
not harder, to create federal common law where the state would be indifferent.
The following section accordingly considers how state policies driving state
decisions to close their forums are affected by a federal choice to provide a
forum. Not surprisingly, most of the state policies driving open-door rules have
mirror images in the policies that drive closed-door rules. Some, but not all,
of these closed-door policies have different Erie implications than their open-
door counterparts.
a. Comity Mirrors Territoriality
Where a state's decision to assert jurisdiction may represent a decision to
vindicate the state's regulatory interest in the underlying dispute, the state's
decision to decline jurisdiction may represent the conclusion that other sover-
eigns have a greater stake in the adjudication. Jurisdiction is declined both
because the state perceives insufficient interest to justify the expenditure of state
resources, and out of respect for the other sovereign's regulatory preroga-
tives. 9 Such a judgment may be reflected in state statutes that impose greater
limits on the courts' territorial reach than would be imposed by the federal
constitution.50 On a case-by-case basis, the state may make comity the ex-
plicit basis for a forum non conveniens dismissal.251
Federal nonconformity with those practices generates far less friction than
nonconformity with the open-door counterparts. The expenditure of federal
248. The Court in Omni Capital noted that it was beyond the power of a common law court to
authorize service of process "outside its district." In a footnote, however, the Court concedes that such
limitations may have been more a consequence of the constitutional limits on extraterritorial jurisdiction
prevailing at the time rather than on any inherent requirement that there be statutory authority for service
of process. 484 U.S. at 108 n.10. Judge Clark's famous decision in Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc.,
282 F.2d 508, 516 (2d Cir. 1960), recognized a federal interest in asserting jurisdiction pursuant to a federal
standard. That position was subsequently overruled in Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219 (2d
Cir. 1963). See supra note 243 and accompanying text.-
249. See, e.g., Hart v. General Motors Corp., 129 A.D.2d 179, 185, 517 N.Y.S.2d 490, 494 (1987),
appeal denied, 78 N.Y.2d 608 (1987) (Delaware has paramount interest in shareholder derivative action
against Delaware corporation); Armadora Naval Dominicana, S.A. v. Garcia, 478 So.2d 873 (Fla. 1985)
(Dominican Republic has paramount interest in adjudicating helicopter crash); Islamic Republic v. Pahlavi,
94 A.D.2d 374, 377-79, 464 N.Y.S.2d 487, 490-91 (1983) (Iran has paramount interest in adjudicating
dispute between the people of Iran and the former Shah).
250. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 617.3 (West Supp. 1981) (limiting use of long-arm statute to Iowa
plaintiffs); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3201 (West 1968) (requiring continuous contact by defendant with
state to support even limited jurisdiction); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-5-15 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (limiting jurisdic-
tion over out-of-state controversies to actions brought by resident plaintiffs). Jurisdictional statutes tend not
to generate Erie problems as a consequence of the federal courts' decision to conform to state long-arm
practice in FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e)-(f).
251. See cases cited in note 249 supra.
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resources on a matter that the state does not care about does not, for the most
part, undermine the state interest in conserving resources. 2
The state interest in maintaining comity with the alternative forum state is
more complicated. Reconsideration of the soup hypothetical, slightly modified,
illustrates the issue. Suppose that when plaintiff returns home and files suit for
her injuries abroad, defendant moves for a forum non conveniens dismissal. The
state court grants the motion on the ground that a Montreal court can more
appropriately evaluate the standard of care of defendants acting in Montreal.
Plaintiff's brother, who suffered the identical injury in Montreal, subsequently
files suit in federal court. Should the federal court be free to retain jurisdic-
tion?25s
If the courts wanted consistency with conflicts doctrine, the answer would
seem to be that a state's preference that another sovereign authority control the
lawsuit must be respected by the federal courts. In Klaxon v. Stentor Electric
Manufacturing Corp.,' the Supreme Court held that the Erie obligation to
apply state law includes the obligation to apply the state's choice of law. The
rule has been extended to cases where the state would not choose its own
law.25
Klaxon is a fairly easy rule to justify if equality of outcome is the principal
objective of the Erie choice. Plaintiff can win in state court and lose in federal
court:
The conflict of laws rules to be applied by the federal court in Delaware
must conform to those prevailing in Delaware's state courts. Otherwise
the accident of diversity of citizenship would constantly disturb equal
administration of justice in coordinate state and federal courts sitting
252. See Parsons v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 375 U.S. 71, 73 (1963) (noting that differences in docket
congestion between state and federal court reduced relevance of a state forum non conveniens dismissal
to decision whether to transfer case pursuant to section 1404(a)). The citizenry is, however, burdened with
jury duty in both cases.
253. Note that this hypothetical implicates Erie concerns in an unconventional context: the formal state
and federal forum non conveniens doctrine may well be identical. The question implicated is whether the
federal courts ought to be bound by the state's application of law to the particular facts of this case. The
case law found in this context suggests little obligation to follow a state adjudication. See Parsons, 375 U.S.
at 75 (state forum non conveniens dismissal "can never serve to divest federal district judge of the
discretionary power vested in him by Congress to rule upon motion to transfer under § 1404(a)").
The converse question, whether a state may proceed in the face of a federal dismissal, was raised, but
not conclusively resolved, in Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140 (1988). The Court there
vacated an injunction issued against a state court by a federal court that had previously dismissed the
identical case on forum non conveniens grounds. The court of appeals upheld the injunction on the ground
that, at least in admiralty, federal forum non conveniens law preempted contrary state law. Exxon Corp.
v. Chick Kam Choo, 817 E2d 307 (5th Cir. 1987). Without deciding the preemption question, the Supreme
Court held that since the initial federal forum non conveniens dismissal did not specifically consider whether
a proceeding in the state court would be appropriate, the court's subsequent injunction was not authorized
under the relitigation exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. For a thorough discussion and analysis of Chick
Kan Choo, see Robertson & Speck, supra note 191, at 953-74.
254. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
255. See, e.g., Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challouer, 423 U.S. 3 (1975) (district court must follow
Texas choice of Cambodian law).
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side by side. Any other ruling would do violence to the principle of
uniformity within a state, upon which the Tompkins decision is
based2s6
Even if the rationale of Klaxon is sound,"s7 however, it is difficult to
extend to choice of forum cases. The outcome impact of court-access decisions
is far more difficult to determine than the outcome impact of conflict of laws
choices.358 Moreover, if a governmental interest approach to Erie problems
is followed, Klaxon makes little sense when applied to cases where the forum
state would not apply its own lawass and even less sense when applied to
the state's preference that the case be tried in another forum. The state presum-
ably has little interest in not applying its law or in not adjudicating the contro-
versy.
In the choice of law context, it could be argued that the state's choice of
another state's law is fundamentally a process by which the state incorporates
a foreign law as its own.260 It thus maintains an interest in resolving the con-
troversy according to whatever rules are fairly applied to the parties. Federal
nonconformity with that choice frustrates the state's vision of fairness to the
parties.' 6 The state's interest in not retaining jurisdiction is more difficult
to frame as an affirmative interest in the disposition of the lawsuit, particularly
when it is the consequence of the state's explicit conclusion that it has an
insufficient interest in the lawsuit to justify retaining jurisdiction.
To the extent that the state's sole interest in not retaining jurisdiction is
courtesy to a more interested state, no apparent internal regulatory preference
would be frustrated by federal nonconformity. Even if the more "interested"
forum would be offended by federal retention of jurisdiction, it would not be
attributable to any act of the forum state; the federal courts would take the heat.
Accordingly, while state door-closing preferences based in comity may, in some
sense, be considered "substantive," federal conformity is not warranted.
b. Selfish Policies Mirror Altruistic Policies
While open-door rules may be driven by extraterritorial preferences, closed-
door policies may represent just the opposite: a selfish unwillingness to expend
resources on claims brought by out-of-state litigants or regarding actions arising
256. 313 U.S. at 496.
257. Klaxon has received more than its share of scholarly criticism. See, e.g., HART AND WEcHsLER,
supra note 78, at 794-95; Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1963); Hill,
supra note 18; Horowitz, Toward a Federal Common Law of Choice of Law, 14 UCLA L. REV. 1191
(1976).
258. See Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508, 513 (2d Cir. 1960).
259. See Hill, supra note 18, at 455-56.
260. See, e.g., W. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS 3-46 (1949);
Maltz, The Concept of Precedent in Choice of Law Theory, 51 MO. L REV. 191, 192 (1986).
261. Cf. Maltz, supra note 260, at 192-93.
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out of state. 62 Whether or not the state's unwillingness to spend resources
on such claims is appropriate, the, state ought to be indifferent to the expen-
diture of federal resources on the problem. (A possible exception may be the
federal jury duty imposed on the state's citizenry.)
A hypothetical demonstrates the point. Suppose a New York citizen is
injured by a product manufactured by a California corporation. The California
defendant has no constitutionally significant contacts with New York. It does,
however, maintain continuous and systematic contacts with New Jersey, where
it has some manufacturing facilities. Assume New Jersey's jurisdictional statute
limits jurisdiction over the foreign corporation to claims arising in New Jersey,
or brought by New Jersey residents, a preference the Supreme Court has upheld
as constitutional. 63 The federal court sitting in New Jersey concludes that
it is more appropriate for the defendant to defend the suit in New Jersey than
to make the plaintiff travel to California. The only reason New Jersey has
limited its jurisdiction, the court determines, is that it did not want to spend its
resources on the out-of-state plaintiff. Why should the federal court be con-
strained by the state's selfish policy? No New Jersey interest is undermined,
and the federal interest of providing an adjudication without parochial bias is
advanced by nonconformity. New Jersey is not required to expend any resourc-
es. The federal court makes its jurisdictional decision without the distortion
created by the forum state's bias for its own plaintiffs.'
The short, but unsatisfying, response of most courts is that the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure require conformity. 5 Pursuant to Rule 4(f), federal service
of process is restricted to the territorial limits of the state unless authorized by
federal statute or rule. Service outside of the state is authorized by Rule 4(e)
"under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed" by state long-arm
statutes, or pursuant to any specialized federal jurisdictional provision.2 6 The
Supreme Court has recently held that it would be inappropriate for the courts
262. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-5-15 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (limiting claims against foreign corporation
to action arising in state or brought by residents of South Carolina).
263. See supra notes 207-08 and accompanying text.
264. Note, however, that the parochial bias reflected in the state rule is not one that favors an in-state
party in this case. As a closed-door policy against out-of-state plaintiffs, the rule favors in-state plaintiffs
in relation to out-of-state plaintiffs. It does not benefit any in-state party at the expense of an out-of-state
party in the same case; both litigants in the hypothetical are noncitizens. Thus, as in the case of the "plaintiff
may sue at home rule," the case for federal nonconformity based solely in a federal interest in providing
a neutral forum in not very compelling.
265. See cases cited supra note 247.
266. FED. R. Ctv. P. 4(e) provides in relevant part:
Whenever a statute of the United States or an order of court thereunder provides for service of
a summons ... upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within the state in which the district
court is held, service may be made under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed by the
statute or order, or, if there is no provision therein prescribing the manner of service, in a manner
stated in this rule. Whenever a statute or rule of court of the state in which the district court is
held provides ... for service of a summons ... upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within
the state... service may ... be made under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed in
the statute or rule.
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to supplement the service of process authorized by Rule 4 on the ground that
it is a matter best left to Congress. 267 Absent some reason that Congress
might disapprove of nonconformity, the Court's approach seems unduly rig-
id.268
However, several other reasons for federal conformity with state service of
process provisions have also been advanced. None is persuasive. First, it has
been suggested that the exercise of expansive personal jurisdiction by the
federal courts is intrusive on the adjudicatory rights not of the forum state, but
of the sister states that would otherwise assert jurisdiction over the case.369
In the above hypothetical, the argument would be that California would object
even if New Jersey would not.
Such an argument appears pertinent only to the issue of whether it is fair
to adjudicate the case in New Jersey under state or federal standards; it does
not explain why federal conformity to the state-imposed restriction is necessary.
The federal court can account for California's adjudicatory interest in the
dispute independent of whether New Jersey wanted to assert jurisdiction. Put
in other terms, California's legitimate interest in adjudicating the dispute is not
affected by whether or not New Jersey wants to hear the case.
A second possible justification for conformity is that subjecting the defen-
dant to greater jurisdiction than is imposed by the state long-arm statute would
be an unfair surprise, and would create unacceptable uncertainty. However,
while that may be true for the first defendant subjected to federal jurisdiction,
subsequent defendants considering contact with the forum state would be on
notice of the federal standard. 270 If necessary, the first defendant could be
exempted from the operation of the rule, which the court could announce for
the benefit of future litigants.27 1
Finally, as pointed out by Judge Friendly in the Arrowsmith case, federal
nonconformity with state service of process provisions would create troubling
267. Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97 (1987).
268. But see Whitten, Separation of Power Restrictions on Judicial Rulemaking: A Case Study of
Federal Rule 4, 40 ME. L. REV. 41 (1988). Professor Whitten asserts that expansion of the rule to permit
nationwide service of process in federal question cases would violate the Rules Enabling Act restraint on
the creation of substantive rights. Cf. Burbank, supra note 33, at 1172-73 n.673 (questioning validity of
Rule 4 even insofar as it authorizes use of state long-arm service). Such a rule, Professor Whitten contends,
would infringe on Congress's legislative prerogative, the basis for the Enabling Act limitation. He would
presumably similarly see a separation of powers problem in the issuance of common law process that
exceeded present limits. Other than noting that Congress knows how to create ajurisdictional provision when
it wants to, Professor Whitten does not explain why Congress would in fact care whether the courts asserted
more expansive personal jurisdiction. For a discussion of an indirect source of friction with the states
generated by expansive federal jurisdiction, see infra note 280.
269. De James v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 292 (3d Cir.) (Gibbons, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1085 (1981).
270. See Ely, supra note 13, at 711 (no debilitating uncertainty generated where parties can conform
conduct to a more demanding standard).
271. See, e.g., Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 108 (1971) (new statute of limitations rule
applied prospectively only).
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inequities between cases filed in federal court and cases removed there.272
Plaintiffs, in effect, would have a greater right to get into a particular federal
court than defendants. 273
While it is true that nonconformity would give the federal court greater
territorial reach in cases brought to it by plaintiffs than by defendants, that
difference should not matter to either party. Defendant's objective on removal
is simply to get the case into federal court, not to summon parties to the pro-
ceeding; defendant has no need for any greater federal jurisdiction than was
exercised by the state court. Neither plaintiff nor defendant is apt to complain
that plaintiff could have taken advantage of even broader jurisdiction by filing
in federal court initially. If defendant disapproves of plaintiff's choice of forum,
transfer is available under section 1404(a).
A particularly unreflective extension of this equality concern was the basis
for the Eleventh Circuit's recent decision in Alexander Proudfoot Co. v.
Thayer.274 The court there refused to recognize a consent to jurisdiction clause
in the defendant's contract because the state courts would not enforce the
provision. In a highly formalistic analysis, the court reasoned that its enforce-
ment of the provision would induce forum shopping and create unreasonable
inequities:
The first concern, forum shopping, requires the court to ask whether
applying the state rule "would have so important an effect upon the
fortunes of one or both of the litigants that failure to enforce it would
be likely to cause a plaintiff to choose the federal court."... A diverse
plaintiff suing a defendant without any contacts in the forum state, but
who has signed a conferral of personal jurisdiction clause, may file suit
in federal or state court. A federal court would enforce the conferral of
personal jurisdiction clause under federal law, and the action would
proceed. The plaintiff suing the same defendant in state court would
face dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction, the contractual clause
notwithstanding. This difference in outcomes indicates that a plaintiff
with a choice of forum would file in federal court to escape the effect
of the state law. Accordingly, the application of federal judge-made law
would disserve the first aim of Erie.
The court also must consider the related second aim of Erie, the
avoidance of the inequitable administration of the laws. To analyze the
second aim, the court asks whether the state law is "so important to the
litigation that failure to enforce it would unfairly discriminate against
citizens of the forum state." . . . The validity of a clause conferring
personal jurisdiction is one of great importance to the litigation. When
a defendant without any contacts in Florida is sued in Florida, an action
272. Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219, 230 (2d Cir. 1963).
273. The removing defendant could only remove to the federal court sitting in a state that asserted
jurisdiction; the plaintiff who filed initially in federal court could take advantage of broader federal
jurisdiction provisions.
274. 877 F.2d 912 (11th Cir. 1989).
1992 [Vol. 100: 1935
Court Access
brought in state court would be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction despite
the conferral of jurisdiction clause. Conversely, the same action brought
in federal court could proceed to judgment because of the contractual
agreement to in personam jurisdiction. The citizens of the forum state
are unfairly discriminated against in this situation because an action that
would be barred in state court can proceed to judgment in federal court
"solely because of the fortuity that there is diversity of citizenship
between the litigants." 75
While this admittedly has a nice ring to it, neither of the court's concerns-
forum shopping or discrimination-stand up to even cursory scrutiny. The
court's reasoning illustrates the conceptual weakness of a pure equality analysis
of court-access problems.
Forum shopping is a problem only when a plaintiff has greater ability than
a defendant to select the forum and thus to manipulate the applicable law. 6
Where, as in Thayer, either party can opt for the federal forum, federal noncon-
formity with state law does not generate inequalities between plaintiff and
defendant. The nonconformity may still be objectionable because it frustrates
a state policy, but to find it objectionable solely because it "induces forum
shopping" begs the question.
The court's "discrimination" concern is equally perplexing. The court found
it imperative not to assert jurisdiction over a Missouri defendant in order to
protect Florida citizens from discrimination. Presumably the class protected by
the court's ruling consisted of Florida citizens other than plaintiff, who was
perfectly content to be so victimized. However, Florida defendants could hardly
feel put upon by a federal rule that subjects out-of-state residents to Florida
jurisdiction.
That leaves only other Florida plaintiffs as the beneficiaries of the court's
position, but not all Florida plaintiffs. The court can only be concerned for
Florida plaintiffs who are suing Florida defendants since Florida plaintiffs suing
foreign defendants would benefit from federal nonconformity. But the protected
class is even narrower than that since Florida citizens suing other Florida
citizens would normally have no need to enforce a consent to Florida jurisdic-
tion clause. Florida defendants are presumably subject to jurisdiction in Florida
in the absence of any contractual provision.
That leaves only Florida plaintiffs suing out-of-state defendants who have
signed consent to jurisdiction provisions as well as Florida defendants. Plaintiff
in that situation needs to get into federal court to enforce the consent provision
against the out-of-state defendants, but the presence of the Florida defendants
destroys diversity. The inequity presumably arises from the fact that a non-
Florida plaintiff could bring the claim in a Florida federal forum, while the
275. Id. at 918-19 (emphasis added).
276. See Hill, supra note 18, at 564-65; Stein, supra note 1, at 826-27 & n.199.
19911 1993
The Yale Law Journal
Florida resident is relegated to suing the out-of-state defendant in another state.
It is hard to see how that Florida plaintiff is better off by denying access to the
Florida forum to similarly situated noncitizens. She could hardly feel like the
victim of anti-Florida animus; Florida plaintiffs would be the primary beneficia-
ries if consent to jurisdiction provisions were enforced. She would be unable
to share the benefit not because she is a citizen of Florida, but because she is
suing another citizen of Florida. In fact, she would probably welcome the
federal enforcement of consent to jurisdiction clauses since it would give her
the option of pursuing her claim against the Florida defendant in a separate
proceeding, thereby restoring diversity and her access to a Florida federal
forum.
There are, then, no Florida citizens who could have objected to federal
enforcement of the provision on equality grounds. If assertion of federal
jurisdiction was problematic, it was because of the right that Florida attempted
to bestow on the nonresident by refusing to enforce consent to jurisdiction
provisions. If anyone would have been injured by federal nonconformity, it was
the out-of-state defendant. Casting the problem as one of equality obscures the
real issue: would the policy animating the Florida doctrine have been under-
mined by federal nonconformity?
Given the Supreme Court's apparent position that federal common law may
be used only to abridge, but not to enlarge, federal personal jurisdiction, an
anomaly is generated by the different techniques a state might employ to give
effect to its "disinterested" policy. If the state, as in the New Jersey hypotheti-
cal, structures its long-arm statute to restrict service of process to cases brought
by residents, or to claims arising in the jurisdiction,277 Rule 4(e) of the Feder-
al Rules of Civil Procedure mandates conformity with the state practice even
when the state would be indifferent to federal nonconformity. Thus, in most
cases involving out-of-state defendants, the federal courts are powerless to
assert greater personal jurisdiction than their state counterparts.
Alternatively, if the state extends its formal jurisdiction over those same
cases, but consistently dismisses them either through the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, or through a separate "door-closing" statute, 278 the federal court
can hear the case;279 the formal provision of jurisdiction in the state long-arm
statute circumvents the conformity required by the Federal Rules. That anomaly
may suggest that the conformity required by Rule 4 exceeds the demands of
federalism. 0
277. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 617.3 (West Supp. 1981) (limiting use of long-arm statute to Iowa
plaintiffs).
278. See Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1965), in which the Court ultimately
rejected application of the door-closing statute on the basis of paramount federal interests. See infra notes
286-96 and accompanying text.
279. Szantay, 349 F.2d 60.
280. Even though it may thus appear that the conformity required by the Federal Rules exceeds the
requirements of rational federalism, Rule 4 conformity does prevent an indirect type of state-federal friction
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c. Liability-Insulating Policies Mirror Liability-Assessment Policies
Perhaps the best reason for federal conformity with restrictive state jurisdic-
tional provisions is that there may be other policies animating the state rule
which would be undermined by federal nonconformity. Just as a state may,
through an open-door provision, want to subject resident defendants to greater
jurisdiction than the federal courts would otherwise deem appropriate," t the
state may want to insulate defendants from jurisdictional exposure by closing
its courts to certain classes of cases. In particular, the state may want to
encourage out-of-state corporations to do business in the state by protecting
them from burdensome litigation arising from activities outside the state.
The Supreme Court recognized in Angel v. Bullingtone 2 that state provi-
sions withdrawing jurisdiction from the state courts in order to insulate the
defendant from a specific type of liability-deficiency judgments on loans
secured by real estate-were binding on the federal courts:
It is suggested that the North Carolina Supreme Court construed the
North Carolina statute to close only the North Carolina state courts but
not the federal court sitting in North Carolina. . . . North Carolina
construed the statute expressive of state policy and spoke only of the
jurisdiction of the state courts because it was concerned only with the
state courts. Secondly, it is most incongruous to attribute to the legisla-
ture and judiciary of North Carolina the imposition of a restriction
against all its citizens from suing for a deficiency judgement, while
impliedly authorizing citizens of other states to secure such deficiency
judgments against North Carolinians.... The essence of diversity juris-
diction is that a federal court enforces state law and state policy...
North Carolina would hardly allow defeat of a state-wide policy through
not relevant in the forum non conveniens context. Friction may be generated by any difference between
state and federal practice that makes the federal courts a more desirable forum than the state alternative.
Just as the federal courts have enlarged their subject-matter jurisdiction through pendentjurisdiction to avoid
making federal courts less desirable than the state alternative, the federal courts should be sensitive to
nonconforming practices that make the federal courts more desirable for reasons other than the courts'
jurisdictional rationale-avoidance of bias or vindication of federal rights. The problem is not forum
shopping in the Hanna sense of creating outcome differences, but rather diverting too much business from
the state courts. See Burbank, supra note 33, at 1173 & n.673 ("From the point of view of federalism values,
the regulation of the territorial jurisdiction of the federal courts can affect, as the regulation of subject-matter
jurisdiction affects, the allocation of business between the federal and state courts.").
In most cases, federal provision of greater court access will not divert cases from the state courts.
Where the state completely denies court access because it is disinterested, it can hardly view a federal
adjudication as in derogation of the state's judicial authority. A federal adjudication would not have the
effect of diverting a case that the state would otherwise hear.
However, federal exercise of broad personal jurisdiction could have that effect in some multiparty cases.
Suppose a plaintiff from state A sues defendant I from state A and defendant 2 from state B for a claim
arising in B. State A's long-arm statute would authorize service on defendant I but not defendant 2. If plain-
tiff could pursue his claims against both defendants 1 and 2 in federal court, plaintiff may choose to file
in federal rather than state court simply because it offers a more attractive remedy. The availability of broad
federal personal jurisdiction would thus divert some business from the state courts.
281. See supra notes 196-98 and accompanying text.
282. 330 U.S. 183, 191-92 (1947).
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occasional suits in a federal court. What is more important, diversity
jurisdiction must follow state law and policy. A federal court in North
Carolina, when invoked on grounds of diversity of citizenship, cannot
give that which North Carolina has withheld. Availability of diversity
jurisdiction which was put into the Constitution so as to prevent dis-
crimination against outsiders is not to effect discrimination against the
great body of local citizens.383
While the jurisdictional restriction in Angel was targeted at a specific type
of liability, there is no good reason why the logic of the decision should not
apply to more generalized attempts to insulate defendants from liability by
restricting the scope of the court's jurisdiction to purely domestic disputes. 4
Why should a state rule that limits litigation expense be treated any differently
from one that limits substantive liability?2 5
Given the prevailing judicial view that the federal courts are generally
constrained by Rule 4 from serving process unauthorized by state statute, a state
can successfully implement that policy, at least for the benefit of out-of-state
defendants, simply by failing to authorize service. Accordingly, there is little
283. Id. The Court did not reach the serious issue of whether North Carolina's refusal to enforce fully
a Virginia judgment was in violation of the full faith and credit clause. The plaintiff had initially sought
the deficiency judgment in North Carolina state court. That court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over
deficiency judgments. Rather than appeal, the plaintiff initiated a second proceeding in federal court, the
subject of the Supreme Court appeal. The Court held that plaintiff was barred by res judicata from seeking
relief in the federal proceeding. Id. at 189-90.
284. Closely analogous to this type of closed-door policy are state rules that prohibit a state from
exercising jurisdiction over a case that calls for the court to interfere in the "internal affairs" of a foreign
corporation, While the rule, a precursor to the modem forum non conveniens doctrine, appears to have its
origin in the antiquated notion that a corporation only existed as such in its state of incorporation, see Stein,
supra note 1, at 809, a few states still adhere to it. See, e.g., Moore v. NAACP, 425 Pa. 204, 229 A.2d 477
(1967); Hanover Affiliates v. Pamrex Corp., 236 N.Y.S.2d 94 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963). The modern rationales
seem to be a concern for not subjecting corporate officials to inconsistent standards of conduct, protecting
the interests of absent parties, and not involving the court in continued supervision of the activities of an
out-of-state business. See Burton v. Exxon Corp., 536 F. Supp. 617, 626 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). Federal practice
would seem to have pertinence to at least the first two of those state policies.
In federal doctrine, as well as in most states, the rule seems to have been absorbed into broader forum
non conveniens principles. See id.; Lapides v. Doner, 248 F. Supp. 883, 890 (E.D. Mich. 1965); Amatuzio
v. Amatuzio, 410 N.W.2d 871, 874-75 (Minn. 1987); Lonergan v. Crucible Steel Co., 37 1ll.2d 599, 606-08,
229 N.E.2d 536,539-40 (1967). Accordingly, most potential Erie problems are avoided. Choice of law prob-
lems can still arise when other forum non conveniens factors militating against dismissal would, in the
court's view, outweigh the problem of interfering with the internal affairs of a foreign corporation. The lower
courts have split over whether such state rules must be respected in such cases. Compare Poe v. Marquette
Cement Mfg. Co., 376 F. Supp. 1054, 1058 (D. Md. 1974) and Lapides, 248 F. Supp. at 887 (state rule
is "local rule of forum-non-conveniens" which need not be followed) with Weiss v. Routh, 149 F.2d 193
(2d Cir. 1945) and Genetti v. Victory Markets, Inc., 362 F. Supp 124 (M.D. Pa. 1973) (state rule must be
followed).
285. Cf. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Charneski, 286 F.2d 238, 244 (7th Cir. 1960) (enforcing state rule against
entertaining declaratory judgment actions brought by insurance companies to test insurance obligations on
ground that purpose of state rule-consolidating all related proceedings in single tort action-would be
frustrated by assertion of federal jurisdiction, and not justified by any countervailing interest in asserting
jurisdiction). While there is some unfortunate equality dicta in the opinion, id. at 243, the Charneski court's
use of a policy-based analysis to resolve the court-access issue is quite consistent with the approach
advocated herein.
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case law testing the applicability to the federal courts of state jurisdictional
restraints imposed in furtherance of a jurisdictional liability-insulating policy.
One notable exception is the Fourth Circuit's failure to enforce such a
statute in Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp.86 Service of process was autho-
rized by state statute,'s7 but another statute limited the courts' jurisdiction
over out-of-state corporations sued by nonresidents for claims arising outside
the state. 8 The court disregarded the liability-insulating policy on three
grounds. First, it was unclear from the legislative history whether that was in
fact the policy behind the rule."s9 Second, the court was concerned that the
South Carolina rule would preclude enforcement to out-of-state judgments in
South Carolina in frustration of the full faith and credit clause.290 Third, the
court found a paramount federal interest in providing equal treatment to nonres-
idents, a policy supported by diversity jurisdiction.291
On the first ground, it is unclear why the burden should have been on the
plaintiff to establish that the state policies were undermined by federal noncon-
formity. If anything, it would seem incumbent on the party urging federal
nonconformity to show that state policies are not implicated.
The second ground was really dictum, since the plaintiff was not enforcing
an out-of-state judgment. The court could easily have carved out an exception
for enforcement cases on the ground that once the underlying claim is reduced
to judgment, the remaining claim for enforcement really does arise in the state,
and therefore falls within the reach of the statute.292
The equality argument is the most troubling one, since it does appear that
conformity with the state statute locks the federal court into parochial favoritism
for local over out-of-state plaintiffs. However, given the fact that federal
nonconformity is not necessary to avoid parochial bias for one party over
another party in the same lawsuit, the core justification for diversity, the
equality argument is not a compelling justification for undermining the state
regulatory policy. Moreover, as discussed above, the "parochial bias" of the
286. 349 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1965).
287. Id. at 62.
288. Id. at 62-63.
289. The Supreme Court of South Carolina subsequently made clear that the purpose of the door-closing
statute was to relieve the state of the burden of adjudicating matters in which it had little interest, as well
as to encourage out-of-state corporations to do business in the state without fear of being sued there for
matters unconnected with their business in the state. See Rosenthal v. Unarco Indus., 278 S.C. 420, 297
S.E.2d 638 (1982).
290. 349 F.2d at 65-66.
291. Id. at 65.
292. A similar logic supports excepting enforcement actions from Shaffer v. Heitners's restriction on
quasi-in-rem proceedings unrelated to the controversy. See 433 U.S. 186, 208-09 (1977) (attachment is
unconstitutional jurisdictional basis where property unrelated to plaintiff's claim). Once there is an
underlying judgment, property attached to satisfy the judgment is the subject matter of the enforcement
action. See id. at 210-11 n.36 (once judgment properly entered, there is"no unfairness in allowing an action
to realize on that debt in a State where the defendant has property, whether or not that State would have
jurisdiction to determine the existence of the debt as an original matter").
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statute is consistent with a rational and citizenship-neutral principle that plain-
tiffs should be able to sue at home.293
The Fourth Circuit has apparently retreated from Szantay. In Proctor &
Schwartz, Inc. v. Rollins,2" the court, in a brief opinion, enforced the South
Carolina door-closing statute against a Georgia resident, distinguishing Szantay
on the ground that South Carolina was the only possible forum in that case.295
Although the statute of limitations had run everywhere else in Proctor &
Schwartz, the plaintiff could previously have brought a timely action elsewhere.
The court therefore found no "countervailing consideration favoring the exercise
of federal jurisdiction" in light of the door-closing statute. 296
d. Litigant-Detriment Policies Mirror Litigant-Benefit Policies
While open-door provisions may guarantee access to resident plaintiffs to
benefit those plaintiffs, closed-door provisions may operate intentionally to
disadvantage certain classes of litigants: as an inducement for a desired action,
the state denies a party access to its courts unless it engages in that activity.
The Erie resolution of this kind of rule is very similar to the liability-insulating
rules considered above. The state policy driving the access rule is directly
undermined by federal nonconformity, and no federal interest justifies that
effect.297
The paradigm is Woods v. Interstate Realty Co.,2 98 in which the Supreme
Court held that a federal court could not entertain a claim brought by an out-of-
state corporation barred from bringing suit in the state courts because of its
failure to "qualify" as doing business in the state.299 Woods was decided
purely on litigant equality grounds: "Where... one is barred from recovery
in the state court, he should likewise be barred in the federal court. The con-
trary result would create discriminations against citizens of the state in favor
293. See supra notes 210-212 and accompanying text.
294. 634 F.2d 738 (4th Cir. 1980).
295. Id. at 740; accord Bumgarder v. Keene Corp., 593 E2d 572 (4th Cir. 1979).
296. 634 F.2d at 740.
297. The federal interest in preventing interference with interstate commerce is independently
implemented by commerce clause restraints on business-qualification statutes that affect interstate transac-
tions. Notwithstanding the holding of Woods v. Interstate Realty, 337 U.S. 535 (1949) that federal courts
must respect state business-qualification rules, the Supreme Court has held that such rules may only be
applied in both state and federal court to "purely intrastate transactions." Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman,
419 U.S. 20 (1974) (holding Mississippi business-qualification rule violative of commerce clause where
underlying transaction was in interstate commerce). Thus, while Woods still illustrates "substantive"
implications of court-access rules, the practical impact of the case has been dramatically reduced. But see
Lawson Products v. Tifco Indus., 660 F. Supp. 892 (M.D. Fla. 1987); McCollum Aviation, Inc. v. CIM
Assocs., 438 F. Supp. 245, 248 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (applying Florida door-closing statute to intrastate
transactions).
298. 337 U.S. 535 (1949).
299. Some qualification statutes are actually framed in terms of denying the nonqualifying corporation
the substantive right to enforce contracts entered into in the state. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 10-2A-247 (1980).
In such cases, the obligation to respect the state law is clear. See Aim Leasing Corp. v. Helicopter Medical
Evacuation, 687 F.2d 354 (11th Cir. 1982) (interpreting Alabama qualification statute to allow suit).
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of those authorized to invoke the diversity jurisdiction of the federal
courts. ' '3to The same result is reached, however, under a policy analysis. The
purpose of the state rule was to prevent out-of-state corporations from not
registering with the state. Federal disregard of that limitation would undermine
that policy to the extent that corporations would risk not registering since they
could always avail themselves of a federal forum 01
The Woods rule is somewhat complicated by Rule 17 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, which directs the court to the law of the state of domicile
or incorporation when determining the capacity of a party to sue or be
sued.301 While Rule 17 is arguably in conflict with door-closing statutes, 303
there is, in the words of Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., no "direct collision"; 30 4
the two rules are capable of coexisting. As noted by Wright, Miller & Kane,
the Rule can be viewed as a threshold requirement for maintaining suit, but
business-qualification requirements must also be respected. Accordingly, no
party lacking corporate capacity under the law of its state of incorporation may
maintain suit, but "[p]laintiff cannot seek relief in a federal court if the doors
of the forum state's courts are closed; the fact that plaintiff would have capacity
under Rule 17(b) is not sufficient. '305
Such a reconciliation makes sense in terms of the respective policy objec-
tives of the rule and business-qualification provisions. The overall objective of
Rule 17 is not to channel the case into one forum rather than another, but to
determine the appropriate party to maintain an action. It thus provides rules for
a variety of situations where the identity of the appropriate jural person is
ambiguous: real-party-in-interest cases, parties suing in a representative capaci-
ty, suits by infants or incompetents, and suits involving corporate entities. Each
300. 337 U.S. at 538.
301. See McCollum Aviation, 438 F. Supp. at 248 (characterizing as substantive Florida requirement
that corporations must qualify to do business in state before using Florida courts since requirement has
"nonlitigative purpose of encouraging corporate qualification for the benefit of the state's citizenry").
302. The rule provides, in relevant part: "The capacity of a corporation to sue or be sued shall be
determined by the law under which it was organized. In all other cases capacity to sue or be sued shall be
determined by the law of the state in which the district court is held .... "FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b).
303. See FED. R. CIV. P. 17(b); Kennedy, Federal Civil Rule 17(b) and (c): Qualifying to Litigate in
Federal Court, 43 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 273, 281-82 (1968); Little, supra note 83, at 792-795. Professor
Little cites the legislative history of the Rule in an attempt to establish that the intent of the drafters was
to overrule Woods. While provocative, her evidence is far from conclusive. The Advisory Committee notes
to the rule do not mention Woods or door-closing statutes at all. The notes do, however, include a reference
to David Lupton's Sons Co. v. Automobile Club, 225 U.S. 489 (1912), in a "see specifically" cite on the
issue of corporate capacity. That case, overruled by Woods, held that state business-qualification rules could
not divest a federal court of jurisdiction over a nonqualifying corporation's claim. The notes also include
reference to a law review article by Judge Clark arguing for a uniform rule on capacity. FED. R. Civ. P.
17(b) advisory committee's notes.
Following the Woods decision in 1949, the rule was amended substantively in 1966, and again in 1987
to make it gender neutral. See 6A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 120, § 1541, at 324-27.
At no time was the Woods problem mentioned. One would certainly expect some clarification or reference
to Woods if the intent of the drafters was inconsistent with that decision.
304. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749 (1980).
305. 6A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 120, § 1561, at 450 (citations omitted).
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situation shares a common characteristic: the people affected by the litigation
may lack authority to enforce the right in the judicial system. Viewed in this
context, corporate capacity in the Rule 17 sense is a measure of whether or not
the named party is a cognizable jural person: I will not be heard to sue as the
Joe Smith corporation if there is no such legally cognizable entity.
However, even if a party is a legally cognizable entity, the law of the forum
may impose various disabilities on that party for a variety of reasons: the state
may withdraw statute of limitations defenses from corporations who were
absent from the state,'3° impose strict liability on certain classes of manufac-
turers, or strip tax-evading businesses of the right to maintain suit. While the
latter could be characterized in a broad sense as an issue of capacity, it could
equally be seen as a rule of substantive liability or jurisdiction.3°
C. Federal Interests that Justify the Frustration of State Policy
In the event that the purpose behind the state practice would be frustrated
by a contrary federal practice, the federal practice must be justified by a
paramount federal interest.
306. See, e.g., G.D. Searle & Co v. Cohn, 455 U.S. 404 (1982) (upholding New Jersey nonresident
tolling provision).
307. While the analysis of door-closing rules above focuses primarily on how territorial interests of
the state are implicated by court-access practice, the analysis also sheds light on court-access policies
normally considered under the rubric of"subject-matter" jurisdiction. Where rules of personal jurisdiction,
venue, or forum non conveniens affect the allocation of authority between different sovereigns, rules of
standing, subject-matter jurisdiction, and arbitration assume some body within the state has the authority
to adjudicate the controversy. The issue is not whether the matter will be adjudicated within the state but
rather who can assert the legal claims, or which authority within the state should resolve the matter. There
appears to be some acceptance of conformity with state practice in this area. See Alexander, State Medical
Malpractice Screening Panels in Federal Diversity Actions, 21 ARz. L. REV. 959 (1979).
While such rules are somewhat beyond the scope of this Article, it should be noted that they are
susceptible to a similar analysis. For instance, suppose a state standing rule vests third parties with the right
to enforce a state-created obligation. Imposition of federal standing limitations on either a diversity action
or on a Supreme Court appeal of some federal issue raised in the case may be inappropriate; the state policy
driving its standing rule will be undermined, and no federal interest may require nonconformity. See
ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 109 S. Ct. 2037 (1989) (permitting Supreme Court review of state proceeding
that would have been dismissed for lack of standing in federal district court).
While it might seem that the standing of federal litigants is exclusively a matter of federal law, federal
law of third-party standing could have the effect of obliterating the objective of the state right. See Diamond
v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 65 n.17 (1986) ("The Illinois Legislature, of course, has the power to create new
interests, the invasion of which may confer standing.") (dictum). Moreover, the policies driving federal
standing doctrine may or may not have any application to the state claim. To the extent that federal rules
against third-party standing are based on separation of powers concerns, see Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,
761 & n.26 (1984), the federal judiciary would not be infringing on any congressional power by hearing
the case; any legislative prerogative in this case belongs to the state legislature which has already entrusted
the judiciary with the resolution of the problem. Similar federal concerns about litigant autonomy would
seem to be irrelevant where the state has created the underlying right.
The example demonstrates the danger of treating the availability of a federal adjudication as a matter
of exclusive federal concern. Even where the issue can be classified as one involving the "subject-matter"
jurisdiction of the court, the effect of federal practice on state policy can be extremely relevant.
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1. Housekeeping Justifications
The federal interest in "regulating practice and procedure" in the federal
courts has been inappropriately relied upon as a paramount interest.308 Carried
to its logical extreme, such an interest undermines any obligation to apply state
law, substantive or procedural. Virtually any law applied in a court could be
deemed relevant to the "practice and procedure" in that court. Once it is
acknowledged that the creation of federal jurisdiction does not per se authorize
the creation of federal law,3t 9 federal displacement of the state preference
cannot be justified by the practice and procedure rationale. 310
Closely related to the practice and procedure rationale are claims that the
federal courts have the authority to develop independent rules to maintain
uniformity of practice in the federal system, 311 and to deviate from rules that
implicate the expenditure of federal resources. 312
As Redish & Phillips have noted, the uniformity justification is relatively
weak in light of the Court's and Congress's ability to achieve uniformity on
any given question by amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or
passing a statute.313
The expense rationale ought to be equally suspect, particularly in the juris-
dictional context. Most state laws enforced in federal courts implicate the
expenditure of federal resources. A federal court would hardly be justified in
refusing to apply a state "market-share liability" standard in a products case
because it would make the litigation more complex and costly. A court's refusal
to recognize an open-door provision in cases where the underlying state policy
308. See supra notes 171-174 and accompanying text; see also Monarch Ins. Co. v. Spach, 281 F.2d
401, 407 (5th Cir. 1960) (noting "the indispensable necessity that a tribunal, if it is to be an independent
court administering law, must have the capacity to regulate the manner by which cases are to be tried and
facts are to be presented in the search for the truth of the cause").
309. See Field, supra note 15, at 918-19.
310. See Redish & Phillips, supra note 13, at 390:
[An independent system of administering justice rationale] might be thought to prove too much;
its logic would authorize federal court rejection of purely substantive state standards where, in
the federal court's opinion, to apply them would cause an injustice.... [A] federal diversity court
has no more authority to reject state procedure it deems unjust than it has to reject state substan-
tive law for the same reason....
311. See Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 435 F.2d 527, 528 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 932
(1971); Hazard, supra note 75, at 644-47.
312. Redish & Phillips, supra note 13, at 392:
Consonant with the policies underlying Erie and the Rules of Decision Act, there is only one
federal concern that should ever be allowed to outbalance a truly significant competing state
interest-that of avoiding the cost or inconvenience to the federal courts that would accompany
the application of a state procedural rule.
313. Id. at 390-91. Moreover, the strength of the interest is questionable. The principal advantage of
uniform practice rules is that it makes appellate supervision easier. The trial courts would be presumably
indifferent to whether they followed state rather than federal practice as long as it was clear which one
applied to any given issue. The bar would presumably benefit from conformity with state jurisdictional
practice, except in cases of interstate practices. The courts lived with diverse practice rules for almost 150
years under the Conformity Acts. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text; see also authorities cited
supra note 79 for contention that there is no uniformity in federal practice.
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would be undermined should be equally proscribed. Constitutional limits on the
jurisdictional reach of state rules provide more than sufficient protection against
"handcuffing" the federal courts with wildly excessive case loads. 314
2. Substantive Federal Justifications
Two other types of federal interests may, however, provide appropriate
authority for federal nonconformity: federal law outside of Article III, and
practices that implement the purpose of federal jurisdiction under Article III.
As Westen & Lehman have demonstrated, any time a federal interest outside
of Article III justifies the creation of federal common law, the Rules of Deci-
sion Act command is inapplicable.315 Indeed, in such cases state law will be
displaced in state as well as federal court.316 An extended consideration of
non-Article III common law is beyond the scope of this Article. It does not,
for the most part, affect court access. One non-Article III federal interest does,
however, provide a potential basis for the development of a federal court-access
rule: the federal interest in international relations. That interest has justified the
displacement of state substantive liability pursuant to the act-of-state doc-
trine.
317
The federal interest in international relations may also justify the creation
of a federal common law of jurisdiction or forum non conveniens in cases
where the jurisdictional choice is affected by the court's assessment of the
strength of a foreign sovereign's interest in the underlying controversy.31
Questions about international comity are, in effect, questions of foreign affairs
that should be subject to a uniform, federal policy. The state of New York
should not be the arbiter of whether a foreign government would or would not
be offended by assertion of jurisdiction by New York courts. As the Supreme
Court stated in U.S. v. Belmont, "in respect of our foreign relations generally,
state lines disappear. As to such purposes the state of New York does not
exist. 319
314. But see Redish & Phillips, supra note 13, at 393. Redish & Phillips explain that the justification
for deviation from state practice on the basis of expense is derived from the federalism principle that "one
sovereign in enforcing rights created by another need not follow rules that would unduly burden the
performance of its essential functions." Id. It would be hard to imagine that level of impact created by the
jurisdictional conformity advocated herein.
315. See Westen & Lehman, supra note 25, at 370.
316. Cf. Friendly, supra note 29. But see Field, supra note 15, at 964 (citing Henry v. Mississippi, 379
U.S. 443 (1965), as example of federal common law displacing state law only in federal court).
317. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423-24 (1964).
318. See Exxon Corp. v. Chick Kam Choo, 817 F.2d 307, 317 (5th Cir. 1987), rev'd on other grounds,
486 U.S. 140 (1988) ("[Als in other areas of federal preemption, state law is preempted by maritime law
if it affects international or interstate relations."). For a detailed critique of the court of appeals' preemption
analysis, see Robertson & Speck, supra note 191, at 958-74. Specifically in reference to the foreign affairs
justifications, Robertson & Speck note the existence of other doctrines that protect that interest where
appropriate, and express skepticism about whether foreign affairs are ever truly implicated by private-party
adjudication.
319. 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937).
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The foreign relations power probably does not justify the wholesale federal-
ization of all international forum non conveniens law. Where the jurisdictional
decision turns on issues such as the location of proof and the convenience of
the parties, there is little need for a uniform federal approach. Federal displace-
ment of state law is appropriate only in cases where the court-access issue turns
on the question of the appropriate allocation of judicial authority between the
forum and a foreign government.3c
3. Jurisdictional Interests
The more problematic issue is determining when the displacement is
authorized by federal jurisdiction alone. If there were no differences between
state and federal courts, creation of the federal courts would have been a waste-
ful gesture. Accordingly, it is appropriate for a federal court to develop an
independent practice when that practice would advance the purposes underlying
the existence of federal jurisdiction.
a. Diversity Justifications
In diversity, this would authorize federal disregard of state bias favoring
its own citizens as it is reflected in state law. In the court-access context, that
means that state court-access rules that discriminate against nonresidents need
not be respected by the federal courts.321 Two forms of bias are relevant. The
"strong" form is when a state practice bestows an advantage on the local party
at the expense of the out-of-state party in the same lawsuit. That type of bias
would seem to be at the core of the rationale for diversity jurisdiction.
The closest any court-access practice comes to creating such an illegitimate
preference occurs when the local party's choice of forum is entitled to greater
320. A good example is provided by the "British pill" litigation. See generally Stein, supra note 1,
at 837-40. In that litigation, a large number of individual personal injury cases were brought by British
residents against various American oral contraceptive manufacturers in numerous state and federal courts
throughout the country. The plaintiffs alleged injury from the omission of package warnings that were
included in the U.S. labeling. A number of state and federal courts held that, as a matter of comity, it would
be inappropriate for U.S. courts to prescribe labeling requirements for pharmaceuticals distributed in the
United Kingdom, particularly in view of the fact that the British government already pervasively regulated
that activity. See Harrison v. Wyeth Laboratories, 510 F. Supp. 1, 4 (E.D. Pa. 1980), aff'd mem., 676 F.2d
685 (3d Cir. 1982); Purser v. American Home Prods. Corp., No. 80 Civ. 710 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 1981). The
New York State Appellate Division, while ultimately dismissing the actions filed there, expressly noted that
the federal adjudication was "not in any way critical to our decision." Bewers v. American Home Prods.
Corp., 99 A.D.2d 949, 950, 472 N.Y.S.2d 637, 639, aft'd, 64 N.Y.2d 630, 474 N.E.2d 247, 485 N.Y.S.2d
39 (1984). In those circumstances, the federal adjudication should have been dispositive. Where the federal
courts found the existence of a paramount British interest in the litigation, the state should not have been
allowed to deviate from that judgment.
321. The question of the constitutionality of such discrimination by the state courts themselves is
beyond the scope of this Article. A pertinent distinction may well be found in the funding of the state versus
the federal courts: as the forum resident contributes disproportionately to funding of the state, but not federal,
courts, she may well be entitled to preferential access to her own state courts.
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respect than the out-of-state party's choice. As discussed above, however, state
rules that operate to the disadvantage of out-of-state litigants may in fact be
the consequence of a citizenship-neutral state preference, such as "plaintiffs
should always be entitled to sue at home." Federal nonconformity might
nevertheless be justified on the basis of the appearance of bias, given the
difficulty of distinguishing naked home-court preferences from citizenship-
neutral judgments that have the effect of disadvantaging the outsider.
State rules operating to the disadvantage of the local litigant should general-
ly be enforced by the federal courts. For instance, there is no federal diversity
interest in disregarding a state rule precluding dismissal of suits brought against
local defendants.
A "weak" form of interstate bias is reflected in state rules that operate to
the relative disadvantage of a party as compared to similarly situated litigants
in other lawsuits, i.e., rules that favor domestic plaintiffs over out-of-state plain-
tiffs, or domestic defendants over out-of-state defendants.3" An example
might be a long-arm statute that asserts jurisdiction over out-of-state claims
only for the benefit of resident plaintiffs.31 If such a limitation is in fact the
product of a naked preference, the "victim" is not the defendant, who would
certainly not benefit if the statute subjected other defendants to greater jurisdic-
tion, but rather other similarly situated, nonresident plaintiffs.
Such bias does not directly implicate the core federal interest in diversity
jurisdiction, which by its very terms focuses on the relationship between
plaintiffs and defendants. This weaker form of discrimination may, however,
justify some nonconformity. While the state may be justified in favoring its own
taxpayers in the allocation of state resources,3s the federal courts have a
broader constituency. There is a legitimate federal interest in allocating federal
resources without regard to state citizenship. This weaker form of interest
should not justify the disregard of state access rules where state policy would
thereby be undermined, however.31
b. Federal Question Justifications
The congressional mandate to respect state law in the Rules of Decision Act
does not differentiate on its face between diversity and federal question jurisdic-
tion. That undifferentiated deference is appropriate only to the extent that
federal nonconformity in federal question cases can as effectively undermine
state regulatory preferences as nonconformity in diversity cases.
322. See Redish & Phillips, supra note 13, at 376 (class-based inequality should not be Erie problem.)
323. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 617.3 (West Supp. 1990) (limiting long-arm jurisdiction against
foreign corporation to use by Iowa plaintiffs).
324. See supra note 208.
325. But see Redish & Phillips, supra note 13, at 392 & n.190 ("fI]f a state did devise procedural rules
that varied depending on whether the litigant was in-state or not, there would be a powerful justification,
based on the purposes of the diversity jurisdiction ... for declining to follow the state rule.").
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It is clear that the calculus of state and federal interests is quite different
in federal question cases. Several examples illustrate the point. Open-door rules
designed to ensure application of the forum law are unaffected by federal
nonconformity since the same federal law will apply in every federal forum.
Closed-door rules designed to encourage out-of-state corporations to register
with the forum state are largely unaffected by providing unregistered corpora-
tions with a federal forum to vindicate their federal claims since those parties
will still be sufficiently disabled from vindicating their nonfederal rights to give
them an adequate incentive to register. State preferences for plaintiffs over
defendants would seem to be irrelevant to plaintiffs asserting federal rights.
Other state interests remain affected. A state regulatory interest in subjecting
a local defendant to the judgment of the community seems as relevant in federal
question as in diversity cases. State distrust of choice of forum clauses would
seem as pertinent to antitrust claims as breach of contract claims.
Obviously, the other major difference in federal question cases is the
heightened federal interest in vindicating the underlying claim. The federal court
has a jurisdictional justification for nonconformity with any state practice that
unduly burdens the assertion of federal rights; M the availability of a forum
with special sensitivity to federal rights is the central reason for federal question
jurisdiction.3 27 Thus, an independent federal practice may be justified even
when the underlying state policy might be affected by federal nonconformity.
For instance, a federal court might legitimately assert federal question
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant even though the state may have a
legitimate interest in insulating a defendant from jurisdictional exposure for out-
of-state acts. The federal decision is inevitably a balancing process, in which
conformity will turn on the degree to which the federal right has been burdened
by the state procedure as against the strength of the state's interest in maintain-
ing federal conformity.
It is noteworthy in this regard that a proposed amendment to Rule 4 would
not require conformity to state long-arm process in federal question cases in
which the defendant is not subject to general jurisdiction in any state, as well
as authorize service of process to the limits of the Constitution or other federal
law in such cases.31
In cases of exclusive federal jurisdiction, the obligation to respect state
preferences should be minimal.329 The state has already been divested of the
326. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947) (requiring state court to exercise jurisdiction over federal
claim); Burbank, supra note 50, at 704 (where federal rights would be jeopardized, no need to apply state
statute of limitations to federal claim pursuant to Rules of Decision Act). A similar formulation is already
used in analyzing whether state courts must follow federal procedures in vindicating federal rights pursuant
to the "reverse Erie" doctrine. See Dice v. Akron, C. & Y.R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952) (requiring Ohio to
provide jury trial for federal claim); cf. Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965) (establishing federal
standards for waiver of evidentiary objections).
327. Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 157, 157-59 (1953).
328. PROPOSED AMENDMENT, supra note 45, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2), at 23.
329. See Westen & Lehman, supra note 25, at 378-81.
1991] 2005
The Yale Law Journal
ability to advance any procedural or substantive policy by the creation of
exclusive federal jurisdiction.330 In terms of the balancing process described
above, it could be said that exclusive federal jurisdiction represents a congres-
sional thumb on the federal side of the scale. It can be assumed that Congress
did not want to subject the resolution of the federal right to the vagaries of state
procedures.
CONCLUSION
The confusion courts and commentators have faced in resolving the Erie
implications of state rules regulating court access are attributable to two mis-
takes: a misunderstanding of the centrality of federalism to the Rules of Deci-
sion Act, and a misunderstanding of the nature of court-access rules.
In treating Erie problems as questions of maintaining litigant equality, the
courts have obscured the more meaningful issue of determining whether litigant
inequalities are appropriate. Federalism theory provides a useful method for
determining when federal deviation from state practice is justified. The results
of that methodology directly advance the purposes underlying the congressional
directive to apply state law in the Rules of Decision Act-the avoidance of
unnecessary friction with state regulatory prerogatives.
Once Erie problems are recast as attempts to discern the impact of federal
practice on state regulatory policies, it becomes clear that the substance-proce-
dure distinction traditionally employed in this context fails to identify accurately
which laws require federal conformity. Court-access rules in particular have
traditionally been resolved on the erroneous basis that they constitute procedural
matters outside of the Erie mandate.
Court-access rules may represent precisely the type of state regulatory
preferences deserving of federal respect. Some federal deviation from state
access rules may be appropriate in given cases, either because the state policies
are not affected by federal practice or because there is a paramount federal
interest in providing different access. However, a more sophisticated analysis
than has been employed in the past is required to differentiate between the
varieties of court-access rules and their different implications for the federal
system.
330. Note that the same result is reached through an "equality" approach since there is no difference
between the rights asserted in the state and federal courts.
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